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This thesis analyzes Italian regionalism in a historical context. The evolution 
of regionalism as a result of the failure of national integration in Italy will be 
discussed in different time spans that are deemed critical in Italian political 
life. The thesis will elaborate on the historical and structural factors such as 
the localist culture, the presence of the Church, the North-South divide that 
acted as an obstacle on the way to a successful national integration. Finally, 
the interplay of these forces during the unification, the fascist and post-fascist 
periods will be analyzed with regard to the national integration process. The 
thesis will aim to address the following questions: (1) Given that neo­
regionalism in Italy is not a new phenomena, what are the reasons or the 
structural factors that had caused the persistence of regionalism in Italy 
despite the attempts to create a unified country? (2) How did the Italian state 
try to make the Italians? What kind of integration model was used to provide 
the integration and to what extent was it able to overcome the duality 
between the North and the South? (3) What is the nature of the neo­
regionalism in Italy, is it a result of the failure of 'making Italians?' and to 
what extent does it pose a threat to the national unity of the country? It is 
concluded that the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy can not be explained only 
by the old and more recent theories on regionalism without taking into 
consideration the sui generis historical background of the problem of 
regionalism in that country.
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ÖZET
ULUSAL ENTEGRASYONUN İFLASI OLARAK 
BÖLGESELCİLİK 
İTALYA ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA
Aylin Avcı (Güney)
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi; Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
Aralık 1998
Bu çalışma, İtalyan bölgeselciliğini tarihsel bir çerçeve içinde 
incelemiştir. Bölgeselciliğin gelişimi, İtalyan ulusal entegrasyonunun 
iflasının bir sonucu olarak, İtalya tarihinde önemli görülen zaman 
dilimlerinde ele alınmıştır. Çalışma, öncelikle başarılı bir ulusal 
entegrasyona engel teşkil eden unsurlar olarak yerel kültürü. Kilisenin 
varlığını, Kuzey-Güney farklılığını vurgulamış, daha sonra, bu 
faktörlerin İtalyan Birliği, Faşist, Faşist dönem sonrası zaman 
dilimlerindeki etkileşimlerini incelemiştir. Çalışma başlıca şu soruları 
yanıtlamaya çalışmıştır; (1) İtalya’daki yeni-bölgeselciliğin yeni bir 
oluşum olmadığı göz önüne alınırsa, ulusal birliği sağlama çabalarına 
karşın bu ülkedeki bölgeselciliğin süregelmesinin sebepleri ve bunda 
etkili olan yapısal faktörler nelerdir? (2) İtalyan devleti ne şekilde bir 
İtalyan milleti yaratmaya çalışmıştır? Bu amaç doğrultusunda ne gibi 
bütünleşme modelleri uygulanmıştır ve bu çabalar Kuzey-Güney 
farklılığının ne derece üstesinden gelebilmiştir? (3) İtalya’daki yeni- 
bölgeselciliğin karakteri nedir? Bu bir İtalyan milleti oluşturma çabasının 
başarısızlığının bir sonucu mudur ve ülkenin bütünlüğünü ne derece 
tehlikeye sokmaktadır? Çalışmanın sonunda, İtalya’da ortaya çıkan yeni 
bölgeselciliğin literatürdeki eski ve yeni bölgeselcilik paradigmalarıyla 
açıklanamayacağı, ve bu sorunun ancak İtalya’ya özgü bir takım tarihsel 
ve yapısal faktörlerin yardımıyla açıklanabileceği sönucuna varılmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Bölgeselcilik, 
Bölgeselcilik, Federalizm
Ulusal Entegrasyon, Yeni-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study is a result of three-years of research and writing. It was a 
strenuous work, but at the same time, it was a project that thought me a lot on 
the way. I met very helpful and precious people during the course of these 
three years who 'put some salt in this soup'. I am indebted to the Cultural 
Affairs Division of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which granted me a 
scholarship to accomplish the research of the study in Italy. Without their 
support it would be impossible to work on this topic and complete my 
dissertation. Particular thanks to the librarians of the Bologna Center of the 
Johns Hopkins University, especially to Gail. It was much easier to study 
after seeing her smiling face every morning. I am also grateful to Professor 
Luciano Vandelli at the University of Bologna who opened his personal 
library and archives for my research and provided me with the valuable 
support and encouragement.
Many thanks to the Committee members. Prof. Ergun Özbudun, 
Assoc. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss, and Asst. Prof. Lauren Me Laren, in particular to 
Assoc. Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, my supervisor, for her patience and 
valuable comments. I would also like to thank Ümit Cizre-Sakallioglu for the 
time she devoted for reading the earlier versions of some chapters. The 
English of the study was improved by Shannonine Caruana, who was so
VI
patient and caring throughout the bad and good moments I had throughout 
these years. Other friends who supported and gave encouragement were 
Menderes Çinar, and in particular Filiz Başkan, who gave me the biggest 
stimulus by letting me hear her voice every morning during these years. I 
also want to thank our Department Secretary, Güvenay Kazanci who never 
said 'no!' to my unending demands and questions during the printing of the 
study. Special thanks to Paolo Ongania who, during his monthly visits to 
Turkey provided me with major newspapers, updated my data on daily 
politics in Italy and enchanted me through his support and interest in the 
topic.
I would like to thank particularly my supervisor and my Professor 
Metin Heper, whose patience, deep encouragement, valuable comments and 
great help enabled me to complete the work.
Thanks to my parents, my grandmother and in particular to my 
brother, Ali. Finally and certainly the most, I would like to thank my husband 
and my best friend. Korkut, for the embracing love and patience that 
motivated me throughout the work.
Vll
To my Beloved Grandparents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
ÖZET
ACKNOWLEGMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION
The Aim of the Study
Theories of Regionalism_
The Old Paradigms of Regionalism_ 
Theories of Integration_____
Modernization Theories
Stein Rokkan's Center-Periphery Model 
Lipset and Rokkan Model ____________
Ronan Paddison Model_
Anthony Birch Model__
Theories of Fragmentation___
Michael Hechter's Model of Internal 
Colonialism
T.R. Gurr's "Relative Deprivation" Model_
IV
V
vi
viii
1
1
5
5
5
6 
9
15
16 
17 
20
21
22
vin
A Note on the Methodological Approach__
Terminological Qarification______________
The New Paradigms of Regionalism_
Italian Regionalism in Context_ 
Plan of Study________________
35
37
41
43
23
CHAPTER TWO : THE HERHAGE OF HALY BEFORE
UNIFICATION
A Brief Note on the Territory and People of Italy________
The Historical Roots of Localism and Microregionalism in Italy_
The Cities, Communes and Regional States__________________
The City-States______________________________________
Communes
Regional States and Gian Galeazzo of Milan_ 
The Impact of the Church ______________________
North-South Duality: The "Two Italies'
Historical Reasons
Economic Reasons
49
51
53
55
56 
64 
71 
75 
87 
87 
95
CHAPTER THREE: THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN 
NATIONALISM IN HALY
The Napoleonic Prelude to Unification (1789-1848): 
The Rise of Nationalist Tendencies
98
99
IX
Some Conclusions about the Impact of the Napoleonic 
Period upon Nationalism in Italy___________________ 109
Ideological Precursors of the Risorgimento 
Unitarianism of Giuseppe Mazzini_______
French Jacobin Influence on Mazzini_
Saint-Simonianism of Mazzini in the 
'Making of the Italian People'______
Mazzini against Class Divisions and Conflicts
Breaking away from the French Revolutionary Ideas 
Federalism of Carlo Cattaneo
Federalism of Vincenzo Gioberti
The Risorgimento Period (1860-1914) - "Making Italy" 
Political Integration in "Making Italy"________
Trasformismo and the Incomplete Political Integration
The Birth of Mafia as a Symptom of Failed Political 
Integration ____________________________________
Economic and Social Integration_ 
Cultural Integration___________
Some Concluding Remarks
112
113
113
115
118
120
123
125
128
130
132
137
138 
143 
145
CHAPTER FOUR: NATIONAL INTEGRATION DURING THE
FASCIST INTERLUDE (1922-1943) 147
The Causes of the Rise of Fascism in Italy in Risorgimento
Historiography________________________________________________  147
Crocean Account of Risorgimento
Gramscian Account of Risorgimento_ 
The Causes of the Rises of Fascism
The Legitimacy Crisis of the Italian State_
National Frustration in the International Arena
Economic Crisis and Social Unrest
The Impact of the First World War
Nationalism and Regionalism in Fascist Ideology_
Fascist Policies in Attempting to "Make Italians"_
Consequences of the Fascist Regime____________
148
149 
151 
151
155
156 
158 
162 
171 
179
CHAPTER FIVE : REGIONALISM AND REGIONALKATION IN
ITALY IN THE POST-FASCIST PERIOD
The Resistance Movement as a Fragmentary Force Between 
the North and the South ______________
The Italian State's Policies for National Integration in the 
Post-Fascist Period _____
The First Wave of Administrative Integration : 
The 1948 Constitution
The Second Wave of Administrative Integration : 
The 1970 Regionalization__________________ _
The "Southern Problem" and State Policies for Economic 
and Social Integration ______________________________
The Impact of European Integration upon National 
Integration in Italy _____________________________
182
182
187
188 
195
200
205
XI
The Obstacles to the Implementation of Regional Policies
of the EU in Italy 212
Center-Region Cleavage 212
Institutional Weaknesses of the Regional 
Governments in the South 216
Cultural Reasons 220
Political Reasons 224
Failure of National Integration? 226
CHAPTER SIX NEO-REGIONALISM AND NATIONAL 
FRAGMENTATION IN ITALY IN THE 1990s
The Domestic and International Factors Lying Behind 
the Emergence of the "Northern Question"__________
The Collapse of Communism and the End of the Cold War_
The European Integration and "Europe of Regions"_______
Electoral Reforms through Electoral Referendums________
The Crisis of Legitimacy _____________________________
The Erosion and Decline of the Traditional Affiliations_
The Changing Economic Conditions in the North_____
Definition and Evolution of the Lega Nord_________________
The Ideology of the Lega Nord________________ _
The components of the Lega Nord's Ideology, 
Neo-federalism
231
232
233
234
235
241
242 
244 
247 
255 
257 
257
Xll
Anti-Southern Stance
Criticisms and Fragmentation within the Lega Nord 
Other Federalist Proposals______________________________
Gianfranco Miglio's Federalism
Giovanni Agnelli Foundation's "Twelve-Region" Proposal 
An Assessment of Neo-Regionalism in Italy in the 1990s_________
259
262
265
265
267
268
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDICES
A.
B.
C.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Lega Nord's Proposal of Federalism in Italy_ 
A Two Way division of İtalya______________
Certain Social Characteristics of Sections of Italy Shortly 
After National Unification
D. Regions of Italy_
E. Italy, Productivity Levels, By Region_
Italy, Distribution of RTD Factors by Region_
Distribution of Employment Intensity in High 
Technology Industries : Mezzogiorno and Remainder 
of Italy__________________________________________
Industrial Performance in the Italian Regions ,1978-1985 
and The Civic Community in the Italian Regions_____
Northern and Southern Satisfaction with National, 
Regional and Local Government (1988)______________
271
284
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
Xlll
J. Public Satisfaction with Northern and Southern 
Regional Governments, 1977-1988 323
K. The "Three Italies" of Arnaldo Bagnasco 324
L. The Symbol of the Lega Nord 325
M. Manifesto 326
N. The Caricature in Corriere Della Sera 327
O. The Caricatures in Corriere Della Sera and 
La Repubblica 328
P. The Fantasy Map 329
R. The Fantasy Map 330
S. The Financial Self - Sufficiency of the Regions 
According to Giovanni Agnelli Foundation 331
T. "Twelve Region" Proposal of the Giovanni Agnelli 
Foundation 332
XIV
MAP OF ITALY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Aim of the Study
The rebirth of territorial politics^ in Italy along with the rise of a regionally- 
based political party in the 1990s has given a new vigor to the debate on 
regionalism and national integrity in that country^. In many respects, it has 
been surprising for many students of Italian politics that in a country that was 
united comparatively recently, political tensions based on territorial conflict 
between the North and the South have erupted so early and intensely, and 
that regionally-based parties demanding secessionism have come to play an 
important role in Italian politics. So far, with the exception of some
1 This new concept of "territorial politics" was defined by Bulpitt as: "that 
arena of political activity concerned with the relations between central 
political organizations and goverrunental bodies outside the central 
institutional complex but within the accepted boundaries of the state, which 
possess, or are commonly perceived to possess, a significant geographical or 
local/regional character." See J. G. Bulpitt, Territory and Power in tJie United 
Kingdom (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), chapters 1 and 2.
2 The best example of this was revealed by scholars such as Gian Enrico 
Rusconi, Se Cessiamo di Essere una Nazione: Tra etnodemocrazia regionali e 
cittadinanza europea [If we are ceding to be a nation: Between regional 
ethnodemocracy and European citizenship], (Bologna: П Mulino, 1993); 
Giorgio Восса, La disunita d'ltalia [The Non-unity of Italy], (Milan: Garzanti, 
1991); Ernesto Galli della Loggia, La Morte della Patria. La Crisi delVldea di 
nazione tra Resistenza, antifascismo e Repubblica. [The Death of The Nation. The 
Crisis of The Idea of Nation between Resistance, Antifascism and The 
Republic], (Bari: Laterza, 1998); Mark Gilbert, The Italian Revolution. The End o f 
Politics, Italian Style? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995).
insignificant parts of the periphery, there have been few influential parties or 
movements with territorial demands of autonomy or more decentralization, 
let alone regionally based parties promoting the break-up of the Italian state.
With the crisis of the state (crisi dello stato) that was characterized by the 
breakdown of the national party system and the disappearance of the two 
powerful center parties of the Cold War years, the Italian Communist Party- 
Partita Comunista Italiana (PCI) and the Christian Democratic Party-Democrazia 
Christiana (DC), there was an increase in the votes of the parties defending 
regional and territorial interests. Particularly important here is one 
regionally-based party, the Northern League -Lega Nord-  ^ led by Umberto 
Bossi. For the first time in Italian politics, in the 1992 general elections, this 
political party defended the view that the present political system in Italy is 
no longer capable of functioning: Northern Italy, economically the locomotive 
of Italy, has been discriminated against by the state in Rome; Southern Italy 
does not function as efficiently and productively as the North and lives on the 
resources chaimeled from the North to the South. The solution to this 
problem according to the Lega Nord is the division of Italy into three macro
 ^ The Northern League will be referred to as Lega Nord throughout this 
study.
regions, the adoption of a federal system, instead of the present unitary one 
and the independence of the North within this scheme.^
The bottomline of the argument of the L·ga Nord had been its somehow covert 
reaction, in fact, rebellion, towards southern Italy, which has been culturally, 
economically and socially more backward than the North. This party's rise to 
power in a coalition government after the 1992 general elections, gave rise to 
an intense debate in Italy as to whether there was now a replacement of the 
'Southern question' by a 'Northern question' that poses a serious threat to the 
national political unity and whether a reform of the state (riforma dello stato) 
could overcome the evolving crisis of the nation-state in Italy.
Here it is important to note that even though the Northern question was 
brought into the forefront with the rise of Lega Nord, regionalism is not a 
new phenomenon in Italian politics and that one can not attribute it to only 
the rise of the Lega Nord. For a long time, the North-South divide^ and 
duality has had historical, cultural, sociological and economical roots, and it 
has always played an important role at different periods of the Italian history. 
However, the recent studies, while attempting to explain the rise of the Lega 
Nord, have paid attention neither to the historical roots of this problem, 
which harks so far back to the period of the Roman Empire and the pre-
For the map of the Lega Nord's proposal, see Appendix A.
 ^For the classical division between the North and South of Italy, that will be 
referred throughout the thesis, see Appendix B.
unification period, nor to the recent developments that have taken place in 
Italy. Rather, the rise of regionalism in Italy characterized mainly by the rise 
of Lega Nord has tried to be explained by earlier and more recent theories on 
regionalism.
The earlier theories of regionalism mainly focused on the integration aspect 
of the nation-building process. Only a few paid attention to such factors as 
ethnicity, economic deprivation and internal colonialism. The focus of these 
theories was the peripheral, underdeveloped regions and as such, they failed 
to account for the regionalist movements in the developed regions of the 
nation-states. The more recent theories of regionalism link its rise to the crisis 
of the nation-state, that is, the pressures which are posed by globalism and 
the overloaded nature of the modern nation-state. These theories generally 
take issue with the centralized structure of the nation-state and as such, they 
are considered as post-modernist. These theories explain the present causes of 
the rise of regionalism but give short shrift to its historical roots.
Although it is important to utilize both sets of theories to come to grips with 
the general nature of regionalism in the Italian case, it is still not sufficient. 
The Italian case can not be explained by either sets of theories without taking 
into account such structural factors peculiar to Italy as the Napoleonic 
heritage, the persistence of the local cultures and the lack of a national 
feeling, the North-South divide and the presence of the Church which makes
Italy a sui generis case. These factors are not dealt with in either sets of 
theories. This study, with a focus on these factors, aims to explain the Italian 
case as one that is a consequence of a failed national integration or the failure 
of the unitary system of government. However, first it is necessary to discuss 
the earlier and more recent theories of regionalism.
Theories of Regionalism
The O ld Paradigm s o f  R egionalism  
1. Theories of Integration
Since the French Revolution in 1789 the nation-state has been considered the 
most important unit through which the interests of nations are being 
articulated. Since the emergence of the modern nationalist movements during 
the fifteenth century, the "nation" has acquired a mythical value. Whereas 
Europeans' primary identity used to derive from membership in a feudal 
fiefdom or in the universalist Roman Catholic Church, the "nation" became 
the object of faith and emotional appeal. Like the Church, it was regarded as 
eternal and transcendental.^ Nation-building was mostly regarded as the task 
of the modern state involving a form of government that brought about the 
consolidation of territory in Western Europe.^ This process was often
 ^ Charles F. Andrain and David E. Apter, Political Protest and Social Change. 
Analyzing Politics (London and New York: University Press, 1995), 94.
 ^Ronan Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography o f Power (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 57. On the formation of the modern state, see 
also Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins o f the Modem State (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), Gianfranco Poggi, The Development o f the
referred to as national integration. However, the most important problem 
concerning the processes of national integration was that the territories of a 
'nation-state' often did not correspond to only one nation exclusively. To this 
date, even though most present nation-states are not composed of exclusively 
one nation, nevertheless nation-statism has been a commonly sought goal. 
The state, through social engineering and political mobilization aims to 
"standardize" the population to the point where it is sufficiently assimilated 
to be described as a nation-state.® Thus regionalism has been a concept with 
negative connotations; it aimed at the recognition of a separate identity and 
alternative administration to the nation-state. Regionalism was regarded as a 
fragmentary force upon the state. As the main issue was to attain a nation­
state, regionalism was something that could not be tolerated by states.
Modernization Theories
Especially, with the rise of the modernization school during the 1960s, the 
nation-state gained an even more important role. Karl Deutsch wrote: 
"Nation-preserving, nation-building and nationalism...these still remain a 
major and even a still growing force in politics which statesmen of good will 
would ignore at their peril."^ It was followed by works of Reinhard Bendix
Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1978), Charles Tilly (ed.). The Formation o f National States in 
Western Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975).
® Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography o f Power, 61.
on nation-building^* ,^ Leonard Binder on national integration and political 
developmental, and Rupert Emerson on nationalism and political 
developmenb^. The literature on nationalism usually interpreted 
development as an incremental or anachronous process of change and 
growth. According to these views, nationalism provided an ideological 
impetus for all sorts of development-political, economic, social, cultural and 
psychological. Thus the basic assumption of these studies was the following: 
the stronger the nationalism, the greater the probability that new demands 
and actions will arise for involvement in national life; these demands and 
actions may lead to change and development.
The process of national integration, through which identities and loyalties 
become transferred from a pre-existing group such as the tribe or smaller 
ethnic division to a larger and culturally different entity is often associated 
with the more all-encompassing set of social processes known as
 ^ Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the 
Foundation o f Nationality. (New York: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and John Wiley and Sons, 1953.), 4.
Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies o f Our Changing 
Social Order, (New York: Doubleday, 1969).
Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LVIII, September 1964, 622-631.
Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," Journal o f 
Politics, Vol. XXn, February 1960,137-149.
"modernization". Modernization is associated with industrialization, 
urbanization, migration, increasing levels of literacy, and communications, 
and the emergence of new modes of social interaction. With the consequent 
loosening of ties with the smaller social units, the vacuum was to be filled by 
the development of ties with a larger and different group that is the nation.^^
The basic building blocks of the modernization perspective are parallel to 
tradition-modernity ideal types of social organization and value systems. 
These have been borrowed from nineteenth century sociology. The traditional 
society is variously understood as having a predominance of ascriptive, 
particularistic, diffuse and affective patterns of action, an extended kinship 
structure with a multiplicity of functions, little spatial and social mobility, a 
deferential stratification system in mostly primary economic activities, a 
tendency towards autarchy of social units, an undifferentiated political 
structure, with traditionalist elitist and hierarchical sources of authority. By 
contrast, the modern society is characterized by a predominance of 
achievement; universalistic, specific and neutral orientations and patterns of
For a detailed overview of the literature on nationalism and modernization 
see Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories o f Comparative Politics: The Search for a 
Paradigm (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).
My emphasis. Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography o f 
Power, 63-64. The main proponents of nationalism in the modernization 
discourse are Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1983); Eric J. 
Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread o f Nationalism. 
(London: Verso, 1983).
action; a nuclear family structure serving limited functions; a complex and 
highly differentiated occupational system; high rates of spatial and social 
mobility; a predominance of secondary economic activities and production 
for exchange; the institutionalization of change and self-sustained growth; 
highly differentiated political structures with legal rational sources of 
authority and so on.^ ^
Stein Rokkan's Center-Periphery Model
One of the most important models for explaining the national integration 
process and the formation of national states in Western Europe has been the 
model developed by Stein Rokkan. Rokkan uses a paradigm of political 
integration within a center-periphery framework. He utilizes Talcott Parsons' 
typology^  ^of economic, religious, military and judicial factors as the channels 
linking the 'subject periphery' to the 'central establishment' The center was 
able to control its hinterland by virtue of its military superiority, which 
enabled it to extract necessary resources, and by a mix of the economic 
(trading), cultural-symbolic (religious) and legal links that brought the center 
and periphery into contact
See S. N. Eisenstadt "Modernization and Conditions of Sustained Growth," 
World Politics, 16, July 1964, 576-594. See also Samuel Eisenstadt, 
Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1965); Clifford Geertz, ed.. Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press, 
1963); Lucien Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1963).
Rokkan also referred to the Parsons-Hirschman model where the four time 
phases were located: two center-generated policies, the first military- 
economic, the second cultural; two phases of internal restructuring opening 
up opportunities for the periphery, the first symbolic-cultural, the second 
economic.^’' Phase I in this model was the state-building process and covered 
the period from the High Middle Ages to the French Revolution in Western 
Europe. This period was characterized by political, economic and cultural 
unification at the elite level during which a series of bargains were struck and 
a variety of cultural bonds were established across networks of local power- 
holders. In addition, a number of institutions were built up for the extraction 
of resources for common defense, for the maintenance of international order 
and the adjudication of disputes, for the protection of established rights and 
privileges and for the elementary infrastructure requirements of the economy 
and the polity.^*
Phase II brought in larger sectors of the masses into the system: the conscript 
armies, compulsory schools and emerging mass media. According to Rokkan, 
they all created channels for direct contact between the central elite and 
parochial populations of the peripheries and generated widespread feelings
Talcott Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Contemporary Perspectives, (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
Parsons-Hirshman model is cited in Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State 
Formation and Nation-building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on 
Variations within Europe," in Tilly, The Formation o f National State, 570.
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of identity with the total political system. Frequently, but not necessarily, 
they culminated in prolonged conflict with already established identities such 
as those built up through churches or sects or peripheral linguistic elites.^^
Phase III brought the subject masses into active participation in the workings 
of the territorial political system typically through the establishment of 
privileges of opposition, the extension of the electorates for organs of 
representation, the formation of organized parties for the mobilization of 
support and the articulation and aggregatioii of demands.^o
Finally, Phase IV represented the next series in the expansion of the 
administrative apparatus of the territorial state; the growth of agencies of 
redistribution, the building of public welfare services, the development of 
nationwide policies for the equalization of economic conditions, negatively 
through progressive taxation, positively through transfers from the better-off 
strata to the poorer, from the richer to the backward regions.^^
Rokkan argued that the analytical history of center formation and periphery 
incorporation in Western Europe must start out from six ^givens': fir^t, the
18 Ibid., 572.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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heritage of the Roman Empire, the supremacy of the Emperor, the 
systematization of legal rules, the idea of citizenship; second, the 
supraterritorial, cross-ethnic organizations of the Catholic Church and its 
central role in the channelling of elite communications during the millenium 
after the fall of Western Empire; third, the Germanic kingdoms and the 
traditions of legislative-judicial assemblies of free heads of families; fourth, 
the extraordinary revival of trade between the Orient, the Mediterranean, and 
the North Sea after the defeat of the Muslims and the consequent growth of a 
network of independent cities across Western Europe; fifth, the development 
and consolidation of feudal and manorial agrarian structures and the 
consequent concentrations of landholdings in important areas of the West; 
and finally, the emergence of literatures in vernacular languages and the 
gradual decline of the dominant medium of cross-ethnic communication, 
Latin, quite particularly after the invention of printing.
In different places, these 'givens' combined to produce a variety of strikingly 
different configurations during the crucial state-building period from around 
the eleventh to the eighteenth century.22 According to Rokkan, the most 
crucial factor in the European development was that the fragmented center 
belt was made up of territories at an advanced level of culture, 
technologically as well as organizationally characterized by, first, a well- 
developed agricultural economy, second, a remarkable network of highly
12
autonomous cities, institutionally distinct from the surrounding agricultural 
lands, third, the linking of the cities as well as the rural areas culturally 
through a common religion, and one dominant language, Latin; and fourth 
the transactions across these varied autonomous territories being regulated 
by the Roman law.^ These points will be elaborated in the next chapter, with 
specific reference to Italy.
For a long time, within the center-periphery model, the dominant theory of 
the formation and consolidation of states was the concept of "diffusionism". 
In essence, it holds that societies and states are formed around central points 
which assimilate the peripheries to their own values. Consequently, a 
common social, economic and political system emerges. The values are those 
of elites in politics, economics, education and other public spheres, which 
legitimate the distribution of roles and rewards in society. Rulers seek to 
extend the dominant value system throughout society. And, by bringing 
more of the population into contact with one another, the development of 
unified economic systems, political democracy, urbanization and education 
will create greater acceptance for it. The process may not be always smooth. 
Indeed, in the initial stages of contact, the contrast between peripheral and 
central values may be a source of conflict and even, in the case of territorial
22 Ibid., 575. 
 ^Ibid.
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peripheries, secession is possible. But, at least in territorially compact 
societies, integration is the norm.^^
The diffusionist model was criticized because of its deterministic approach. 
The main criticism was that the ideology of nationalism is not merely the 
product of cultural diffusion from the core and the assimilation of the 
peripheral territories into a common value system. The ideology of 
nationalism may be consciously used by political elites to create a common 
value system, using mechanisms of communication, education and 
administration. The political act of creating the state may come first and the 
sense of national identity would be created later by public policies and 
partisan activity. John Breuilly, for instance, has regarded nationalism as a 
special and successful form of modern politics to capture state power in 
opposition to ruling classes. In his view, nationalism serves as a vital political 
discourse able to mobilize different strata, uniting divergent social interests 
and legitimizing their political aspirations. In other words, nationalism is a 
form of politics, principally opposition politics.^  ^ He states that the roots of 
modern nationalism are to be found in the territorial and monarchical states 
of Western Europe in the early modern period. As these states extended their 
authority over their subjects and diminished that of other institutions, such as 
churches, estates and guilds, and as they came into increasing and more
Ibid.
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intensive conflict with one another, they took on the character of nation­
states, Thus opposition to increasingly powerful monarchical states in various 
forms laid the ground for nationalism.^^ Thus nation-building is an activity 
suiting the interests of key groups at various historical moments and it can 
not be seen apart from this essentially political function.
Lipset and Rokkan Model
Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, while using the center-periphery model, 
stated that the process of modernization might give rise to territorial and 
cultural conflicts that persist into industrial society. However they consider 
territorial resistance to incorporation as the result of an incomplete 
modernization and therefore the continuing isolation of the periphery from 
the center. Thus territorial politics may develop where there is a heavy 
concentration of a distinct culture in the periphery; where there are few ties of 
communication, alliance and bargaining experience toward the national 
center and more toward external centers of cultural and economic influence; 
and where there is minimal economic dependence on the metropolis. In other 
words, where the process of modernization has been incomplete and the 
periphery has remained isolated, a distinctive territorial politics may persist. 7^
^ John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 8.
26 Ibid., 75.
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Ronan Paddison Model
Ronan Paddison distinguishes three types of integrative factors, measuring 
cultural, economic and political variables in the process of national 
integration. The interplay of these factors are important in assessing 
especially the reasons for fragmentation in national states. The first, cultural 
integration, is deemed important by Paddison, since one of the tests of 
national integration is the extent to which a shared national identity is 
conrunonly subscribed. Thus culturally based differences that give rise to their 
own internal sets of loyalties are potentially divisive. Chief among these 
factors are those associated with religion or language or some other basis that 
helps support an ethnic group, membership of which gives the individual a 
value system that he will use to orientate himself to the wider national
society.28
The second integrative factor is economic integration. National economic 
integration is achieved once there are substantially comparable levels of 
social and economic development in all the regions of the state. According to 
Paddison, at one level, it assumes that as the developed economy brings in 
regional specialization, each region interacts with others and becomes 
increasingly interdependent with them. But it also assumes that each
Seymour M. Upset and Stein Rokkan, "Qeavage structures, party systems 
and voter alignments: an introduction," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 
S. M, Upset and S. Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 12.
Paddison, The Fragmented State, 69.
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individual region enjoys roughly similar benefits from membership of the 
national economy, measurably through indices as per capita income, the 
consumption of goods and services, mortality rates, the incidence of 
unemployment and the proportion to employment in 'declining industries'. 
Paddison adds that the implications of this have been linked to the 
development of nationalism.^^ The third, political integration is linked with 
the extent to which social class is the basis of political conflict.^° Even though 
other factors such as religion, ethnicity are cleavage-forming in a successful 
political integration, the distribution of wealth between classes is 
superceded.^^ Paddison also argues that the existence of regional political 
parties provides the most overt evidence of an unsuccessful national political 
integration. Such parties are by definition tied to a territory embracing only a 
part of the state, their objectives are usually to mobilize support across class 
lines and to win concessions, including autonomy or the right to secede, from 
the state.32
Anthony Birch Model
According to Birch, modern nations are an amalgam of historical 
communities which possessed a fairly clear sense of separate identity in the
29 Ibid., 70.
30 Ibid., 71.
3^  Ibid.
'2 Ibid., 74.
17
past but have been brought together by various economic, social and political 
developments. The process by which they are brought together is known as 
political integration.^ Thus the term refers to the process by which smaller 
communities are consolidated into territorially larger units of government. 
Loyalties to local political institutions typically become secondary to the 
allegiance and support enjoyed by the larger unit.^ When political 
integration takes place at the national level, it is described as national 
integration.^
Birch underlines two main phases in the process of national integration. The 
first phase is characterized by the attempt to reach the natural borders or 
physical boundaries that would provide the state with military defensibility 
and a sense of integrity and completeness.^^ It is usually called state-building 
or penetration, which involves military pacification of the territory and the 
build-up of a network of field administration services insuring that the center 
is able to meet the basic needs of government, for instance the establishment 
of law and order and means to collect taxes.^  ^ This phase can also be
^ Anthony H. Birch, Nationalism and National Integration (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), 8.
^ Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography o f Power, 58.
^ Birch, Nationalism and National Integration, 8.
36 Poggi, The Development o f the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, 90.
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characterized with the assertion of sovereignty, which in early modern 
Europe represented the rejection of the universal claims of the Catholic 
Church and the residue of the Holy Roman Empire and the claim that 
ultimate power resided within the boundaries of the state. After the French 
Revolution the process of destruction of particularistic institutions continued 
even more effectively by the republican and Napoleonic regimes.^»
The second phase is nation-building, during which the process of mass social 
fusion takes place, giving the political unit a common identity. This identity is 
"nationality",^^ by which a state would claim that populations currently 
subject of its own or a neighboring state were "nationally" the same as the 
claimants own population and hence should join the latter in a single system 
of rule.4° According to Rokkan's center-periphery model, this phase is 
associated with center-initiated policies aimed at cultural standardization, 
notably a common language and education system.^^
Paddison, The Fragmented State, 61-62. See also Birch, Nationalism and 
National Integration, 8.
33 Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New Politics o f Nationalism in 
Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 16.
39 Ibid., 63.
40 Poggi, The Development o f the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, 90.
Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of state-formation and nation-building: a 
possible paradigm for research on variations within Europe," in Tilly (ed.).
The Formation o f National States, 562-600.
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Birch enumerates the essential steps in this process as the creation of symbols 
of national identity (such as a head of state, a flag and a national anthem), the 
establishment of national political institutions that bring all the citizens under 
the same law, the creation of an educational system which gives children a 
sense of national identity, teaching them about their common history and 
inculcating patriotism, and the development of national pride.^  ^ the result 
of a successful national integration, "the citizens must feel that it is their 
government whom they are obeying, their country for which they are making 
sacrifices."^^
2. Theories of Fragmentation
The national integration process from time to time was reversed and, in fact, 
culminated in fragmentation. One of the biggest surprises of the 1960s and 
1970s were the revival of ethnic-regional-micronational consciousness within 
some of the oldest, and most advanced national societies. This situation ran 
contrary to the theories of the modernization school, which until then claimed 
that modernization would bring with itself national integration, and in turn, 
the cleavages between the constituent units of a nation-state would wither 
away. The rise of especially ethnic separatist movements within the
Birch, Nationalism and National Integration, 9-10.
Ibid., 8-9. Birch states that the main obstacle to the development of national 
integration is the existence of ethnic or cultural minorities within the state 
who resist integrative tendencies. The steps in integration of such minorities
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seemingly established nation-states in the 1970s proved this theory wrong. 
The re-emergence of regional nationalism not only upset many of the 
textbook theories of politics in western nations, but it also proved an 
uncomfortable experience for scholars who are brought up within 'national' 
traditions which took for granted the existing state order, and regarded 
regional nationalism either as a pathological condition, that is a malfunction 
of the modern state or as an archaic throwback, a temporary regression in 
political development.^^
Michael Hechter's Model of Internal Colonialism
The model of internal colonialism seeks to explain the causes of new regional 
nationalism in the early 1960s as a response to economic deprivation.^^ 
Hechter aims to explain resurgent minority nationalism by specifically 
arguing that this was a reactive mechanism to cultural and economic 
domination by a core group. The basic argument is that a cultural system of 
stratification overlies the more characteristic economic configuration of 
classes. Cultural domination arises, because in the process of modernization, 
certain areas and groups become more advanced and are able to use this to 
establish their economic and political superiority. Efforts by the core group to
is first, social mobilization, and second, official national language for 
instruction in schools. Ibid., 10.
Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism, 1-2.
Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).
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maintain their status will lead them to subordinate minority groups within a 
cultural division of labor. The outcome will be apparent not only in the 
overall economic structure of the peripheral ethnic areas but also, more 
specifically in the occupations of the minority group members as in their 
general wellbeing. In other words, the economic differences between center 
and periphery can be causally linked to the cultural differences between core 
and periphery groups.^^
T. R. Gurr's "Relative Deprivation" Model
T. R. Gurr has developed a general model of conflict in which he argues that 
right or wrong perceptions of relative deprivation leads to frustration, which 
in turn fuels discontent and results in violence in the peripheral areas. In 
some extreme cases it may even lead to secession of the "relatively deprived" 
part of the country. This is only likely where the feeling of relative 
deprivation is widely felt among a territorially distinct population. These 
territorial differences, combined with beliefs that central control has been 
relatively disadvantageous to the region's prosperity help explain national 
fragmentation in the forms of increased demands for autonomy
Most of the above-mentioned theories are based on the idea that groups in the 
periphery perceive themselves to be deprived, usually economically, but, in
Paddison, The Fragmented State, 82.
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some versions, culturally or politically, relative to those in the center. 
However, there is a poor relationship between relative economic deprivation 
and peripheral nationalism. Nor does a resurgence of territorial identity 
always coincide with a relative downturn in the regional economy. On the 
contrary, some regional movements have often been associated with a relative 
economic improvement. The best examples here are the cases of Catalonia or 
the Basque region and also the Northern League movement in Italy, where 
regional nationalism has emerged in the economically advanced regions.
The New Paradigm s o f  R egionalism
In the 1990s tendencies towards fragmentation continued in various regions 
of Europe. Most interestingly, established nation-states faced difficulties vis- 
a-vis these fragmenting tendencies, such as the Scottish in Britain, Basque in 
Spain and the Lombards in Italy. However, with the end of the Cold War 
between the two blocs and the collapse of communism, the explanations for 
these new regional movements differed from the previous ones. Thus the 
1990s witnessed a neo-regionalist school which can be regarded as also being 
post-modernist Post-modern society, like all antithesis, brings to the 
extremes some of the trends of the preceding one, and in part, represents a 
reaction to it. Cultural pluralism, polycentrism, and localism belong to the 
post-modern view. It is also marked by the rejection of the value of 
uniformity, equality and homogeneity, which characterizes the modernist
41 T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
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thinking which is shaped by the requirements of the rule of law, of 
bureaucracy, and of mass production. Post-modernist thoughts defend the 
value of diversity and multiplicity.
Thus in the post-modernist and neo-regionalist perspective, unlike the old 
paradigms of regionalism that were regarded as having negative 
connotations, the term regionalism acquired positive connotations. As a neo- 
regionalist, Thomas Hueglin has pointed out there is considerable dissent as 
to whether regionalist movements are backward-oriented, traditional 
reactions against modernity and its defects. On the one hand, regionalism is 
described as the "resurgence of tribal sentiments" and as part of a "backlash" 
politics; on the other hand, it is identified as a leftist strategy linked to the 
new social movements and arising from peripheral forms of anticapitalist 
struggle.^® According to Hueglin the paradigmatic change on the left 
culminated in the rediscovery of province as a new basis of emancipation. 
Ever since the French Revolution, regionalism had been regarded as 
provincialism and as a feudal relic impeding the democratic goals of equality 
and participation. But when the demerits of the centralized bourgeois 
intervention and welfare state became more obvious, the political left, or
Thomas O. Hueglin, "Regionalism in Western Europe. Conceptual 
Problems of a New Political Perspective," Comparative Politics, 18, (July 1986), 
447.
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rather the non-Fabian faction rediscovered the province as a new basis of 
emancipation.^^
According to neo-regionalists, there are several reasons as to why regionalism 
had not been paid much attention to, but had rather developed as a 
subsidiary or side-topic. For instance, as Thomas Hueglin argues, "it is due to 
a centralist Weltanschauung and both political scientists and politicians have 
been slow to recognize it as a dominant trend. As a result they had failed to 
anticipate the impact of regional movements on politics in Western Europe.^° 
Perry Anderson provided a historical account of why the term "region" was 
so much neglected. As he explained, the term "region" was never central in 
the political vocabulary of the early modern state. There were several 
administrative terms to denote territorial subdivisions within the framework 
of absolutist or semi-constitutionalist rule. In common discourse, however, 
the word "province" was more or less universal usage. Even though this term 
was used in the interwar period, in the post-war world, it faded away, 
ceasing to form part of acceptable discourse. From the beginning, the term 
also had a secondary connotation which was related to its Roman origins: 
provinces existed not just as a division of a realm, but also in its opposition to 
its capital.51 Thus, in time, the usage of 'province' fell out of favor, as
«  Ibid., 448.
Ibid., 439-440. My emphasis.
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compromised by a pejorative cultural undertone, leaving the field free for 
'region' as a neutral term. However, when the term 'region' first acquired a 
political ring, in the late nineteenth century, there was also opposition against 
it. If 'regionalism' was accepted in the literature as a minor but harmless sub­
genre, regionalism in politics was condemned by most contemporaries as a 
regressive recalcitrance against the unity of the nation.^^
Another reason why region was not popular had to do with the ideological 
contradictions o f liberalism. As a doctrine of liberation, liberalism sets 
individuals free from the constraints of the traditional institutions and 
communities such as religion, ethnicity and region. This was not only wishful 
thinking but a blatant disregard of the contradictions on which liberal 
democracy and the welfare state were based. Postulating a general decline of 
the older group and conflict patterns in the age of consensus and affluence.
51 Perry Anderson, The Invention o f the Region 1945-1990. (Badia Fiesolana: 
European University Institute, 1994), 7. According to Anderson, "the source 
of this contrast was French. Pejorative reference to 'provincial' culture and 
manners can be found as early as Montaigne, and is a commonplace by the 
time of Madame de Sevigne. Bourbon centralization in the time of Louis XIV 
gave it virtually canonical force. From France, the associated meaning spread 
throughout Europe. By the early 18* century Samuel Johnson's dictionary in 
England treats 'provincial' as more or less a synonym of bucolic. By th? 19* 
century when the earlier antithesis between court and country-onto which the 
opposition between capital and provinces had been mapped- had ceased to 
be active, scorn for provincialism if anything intensified, becoming a 
standard topos of mid-century French literature- Gautier, Sand, Flaubert, in 
particular. It is thus clear enough why the term province should have lost 
credit in the polite vocabulary of politics, once universal suffrage became a 
20* century norm."
Ibid., 10.
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the proponents of liberalism overlooked the fact that it itself depended on 
stable patterns of local, ethnic, religious, or class relationships. As a result, 
regionalism was always regarded as a backward-oriented reaction against 
modernization and centralization and as a fragmenting force and a threat 
against the unity and integrity of the modern nation-state.
According to Anderson, there were three significant forces that contributed to 
the rise of the region as a point of political identification across Western 
Europe. The first of these was the uneven economic development of postwar 
capitalism. One came across the phenomenon of the 'depressed region' 
already in the inter-war period. But amidst the general hardships of the 
Slump and the War, it did not acquire prominence. During the post-war 
period, on the other hand, the fate of those areas which did not share in the 
median rise of the living standards within each nation, whether because they 
were zones of declining industry, or of uncompetitive agriculture, stood out 
as socially more combustible. Pressure for measures to redress the handicaps 
of relative disadvantage inevitably built up, giving a meaning to regions- 
economic interest supplying bonds even where prior cultural identity was 
weak.^
Hueglin, "Regionalism in Western Europe," 440. My emphasis. 
^ Anderson, The Invention o f the Region 1945-1990,10.
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A second force was quite different in its impact and even opposite in 
direction. At a somewhat later stage of development, modernization and 
concentration of the means of mass communication started to create 
conditions of hitherto unprecedented cultural homogeneity within each 
nation-state of Western Europe. Television notoriously played the prime role 
in this process. Predictably, centralization of this kind in due course 
provoked local reactions. Other things being equal, most people wanted both 
material conditions similar to and cultural distinctions setting them off from, 
those within existentially comparative range from themselves. Uneven 
economic development gave one impulse to regional identification, and too 
even cultural development gave another.^^
The most profound change has been the advent of the European Community 
(now the European Union) itself. The emergence of a supra-national 
administration, more distant from immediate experience than any previous 
public authority has put an understandable premium on sub-national 
administration, as a compensating mechanism. The European institutions, in 
particular the Commission and the Parliament have been trying to by-pass 
national authorities, in pursuit of closer union and they express their interest 
in promoting regional institutions as lower-level partners, as it is expressed 
clearly in their Charter of Regionalization.
Ibid., 10-11. My emphasis. This point was further elaborated by the writers 
on nationalism in the modernization discourse mentioned above.
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To these three factors, Anderson adds one alteration which is in line with 
Hueglin's. He states that until 1945, the dominant ideological value in every 
Western European society was the nation. That is, the supreme legitimating 
discourse of public action was advance or defense of national interest or 
identity. This held good for both liberal-democratic and fascist-authoritarian 
regimes. After 1945 this has changed. One reason was the mutual destruction 
brought by the Second World War itself that left every West European 
power, including the winners, destroyed. Ideally, democracy became the 
prime internal justification of the existing social order, counterposed to its 
dictatorial opposite in Eastern Europe. It was above all, this permutation 
which released dynamics of the region. It weakened the principal modern 
barrier to the growth of regional autonomy. In Western Europe territorial 
claims by one state against another effectively disappeared, neutralizing one 
factor that had often made local autonomy suspect to central authority. The 
nation was now at once secured as a space and relativized as a code, the 
region could stir more freely within it. This was a negative condition-lifting 
of the restraints.®^
On the other hand, the elevation of democracy into supreme legitimation of 
the social order offered a positive opening to regional affirmation. 
Parliamentary systems based on universal suffrage and civil rights afforded a
Ibid., 13.
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compelling model of self-government. The question that now arose was: why 
should representative institutions be confined to the national level, 
necessarily distant from local life? Could they not be extended to the 
'regional' level, so that they could 'fill ouT the bare structures of decision­
making at the center? Nothing inherent in the doctrines of liberal democracy 
appeared to rule out such a dédoublement. At worst, regional authorities might 
be supererogatory but they could not easily be viewed as incompatible with 
national assemblies.
Nevertheless, whatever the possible mediations between them, there had 
always been an undeniable tension between nation and region. Between 
democracy and region, by contrast, the relation might seem more like one of 
completion.®®In this way, the term region gained a positive connotation. What 
is very important regarding this new political perspective was the linkage 
between globalism and localism. According to this view, "the growth of 
globalism does not correlate with a corresponding decline of localism; on the 
contrary, many new forms of localism are cropping up. 'New localism' seems 
an emergent feature of 'postmodern society'
Ibid.
58 Ibid.
5^  Raimondo Strossoldo, "Globalism and Localism: Theoretical Reflections 
and some evidence," in Zdravko Mlinar (ed.) Globalization and Territorial 
Identities, (England: Avebury, 1992), 35. Also see, Zdravko Mlinar, 
"Individuation and Globalization: the Transformation of Territorial Social 
Organization," in Mlinar, ed.. Globalization and Territorial Identities, 1-34.
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As noted, students of territorial politics called these regionalisms neo- 
regionalism} also because the concept connoted the reaction to modernist 
explanations, or old paradigms of regionalism. The first paradigm that the 
neo-regionalists reject for explaining and analyzing the rise of regionalism 
has been the center-periphery disparity. Hueglin argues that "peripherality is 
by no means synonymous with underdevelopment. Rokkan and Urwin 
define peripherality as "distance, difference and dependence". Peripheries 
depend on one or more centers with regard to "political decision-making" 
"cultural standardization" and "economic life". Thus peripherality includes 
both a horizontal dimension of spatial asymmetry and a vertical dimension of 
socioeconomic and political interaction characterized by central control. From 
this perspective regionalism appears as a protest movement against political- 
administrative and socioeconomic centrality. It is not so important whether its 
goals are sociocultural autonomy, political federalism, or outright separatism, 
whether its driving force is a small intellectual elite or politically organized 
party, nor whether its motives are predominantly cultural, economic, or 
political. The common characteristic of all peripheral regions is their position 
with regard to the overarching system of centrality.
The modernist explanations of regionalism are unsatisfactory for the most 
part, because they fail to explain what exactly set these peripheral 
predicaments in motion. Ethnicity and language can hardly explain why
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regional identities would become salient exactly at a moment when ethnic 
minorities had almost ceased to differ from their majoritarian mass culture 
surroundings. These ends are now commonly explained in socioeconomic 
terms. But while the "unevenness" of the "tidal wave of modernization" goes 
a long way in explaining particular regionalist reactions against centralist 
national policy-making, there is also counter-evidence. A study of the 
correlation of regionalism and industrial development in 1975 showed that 
regionalism and anti-centralism in the then European Economic Community 
were most pronounced in those areas that had already attained some degree 
of modernization, whereas the poorest and predominantly agrarian regions 
sided with the industrialized centers, showing considerable faith in centralist 
national problem-solving. Hence, the mere factor of unevenness does not 
explain regionalist mobilization sufficiently. Regional mobilization is a 
"question of inconsistency between economic strength/ potential and cultural 
status. Generally speaking, the phenomenon of uneven development in the 
process of modernization does not seem to correlate very well with the 
epochal rise of regionalism. Further explanation must be found in causal 
factors which are more specifically linked to the socioeconomic turbulences 
of that epoch.
The neo-regionalists provide some alternative explanations for the rise of 
regionalism that can be grouped under two main headings:
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(a) Endogenous reasons: According to those scholars who adopt this 
approach, the rise of regionalism was mainly due to the modem concept 
and nature of the state itself and the way it was integrated and functioned. 
The main attribute of the modern state has been its highly centralized 
structure. As a result, the nation-state has become overloaded and is losing 
the capability to provide basic services and perform its traditional 
function.
As "the nation-state became too big to run everyday life and too small to 
manage international affairs,"^  ^ the regions or the sub-national units 
constituting the nation-state came to have influence and authority. The 
consequence of this development is that the national cultures and identities 
are squeezed between a much wider, more global culture and local or 
regional cultures and identities.^i As a result, national identities may not 
necessarily disappear but they may be overshadowed by regional or local 
identities. The next step is alienation from the state, questioning its legitimacy 
regarding fulfilling the needs of the specific regional/local entity, followed 
by demands and sometimes struggles for more autonomy. Thus tension 
between the nation-state and its constituent units regarding the issue of more 
devolution of power from the center to the regions once more came to the
John Newhouse, "Europe's Rising Regionalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, 
No: 1, January-February 1997, 67.
61 Ibid.
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surface. This has been particularly evident in European countries where 
regions occupy an important place in political life.
(b) Exogenous reasons: According to some other proponents of the "crisis of 
the nation-state" argument, the crisis stems from the pressures that 
globalism poses. Changes in the structure of international economy, 
technological advance and the end of the Cold War together are forcing a 
realignment of relations among states, citizens and the international 
economy.^2 Thus the already weakened structure of the nation-state is 
further weakened by increasing globalism.
The best example of the global impact upon nation-states and their 
constituent regions is revealed by the process of European integration. The 
process of European integration added further complications to the already 
problematic relationship between state and nation. While trying to integrate 
with the global market, nation-states witnessed the resurgence of 
regionalism.^ With the process of integration, regions gained further 
importance since this meant for them to jump state frontiers and apply for 
funding and appeal directly to the EU when they had problems. Even though 
integration did not aim to discard the nation-state from the scene, it has
Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State. Citizens, 
Tribalism and the New World Disorder (Great Britain: Harper Collins Publishers, 
1994), ix.
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provided a ground to justify the assertion of the activities and identities 
within the nation-states in Europe. This policy was further strengthened by 
the creation of the Committee of the Regions and by allowing the regions to 
open up representative offices in Brussels to articulate their own interests and 
lobby the Commission.
The European Union does not consider these developments as infringing 
upon the integrity of the nation-states. For instance, the European Parliament 
had repeated frequently that "the autonomy of the Regions of the European 
Community and the creation of a Europe politically more united constitute 
two complimentary and converging aspects of the same political evolution."^ 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that more or less uniform 
policies of the European Union had important implications upon each 
individual state, which were shaped to a great extent by the sui generis 
history, political structure, political culture and economic conditions of that 
country. As a result of these two factors-endogenous and exogenous- the 
nation-state faces a twin crisis which in turn, paves the way for the rise of 
regionalism.
A Note on the Methodological Approach
^ Newhouse, "Europe's Rising Regionalism," 68.
^ Santiago Petschen, La Enrôla de las Regimes. [The Europe of Regions]. 
(Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Autonomies, 1992), 326.
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Most students of territorial politics criticized the neglect of the territorial
aspects of politics. For instance Jim Sharpe stated:
Until fairly recently the concept of territoriality did not usually 
attract much interest in political science...Territorial, spatial or 
even scale effects were usually left to geographers. The reasons 
seem to be partly because the dominant modes of analysis were 
usually sociologically inclined and were thus cast in non-spatial 
horizontal categories such as class or social strata; or in vertical, 
sectoral categories related to the division of labor. Alternatively 
the emphasis has been on the underlying primordiality of the 
economy, but an economy rarely defined territorially...The 
other unit of analysis has been individual. But again the impact 
of territoriality on behavior except for nationality has not been 
prominent.
The concept of "territorial politics" methodologically brought in some novel 
approaches. The most important point made by those who study "territorial 
politics" was their criticism about the theory of intergovernmental relations. 
Of all the approaches encompassed by the term center-periphery relations, 
the intergovernmental theory was seen as the most restricted because it used 
to focus only on institutional relationships. Thus the key difference between 
the study of territorial politics and of intergovernmental relations lies not 
only in the latter's concern with institutions but in the former's recognition 
that there is a need to return to history.^ '^  A focus on territorial politics, 
therefore, fuses the intergovernmental theory with history.
^ J. L. Sharpe, "The West European State: The Territoriality Dimension," in 
Tensions in the Territorial Politics o f Western Europe, eds., R.A.W. Rhodes and 
Vincent Wright 147-167, (Great Britain: Frank Cass, 1987).
Ibid., 148.
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Rhodes and Wright suggest two possible ways in which historical analysis 
can be incorporated into the study of territorial politics: (a) synoptic, synthetic 
surveys (spans decades, even centuries, identifying general trends and 
providing an interpretative backcloth for current events) and (b) the analysis 
of critical junctures (focuses on either particular events or years deemed to be 
turning points in the development of territorial politics, documenting the 
events of concern and demonstrating their continuing impact).^^
This study will attempt to emphasize the territorial dimension of the regional 
problem in Italy that was neglected so far. The main approach will the 
analysis of critical junctures of Italian history regarding the emergence and 
evolution of the regional problem in relation to the national integration 
process that started with the Unification of Italy. In this respect, the study will 
elaborate on the main events at critical junctures of Italian history with regard 
to the national integration process.
Terminological Clarification
In order to explain what regionalism means, first it is necessary to define the 
term 'Tegion". "Region" has several meanings. It can refer to a plurality of
R.A.W. Rhodes and Vincent Wright, "Introduction," in ibid., 1. Rhodes and 
Wright argue that the focus on history is necessary because contemporary 
events have to be located historically if cause and effect continuities and 
discontinuities are to be accurately distinguished.
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states, such as "European region", "Baltic region", and some territories where 
specific supranational organizations are formed, such as "European Union", 
"Arab League" and the like.^  ^ "Region" also refers to the parts of a state. This 
usage of the term is quite wide-spread. As such, it is defined in the 
constitutions of many European countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and England. In this respect, the "region" is defined as "the largest 
territorial articulation within a state." In other words, "the region is the 
ampia where a series of rules correspond to an institutional asset marked by 
the democratic organs that represent the corresponding collectivity, 
administrative, and in many cases, also legislative power and autonomy 
under the guarantee of the organs of the same state."^° According to Peter 
Wagstaff, region may be a territory which is given the status of a region for 
administrative purposes; it is a unit occupying an intermediate position 
between central and local government. Region may also be a territory with 
claims to a cultural and political individuality of its own, marked out by 
ethnic, historical, linguistic features, moulded by shared myths and 
traditions. A region, may, of course, have the last two sets of characteristics.^^
68 Ibid., 3.
6^  Walker Coimor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 108.
70 Ibid.
"Introduction," in Regionalism in Europe, ed., Peter Wagstaff (Great Britain: 
Cromwell Press, 1994), 4.
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According to Perry Anderson, the term ^region' is an old word in all 
European languages with a major Latin word-stock, one typically that came 
into use in the fourteenth century. Its meaning was twofold: the demarcation 
of a geographical territory, vaguely associated with the sense of 'rule' (regere) 
and a portion of sub-division of any wider referent. However, from the very 
beginning, the term was highly indeterminate and was never central in the 
political vocabulary of the early modern state. In common discourse, there 
came to be one word of more or less universal currency; 'province'.^^ So it 
was rather the term 'province' in general usage than the term 'region' but 
they more or less meant the same thing.
Anderson defines "regionalism" as the tendency of the inhabitants of a 
specific region to obtain major privileges, due to anthropological, historical, 
or cultural reasons. In other words, regionalism means the aspirations and 
activism of the concerned inhabitants of a region, and denotes the pursuit of 
the specific interests of such a unit.^  ^ Hueglin defines regionalism as "the
Anderson further argues that the most celebrated use of the term in its own 
way makes the point. The principle of cuius regio, eius religio, which came into 
use on the Peace of Augsburg, ...conceded to each ruler the right to 
determine the doctrine professed within the whole, not part of their territory: 
the sense is that of 'realm'. See Anderson, The Invention o f the Region 1945- 
1990, 6.
73 Ibid.
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persistence of subnational and transnational differences, identities and 
commitments/^
There are different categories of regionalism. Massart-Pierard categorizes five 
types of regionalisms: (a) political regionalism: a regional community exists 
which aims to obtain the participation of this group to the decision-making 
process in accordance with certain autonomy, such as Scottish regionalism, 
(b) Neo-regionalism: all forms of regionalism lying behind the "modern" 
concept of the region. It emerges because of the economic, social, 
administrative and spatial disequilibriums stemming from the modern 
industrial society, (c) ethnic regionalism: retrospective regionalism which 
proposes the division of linguistic zones or sub-cultural sectors, such as the 
Basque or Catalan regionalism, (d) instrumental regionalism: regions seen as a 
means to obtain some objectives, (e) functional regionalism: found not on 
historical or sentimental considerations but on objective consideration, such
as administrative regionalism.^^
Hueglin, "Regionalism in Western Europe," 439. He also cites Rokkan and 
Urwin who define the main characteristics and its perception of regionalism 
in the context of the modern centralized nation-state as geopolitical distance, 
sociocultural difference and socioeconomic dependence. See Stein Rokkan 
and Derek W. Urwin, Economy Territory Identity (London: Sage, 1983), 2-6.
Françoise Massart-Pierard, Pour une Doctrine de la Région en Europe. 
Regionalization e Régionalisme [A doctrine for the regions in Europe. 
Regionalization and Regionalism], (Louvain: Vander, 1974), 147-148.
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Throughout the present study , the term regionalism will be used as a term 
that will refer to the regionalist movements up until the end of the Cold War 
period. Whereas neo-regionalism, bearing also some post-modernist 
connotations, will be used to refer to the regionalism in the post-Cold War era 
that became even more obvious with the rise of the regionalist party. Lega 
Nord.
Italian Regionalism in Context
It is important to make a further distinction regarding the usage of the term 
"regionalism". It bears two different meanings in the Italian context. The first 
meaning refers to the regions in the micro sense. The examples are 
Lombardia, Emiglia-Romagna, Umbria, Sicilia. The second meaning refers to 
the regions in the macro, that is geographical sense. There are three 
macroregions in Italy. One is Northern Italy, which is also referred to as 
Padania in the rhetoric of the Lega Nord. Northern Italy is composed of such 
microregions as Piedmonte, Lombardia, Veneto, and Emiglia-Romagna. The 
second macroregion is Central Italy, which is also referred to as Tuscia, being 
composed of such microregions as Toscana, Marche, Umbria, Abruzzi, 
Molise, and Lazio. The third macroregion is Southern Italy, often referred to 
as Mediterráneo, being composed of such microregions as Campania, Calabria, 
Puglia, and Basilicata. In addition to these are five special statute regions 
which have a higher degree of autonomy. These are the border regions in the
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North, namely Valle d'Aosta, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige, 
and the two islands in the south, namely, Sicilia and Sardegna.
As noted above, the general objective of this study is to analyze the 
emergence of neo-regionalism in Italy in the early 1990s by tracing its 
historical, social, cultural and economic origins through a study of critical 
junctures in Italian history regarding national integration. This task might 
seem ambitious since it will cover an extensive time span. Another difficulty 
stems from the highly regional character of Italy itself. As one student of 
Italian politics had mentioned, 'there is not only one history in Italy, but 
many histories'. In analyzing the national integration process in Italy, the 
present study will focus on the "Northern question", that is deemed as the 
most critical regional problem in Italy and which is the source of today's 
crisis of 'neo-regionalism' in this country. The process of national integration 
in Italy in different time periods will be examined by adopting the three most 
important integrative criteria- political, cultural and economic, that are 
borrowed from Rokkan and Urwin's model.^  ^ By pointing out the
The same analytical tools were used by Michael Keating in his comparative 
study State and Regional Nationalism, where four countries were examined. 
However, Keating uses the terminology somehow differently. He borrows the 
terms 'national revolution' referring to the efforts of central elites, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to establish common institutions based 
on consistent values within four states; 'industrial revolution' referring to the 
spread of industrialization, capitalism and market relationships in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the new classes which they spawned 
and the effects of this on the territorial balance. To these two terms he adds 
the term 'cultural revolution', referring to the efforts to unify state territories
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importance of the structural factors and the historical heritage inherited by 
the modern state and by analyzing the sui generis operation of the three 
important integrative factors during the national integration process in Italy, 
this study will attempt to trace the origins of neo-regionalism beyond the 
"crisis of the modern state" argument and will attempt to bridge the gap in 
theories about explaining the rise of neo-regionalism.
Plan of Study
Before dealing with the different time periods and historical events that have 
affected the pace and nature of the formation of nationalism, some structural 
factors and historical heritages peculiar to Italy that the modern Italian state 
had inherited will be delineated in Chapter 2. In this Chapter, firstly, the 
peculiar geography of Italy - its being a long peninsula, its north being closer 
to Europe and its south being closer to the Mediterranean and Africa will be 
discussed. The importance of geography stems from the fact that it plays a 
crucial role in the development of the 'Southern question' and regionalism 
which is the most prominent character of Italy compared to the other 
European states. Secondly, the highly regional/local character of Italy will be 
mentioned. Here, a brief historical background of the local culture will be 
elaborated, which is important to understand how the forces for 
fragmentation operated throughout history, especially during the Roman
linguistically and culturally, seen much more as a strategy of political elites at 
the center than as a process of natural osmosis resulting from contacts
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Empire. The main focus will be the historical, sociological, cultural and 
economic differences that had evolved between the North and the South 
throughout history. As an example of this, the separate developments of the 
city-states in the North and the South, the development of civic consciousness 
and impact of the church in the two parts of the country during the pre­
unification period will be taken up. Thirdly, the impact of French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic regime in Italy will be examined. It is an important 
period that has formed the genesis of the Italian nationalism. This is because 
Italy, too, was affected by dissemination of French revolutionary ideas. 
Indeed, the presence of the French both as an occupying power as well as an 
exporter of revolutionary ideas and new forms of the state administration left 
a deep imprint in the later developments regarding state-building and 
nation-building in Italy. Thus, these three factors are deemed as critical 
heritages that the founders of the Italian state inherited, and they continued 
to be important factors concerning the national integration process.
In the following chapters of the study, regionalism and neo-regionalism will 
be examined as regards their links with the national integration process in 
Italy since its unification (Risorgimento). In other words, regionalism will be 
regarded as a fragmentary force since it aims to assert itself at the expense of 
the nation-state. Each chapter will focus on different time periods and 
historical events which are deemed as crucial in determining-by contributing
between center and periphery. See Michael Keating, State and Regional
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to or impeding- the evolution of the national integration process in Italy. 
These periods will be the Unification period (1848-1870), the Fascist period 
(1914-1945) , the post-Fascist (1945-1990) and post-cold war (1990-today) 
periods. In each period, ideologies and policies of the state towards the 
problem of national integration will be analyzed. The ideological debate 
between the unitarists and the federalists during the unification period, the 
ultra-centralist policies of the Fascist state and the decentralist trends in the 
Cold War years were considered as critical for understanding the attempts for 
national integration in Italy. In sum, the general trend of policies intended 
for a successful national integration- centralism, decentralization and a 
possible federalism - will be analyzed since they are deemed as important in 
the national integration process of Italy.
Thus, Chapter 3 will elaborate on the unification period (Risorgimento), Here 
the emphasis will be on the ideological debate about the form of the newly- 
founded state and the 'Southern question' between the unitarists and the 
federalists. The reason why the unitary solution was preferred and its 
implications for the creation of the nation state and the 'Southern question' 
will be elaborated.
Before delineating briefly the reasons for the rise of fascism in Italy, Chapter 4 
will provide two different but essential historical accounts of the making of
Nationalism, 24-25.
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the Italian nation-state and its impact on the rise of Fascism in Italy. The first 
one is the Gramscian-leftist approach and the second is the Crocean-rightist 
approach. Then, the chapter will deal with the fascist vision of nationalism 
and regionalism and their impact on Mussolini's policies in trying to "make 
Italians". The main emphasis will be on the effects of the fascist period upon 
the process of national integration in Italy.
Regarding the 'Southern question', dealt within the framework of transition 
to democracy in aftermath of the Second World War in Italy, Chapter 5 will 
first elaborate on three main policies of the dominant actors in Italian politics 
towards the solution of the 'Southern question' and the consequences of these 
policies. More specifically, the 1948 Constitution, that envisaged a great deal 
of autonomy for regions like Sicilia or Sardegna will be elaborated. Secondly, 
the impact of the party politics (partitocrazia) upon the (non-) solution of the 
question will be examined with specific reference to the clientelistic policies 
of the right of center party, Democrazia Christiana (DC) and the decentralist 
policies of such leftist parties as Partita Comunista Italiana (PCI). The 
implications of party politics upon the Southern question and thus upon 
national integration are important not only because main deficiencies in the 
political system stemmed from this period, to which the criticism of the Lega 
Nord are directed. The policies of the DC to co-opt the Southern political elite 
into the system had some important consequences which culminated in 
increased corruption and clientelism. Besides, most of the policies pursued in
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this period by DC for the economic development of the South proved futile. 
Thus, this period is an important period; it was during this period that the 
seeds of fragmentation and tension were planted. Regionalism, in this period, 
became an important issue, yet it remained under the shadow of party 
politics. Thirdly, the implications of European integration are deemed 
important for the rise of a supranational identity in Italy. Here, more 
specifically the study will elaborate on some regional policies of the European 
Community and evaluate the success of these policies in trying to bridge the 
gap between Northern and Southern Italy.
In Chapter 6, the neo-regionalist debates in Italy in the post-Cold war era will 
be taken up. The reasons behind the rise of the regionalist party- Lega Nord , 
its rhetoric and practice are the main issues addressed in this Chapter. This 
Chapter will also try to assess the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy within the 
context of the rise of regionalism and federalism in Europe in general. 
However, the Lega Nord is not the only medium through which the federalist 
proposals and schemes for state reform were being disseminated. In addition 
to Lega, the Fondazione Agnelli-a leading industrial sector representative, the 
Diocesana Ambrosiana-that is regarded as the voice of the Church and some 
other leading academic figures as experts of the issue have elaborated on this 
issue and proposed different solutions to the present crisis. Thus this Chapter 
will analyze these different segments of Italian society with the aim to 
address the following question: To what extent does the intense debate in
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Italy regarding the issue of neo-regionalism pose a threat to the national 
integrity of the Italian nation state and can it be considered as a failure of 
national integration in Italy?
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CHAPTER II
THE HERITAGE OF ITALY BEFORE UNIFICATION
The formation of an Italian nation was not an easy task for its founding 
fathers since Italy had a unique historical heritage which did not exactly 
coincide with the nationalistic feelings that were to flourish. This difficulty 
was best revealed in Massimo d'Azeglio's famous phrase (Fatta Vltalia, 
dohbiamo fare gli Italiani-No'w that Italy is made, we must make the Italians). 
Since Italians as a people had little sense of loyalty to that state or to each 
other, Italy's unification was achieved quite late in 1870 compared to the 
other nation-states of Europe. This chapter, analyzes the main factors that 
played a crucial role in Italy's late unification and the problems which 
followed that had to be faced in order to build the nation.
The first factor was the highly local character, indeed the mosaic-like 
structure of the peninsula, where intense local allegiances have always been 
an important feature of the population. The strength of local culture was the 
main obstacle for the founders of the Italian state who aimed at the national 
integration of Italy. Especially in regions like northern Italy, where many 
prosperous commercial cities existed, and none of which was clearly
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dominant over the rest, it was even more difficult to achieve integration, since 
such polycephalous areas are notoriously hard to unify.  ^The most important 
aspect of local culture was revealed by the cities or rather the city-states 
which in time turned into regional states. These states played a crucial role in 
the national integration process of Italy.
The second factor which had played a crucial role in Italy's late unification 
and difficult national integration were the Papal States in central Italy that 
had always viewed any effort to construct a united Italy as a threat to its own 
interests and to those of the Church. The Church was one of the forces that 
promoted fragmentation rather than integration between the individual city- 
states and regional states of the Italian peninsula. The location of the Papal 
States right in the center of the peninsula rendered difficult the integration of 
the north and the south of Italy.
The third factor was the dual structure in Italy, usually referred to as 'Two 
Italies', which was characterized by the profound difference between the 
historical traditions of northern Italy which had been under Germanic 
domination and those of the continent and, the insular southern part which 
had experienced Byzantine, Moorish, Norman and Spanish rule.  ^ It was a
 ^Raphael Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State and the Consequences of Late 
Unification, in Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski eds.. Regionalism and 
Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1987), 92.
Ibid.
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difficult task for the founders of the Italian state to make these 'two Italies' 
one, since the 'Southern question' always posed an obstacle for them. This 
duality of the country has always been a vivid issue in the political life of 
Italy since the relationship between the two parts were mostly tense, and this 
tension was recently revitalized by the emergence of the Lega Nord.
A Brief Note on the Territory and People of Italy
Continental Italy is a peninsula which extends from Central Europe like a 
long boot towards North Africa. It is surrounded by the Alps in the north, the 
Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Seas in the west, the Adriatic and Ionian Seas in the 
east, and the Messina Straits and the Mediterranean in the south. The two 
islands of Sicily and Sardinia were annexed in 241 and 238 B.C., respectively, 
as a result of the First Punic War with Carthage (264-242 B.C.) during the 
Roman Republic. It was then that what is known today as "Italy" took its 
actual form.^
The majority of Italians who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
never heard the word 'Italy'. It was a country which hved only in the minds 
of the literate. There were three main sources of the idea of Italy. First, the 
study of classical literature implied the idea of the old Roman province, 
praises of Italia from the Latin poets, and a belief that the peninsula formed
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a territory with natural boundaries. Second, the native people's hatred of 
non-Italians as peoples whose language could not be understood and whose 
soldiers devastated native fields and towns for the claims of overlordship fed 
the idea of 'Italy'. Third, the merchants and exiles who were able to make a 
comparison between Italy and other countries played a role. For instance, an 
exiled writer, Brunetto Latini, on his return to his native city expressed his 
new consciousness of 'nationality' by saying: 'Italy is a better country than 
France.' *
Even though the peninsula was divided among Italic tribes and Greek 
emigrants, there was a tendency to regard it as a whole unit, as revealed by 
the works of such writers as Plato and Archimedes. Roman historians such as 
Livy, Virgil and Tacitus also approached the area as a unit and the heartland 
of the Roman Empire. Dante Alighieri (1251-1321) located and depicted its 
regions, stressing its natural frontiers. In his Divina Commedia [Divine 
Commedy] (1321), he spoke of "beautiful Italy", as the "garden" of the 
Medieval Empire.®
® Ronald S. Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism. From its Origins to World War II 
(Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1990), 3.
 ^ John Lamer, Italy in the Age o f Dante and Petrarch 1216-1380 (London and 
New York: Longman, 1980), 1-2.
® Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism: From its Origins to World War II, 3.
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As regards the people, no precise origins can be claimed. The main influx was 
of the Indo-Europeans, whose habitat was between Scandinavia and the 
Russian steppes. The Indo-Europeans, who spoke a language from which 
Greek, Latin and German were derived, participated about 2500 B.C. in a 
massive migration, with one branch penetrating into Italy, several dispersing 
into other areas of Central and Western Europe and another reaching India. 
The Greeks and Etruscans were later arrivals, the former crossing the Adriatic 
and the Ionia between 750-550 B.C. while the latter infiltrated the region 
between the Arno and Tiber rivers in 600-510 B.C. Many anthropologists 
agree that another racial component may have filtered through North Africa. 
The North African immigrants first mingled with the indigenous population 
to form the Italian people, then were divided into Italic tribes and formed the 
ancestors of the Italians living in the regions of the peninsula; Romans, 
Tuscans, Ligurians, Piedmontese, Venetians, Lombardians, Umbrians , 
Neapolitans, Sicilians and others.
The Historical Roots of Localism and Microregionalism in Italy
As noted, one of the most important peculiarities of Italy that can be 
considered as an impediment to its national integration, has been the highly 
fragmented and mosaic structure of the country. Even though Italy is often 
considered as a geographically compact country and a unitary state, it is not a 
homogenous unit when one looks at its political and cultural structure. Italy's
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history is that of a nation in the making.^ The geographically defined regional 
entities, politically independent, economically differentiated and generally 
dominated by a strong city have been prominent in Italian history for more 
than a millenium/ For a long time, 'Italy' was nothing more than a sentiment 
and a literary idea. Throughout history, it has always been a collection of 
regions, and each region has been a collection of smaller units dominated by 
particularistic sentiments and local interests. Some of these regions are very 
ancient and have kept their identity and loyalties even under strong 
governments, such as the Roman Empire and the fascist Italy. Thus the most 
important structural factor in understanding Italian politics, state-society 
relations and economic development is this strong sense of localism, or rather 
regionalism. It is always important to keep in mind that an Italian is Milanese 
or Neapolitan before he is Italian, or very often he identifies being Italian 
with being Milanese or Neapolitan.®
This had some important implications upon Italian national historiography, 
because as one writer mentioned, 'there was not one but many histories in 
Italy'. If English history was made meaningful and given form by the story of
® Rita Moore, "Historical Setting," in Italy: A Country Study, ed. Rinn S. Shinn 
(Washington, D. C.: American University, 1985), 3.
 ^ Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. Making 
Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 18.
® Chris Wickham, Early Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society 400-1000. 
(Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1981), 1.
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its parliament and the history of France by its monarchy, what characterized 
Italian history was precisely its lack of any coherence.^ The historical studies 
reflected the particularistic character of the peninsula, since the main theme 
in these studies were individual cities or regions.^  ^ It is quite recent that 
national unification in Italian historiography was achieved.
The Cities, Communes and Regional States
The collapse of the Roman Empire in 476 was a critical milestone in Italian 
history. The Roman Empire had a vast range of territories extending from 
Ireland in the northwest to the Indus River in the southeast, the Danube in 
the north and the coastal area of Africa in the south. It contained about 
75.000.000 people of different nationalities and levels of culture. Following 
the collapse of the western axis of the empire in 476 A. D., four major states or 
empires emerged, each advertising itself as the sole custodian of Roman 
universality.^^ These were the Eastern Roman Empire, Charlemagne's 
Frankish Bangdom, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and the
 ^Lamer, Italy in the Age o f Dante and Petrarch, 7.
Julius Kirshner has argued that in Italy, the genre of political history 
focusing of particular individuals, acts and events, though battered, was 
never choked out by exotic species of historiography. This inherent character 
of established political history is also partly due to the 'intractable localism 
and geographic diversity that is not easily reduced to holistic paradigms. See 
Julius Bdrshner, "Introduction: The State is Back In," in The Origins o f the State 
in Italy 1300-1600, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1995), 3.
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Roman Catholic Church. Italy became the battleground of the conflicting 
ambitions of these four actors. However, the local or regional identities did 
not fade away under these empires since none of them was able to centralize 
or unify the peninsula. On the contrary, the localities took advantage of the 
conflicting policies and ambitions of these four actors and strengthened their 
identities and allegiances.
The C ity-States
The main local entities forming an obstacle to national allegiance for the 
Italians were the city-states. Before nationalism could germinate and flourish, 
strong public sentiment had to be transferred from the previous allegiances as 
the Roman Imperium, Roman Catholic universalism, and Renaissance 
transnational humanism based on allegiance to the city-state republics.^  ^
Nation-state building in Europe along ethnic-political lines had started long 
before the Italians began to think in similar terms.
As mentioned above, the Italian cities predated the Roman Empire. They 
were places where basic public consciousness and responsibility in the 
Empire were maintained. They retained these features right through the 
Middle Ages. The Roman Empire had maintained the cellular structure even 
though it had been strong and centralized. But when the empire began to
Lamer, Italy in the Age o f Dante and Petrarch, 9. 
2^ Ibid.
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collapse in the tenth century, its cellular structure became a disadvantage, for 
the interests of each city were no longer totally tied to that of the central 
government Thus, Italy remained as an agglomeration of localities where 
local interests mostly crystallized around individual cities. There was already 
in existence a viable network of city-states long before the centralized state 
departed from the Italian political scene. Thus with the collapse of the Empire 
these small cellular structures became active on their own.
These localities which were under the pressure of conflicting and clashing 
interests of the four actors mentioned above exploited the situation to their 
interests and increased their room for maneuver economically and politically. 
Like small islands in the sea, they turned inward to the web of relationships 
being worked out between the major city and the countryside. The 
countryside was slowly assimilated by the metropolitan area and the degree 
of this assimilation was best revealed by a type of localism, called 
campanilismo.^  ^ The concept meant that one's sole political allegiance was to 
one's city, whose piazza (public square) was conveniently accessible, and 
whose main cathedral and bell were visible and audible to all the citizenry. 
In other words the tower and the cathedral became the symbols of city- 
identity.
The first example of campanilismo was in Florence with the building of a 
campanile-tone (belfry-tower) in the city.
Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism, 10.
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Allegiance to the city-states were utmost and the city-identity was very 
strong. However, the sentiment of sharing a common citizenship within a 
city-state was not solely the result of having a common residence. When 
Waley quotes Ріа dei Tolomai in Dante's Purgatorio — 'Siena made me' (Siena 
mi fe), she is more than announcing her place of birth: she is saying that by 
providing the physical, social and political environment in which she grew 
up, the city-state of Siena shaped her outlook and personality.^^ In Count 
Carlo Sforza's words:
The Polis, the city-state, constituted the sole base of every 
political and social organism. One might say the same of Etruria 
between where the Arno and the Tiber was, until the Roman 
conquests, just a federation of twelve cities, a federation with 
extremely strict religious ties, but with a wide autonomy for 
each city....When dominion of Rome was extended all over 
Italy, things changed but little morally and socially; the civitas 
continued to be the base and the key to the life of all Italians.
There is no other nation whose traditions, legends and popular 
epic are compelled so constantly to look to the city for their
origin 16
Civic patriotism cannot be explained solely in terms of government and 
administration. A man will become fully aware of his allegiance to his own 
state only if he knows of other states to which he has no allegiance. His 
loyalty will be sharpened all the more if it becomes engaged in opposition to
Daniel Waley, Tlie Italian City-Republics (London and New York: Longman: 
1969,1978), xiv.
Count Carlo Sforza, Italy and the Italians (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1985), 1.
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other states. The Italian city-republics were highly capable of eliciting such 
loyalty, since a man had every chance of knowing neighboring cities and the 
important differences in geographical site, in architecture, in economic life, in 
political constitutions and traditions between other cities and his own. 
Traditions of enmity for rival cities were in fact an invariable ingredient in 
fully developed civic patriotism.^^
The city was the focus for autonomous activity after the fall of state power. 
City-identity in both the Empire and the early Middle Ages was defined 
administratively: the presence of a city council, a duke, a count, a bishop and 
die presence of walls alone sometimes seems to have underlain the juridical 
definition of a city.^* Among thousands of centers of population in Italy, some 
hundreds were designated as cities (citta) and of these, some eventually 
acquired enough independence to deserve to be called city-states. The jurist 
Bartolus of Sassoferato (1313-1357) offers an illuminating definition of the 
city. A wall was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, according to
Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 88. It has been suggested above that fully- 
grown civic patriotism was the product of enmity and warfare between cities. 
This patriotism did not merely expand by "natural" growth in these 
circumstances, but was consciously nurtured. An instance of this process is 
the communes' use of the carroccio, a special wagon to bear the standard in 
battle. ...By the later twelfth century a number of cities had adopted the use 
of carroccio, sometimes giving it a special name (Parma's carroccio was called 
'Blancardus', Cremona's 'Bertha' and always appointing a body-guard to 
accompany it into battle.... The Milanese did not retain the carrocio without 
making modifications. In the later twelfth century St Ambrose, the city's 
patron saint, was portrayed where Archbishop Heribert had preferred a 
crucifix. For the symbols of the civic patriotism, see Ibid, 101.
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Bartolus, to qualify as a ''city/ A fortress (castrum), though provided with 
walls or a moat, usually lacked common law jurisdiction and so it was like a 
village; although it might possess magistrates, they were placed there by the 
city to which it was subject/^ Bartolus adds that the place had been a city, 
however, before it acquired its bishop. The distinguishing mark of a city is 
the possession of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction not only over those within its 
walls, but over subject towns, villages and fortresses. Such cities might have 
been empty shells, or tiny settlements of peasants. In southern and southern- 
central Italy they often were. But there was perhaps four times the density of 
cities in some parts of the South as in the Po plain, in a far poorer landscape. 
Such a restricted territorial base often meant that such cities were only 
villages, with just a cathedral as their focus. They had a much weaker 
resistance to wars and invasions. Less than half of the Roman cities of the 
South survived the sixth and seventh centuries even as bishoprics. The 
geographical persistence of the northern cities contrasts clearly with this. In 
the North, there was a true urban society functioning in the cities such as 
Ravenna, Lucca and Milan. This assumes a clear economic definition of the
city.20
The ideological pre-eminence of urban life in Italian city-states throughout 
the early Middle Ages is clear. The survival of the institutions of the state
Girffiths, "The Italian City-State," 76. 
20 Ibid, 80.
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and church in the cities contributed to a definite solidity of urban economic 
activity, too, even if it was less firmly based than under the Empire. When the 
Italian state decayed in the North, some of the great aristocratic families 
ruralized themselves. That was the lowpoint for the political dominance of 
Italian cities. But this in itself shows the persistence of the city as an 
administrative center for the state up to at least the tenth century. As the rise 
of the communes shows, even in the eleventh century, the balance lay with the 
cities.2^
Cities had been acting as collectivities, at least informally since the late 
seventh century. For instance, the citizens of Milan had an assembly place in 
front of their cathedral as early as 879 A. D. For several centuries the bishop 
acted as the focus of city politics.22 It is clear that on one level the surrender of 
city government to bishops was a logical step in urban political development. 
But it was not all to the bishop's advantage. Cities were not collectivities that 
could easily be controlled; particularly the most important urban families, 
who were also for the most part major rural landowners, too, kept their 
autonomy. Even the most seigneurialised of northern Italian cities 
maintained their autonomies, as they were too complex to control by any 
other means. The germ of the commune (municipality) lay in these institutions
21 Ibid, 87-88.
22 Chris Wickham, Ear/y Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society 400-1000 
(Totowa, New Jersey; Barnes and Noble, 1981), 181.
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which were administered by the professionals who ran them as judges and 
notaries. Together with the urban landed aristocracy, the judges and notaries 
formed the cives. The city uprisings of the eleventh century show that 
ordinary people were prepared to fight for their cities and were not 
unpracticed at it. In the urban context, fighting had not become restricted to 
an elite, and in the pursuit of civic identity the poor were mostly prepared to 
follow the rich.
As mentioned above, both under the Roman Empire and the following 
Lombard Kingdom, the comparative uniformity of the central government 
and of the city administration totally broke down at the local level and was 
not replaced later. The collapse of the Roman Empire created a great power 
vacuum on the part of the central state and the localities took advantage of 
this situation. The basic unit for the Lombard state was essentially the city 
and its territory, making a cellular structure for the kingdom, mostly as the 
continuation of the traditional social and geographical framework of Italy 
Even though the Lombards tried hard to centralize these regional units, they 
could not manage it due to their disorganized invasion and their scattered 
settlements that were mostly confined to the northern part of Italy, most 
heavily around Milan, Pavia, Brescia, Verona, and in Friuli; less heavily in 
Western Emilia and around Lucca; hardly at all further south.
6 2
Another significant development in this post-Roman Empire period was that 
regional distinctions, which are not directly related to the Lombards, began 
to appear. From 700 A. D. onwards every zone of Italy has its own local 
customs and peculiarities in social hierarchy, legal formulae, weights and 
measures. This may be the separate development of different localities after 
568 A. D., or quite probably the first clear evidence of deep local differences 
that the Romans could not have eradicated. It also shows that systematic 
reorganization of society by the Lombards was unlikely. Most of the 
peasantry, the bulk of the society was and remained Roman (romani). The 
Lombard settlement therefore did not produce a radical change in social 
structure.24
The Lombards created a kingdom in Northern Italy and established 
themselves along the ridge of the Appenines , which stretch the whole length 
of the Italian peninsula, but were unable to take Rome or the coastal cities. 
The latter retained their ties to the imperial capital in Constantinople. But the 
Emperor could no longer guarantee the security of Rome, much less provide 
the forces necessary to drive the Lombards back. In this situation, the bishop
^ Ibid, 42. See also Cristina La Rocca, "Public Buildings and Urban Change in 
northern Italy in the early Medieval Period, in The City in Late Antiquity, ed., 
John Rich (London and New York; Routledge, 1992), 161-180.
Ibid., 71. For a more detailed account of the impact of the Church see 
Gordon Griffiths, "The Italian City-State," in The City-State in Five Cultures, 
eds., Robert Grieffeth and Carol G. Thomas (California and England; ABC- 
Qio, 1981), 71-73.
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of Rome began to exercise an increasingly important political role. To counter 
the Lombards, he called on the Franks , who defeated the Lombards and 
made the Lombard or 'Italic' kingdom part of the larger empire whose center 
was north of the Alps. As for the lands which the Pope had undertaken to 
administer and to defend, these were not returned to the possession of the 
eastern emperor, but became 'States of the Church,' stretching from sea to sea 
across the middle of the Italian peninsula and separating the north from the 
south. Upon the king of the Franks, the pope conferred the crown of a new 
Roman Empire of the West (Frankish Roman Empire) in 800 A. D., but the 
rulers of this 'Holy Roman Empire' were not Romans but Germans as of 919 
A. D. and they were never able to obtain control of the whole peninsula.^s
Communes
Increased confidence motivated cities to become more bold and capitalize 
more fully on the animosities between the Empire and the papacy for the 
liberty and autonomy associated with the Era of Communes (1000-1250).2^
25 Ibid.
25 Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism, 11. For the transformation to the communes, 
see Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 32-34. He argues: The process involved 
three essential elements. In the first place the role of the law-worthy' men, the 
boni homines, had to be transformed by the setting up of a regularly instituted 
and permanent body among them as an executive for the citizens. The second 
element in the process was the gradual replacement of episcopal and other 
authority by the commune as the most important jurisdictional power within 
the city. The third element in the formation of a republican city-state was the 
acquisition of rights outside the city and the development of relations with 
other communes. This process, which gave momentum to the others,
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The commune was an association of men bound together by an oath and 
common interests. They swore to aid and defend one another; they pooled 
their prestige and minute jurisdictions that they invested in their consuls.^  ^
Uprisings were not a necessary or immediate prelude to the commune, but 
they show clearly the force that civic identity began to take on once 
communes became autonomous political centers. That the principal heir to 
political power in the town was the bishop was a sign of the weakening of 
central authority in the early middle ages and of the discontinuity in 
institutions. From the ninth century onward, in the period of feudal 
particularism following the fission of the Carolingian dynasty, some bishops 
enjoyed this position by virtue of a royal grant of comital powers, though 
these were normally held by landed families, while some other bishops
involved the formation of new institutions — administrative, military and 
diplomatic— and conferred on the city an awareness of its individuality. 
Patriotism was above all the product of conflict. This third strand in the 
making of the commune as a state was interwoven with the second and was 
contemporaneous witih it. Just as the judicial take-over from the bishop was a 
gradual process, so too was the winning of autonomy by the commune in its 
relations with the subject territory, 'the early 'submissions' by feudatories and 
rural or village communes were often made to the bishop as the recognized 
civic authority. Then there often followed a phase during which submissions 
were received jointly by the bishop and consuls. Ultimately the bishop was 
eliminated and the consuls acted on their own.
By that time the word commune was no longer merely an attributive, as 
in 'common counsel' or in deliberations 'in common', but a substantive in its 
own right, signifying the citizens or their assembly. This was the situation 
described by outside observers such as Otto of Freising and Benjamin of 
Tudela soon after the middle of the twelfth century. Both of these noted that 
the north Italian towns, under their consuls, were autonomous. 'The entire 
land is divided among the cities."
Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination. City-States in Renaissance Italy 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979,1988), 27.
65
exercised similar de facto rights in the absence of any other effective local 
authority. The authority of the bishop, however, was comparable with the 
sporadic survival of skeletal civic institutions. Certain arrangements of local 
importance had to be made wherever an urban community of any 
significance existed. These included the organization of defenses and in 
particular the allocation of the burden of keeping the town walls in adequate 
repair as well as other public works, and making of agreements affecting the 
local market. Certain ecclesiastical matters also called for discussion and 
settlement, among them sometimes the choice of the bishop himself as well as 
the more routine festivities and processions.^®
After the mid-tenth century civic consciousness and uprisings became more 
common. All the citizens of Verona came together to oppose Bishop Rather in 
968 A. D. In 983, the Milanesi expelled Archbishop Landulf II from the city 
and he had to make many concessions to the civic aristocracy to return.^  ^
There were other similar revolts such as those in Parma, Milan and Pavia and 
Raveima. All of them were, at least in part, risings against what remained of 
imperial authority. They were local oppositions to the hegemony of the state. 
The strength of the Italian state had once been derived from its network of 
cities, but by Conrad ITs reign the cities were the standard-bearers of local 
autonomy, more opposed to him than any other force in Italy. It is at this
28 Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 1-2.
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point that urban aristocracy detached itself most firmly from the state office­
holding traditions of the rural aristocracy and began to direct its concerns 
exclusively to urban life. When it did so, the force of episcopal hegemony 
inside the city could not resist it for long; the combined landed power of the 
urban aristocracy was far greater than that of the bishop. Civic ideology in 
particular became entirely localized which formed the seeds of the 
communes. ^
One other occasion to exploit this schism between the Empire and the papacy 
came when Frederick Barbarossa (1152-1190) tried to restore imperial power, 
but his plan of installing an imperial governor (podesta) in each city provoked 
revolt in Lombard towns, led by the self-governing city of Milan (1160-1162). 
Milan was razed to the ground, but by 1167, a Lombard League, including a 
reconstructed Milan, had been formed with the support of Pope Alexander 
III. The Milanese and their allies defeated Frederick at Legnano in 1176 and 
forced him to sign a truce which became definitive in the Peace of Constance 
(25 June 1183). The Peace of Constance gave communes the right to nominate 
their own magistrates, to raise taxes, to make their own laws, and to try their 
subjects under their own laws but with the right of appeal to an imperial 
tribunal. In return, citizens were to swear loyalty to the emperor, and 
consular magistrates were to receive their investiture from him or from his
Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, 190. 
30 Ibid., 191.
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representative. By this peace, Italian communes which had been growing for 
a century in de facto political power, acquired de jure recognition.^  ^However, 
Legnano can be considered a victory for inter-Italian cooperation only in a 
limited sense. Although the battle cry of the Lombard League was "the 
Fatherland and Liberty", what was understood by fatherland was the 
individual city-commune and by liberty its right to be independent and free 
from any form of coercion.^^
These examples of autonomy, in castelli and cities, by nobles, peasants, 
bishops and citizens were important features of Italian history in the late 
tenth-eleventh centuries. Italy was and is localised. Every different locality 
had its own history and individual dynamic. Wider forces like states, at least 
initially, were imposed on each of these localities from the outside. For each 
of the autonomous forces of the eleventh century, there was a long historical 
tradition. But the solidarity and cohesion of their ideologies were the product 
of the fall of the state, not its cause. In fact, apart from the times of their wars 
in Germany, the emperors of the eleventh century were plagued by four 
problems in Italy: (1) the rebelliousness of cities and mighty vassals, (2) a 
blazing reform movement directed against simonist clergy, (3) the resolute 
violence of papal factions and a riotous baronage in Rome, and (4) the
See Martines, Power and Imagination, 26; Griffiths, "The Italian City-State,' 
79-80.
32 Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism, 11.
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menacing pressure in southern Italy of Byzantine and especially Norman 
armies.33
The conception of a single people and a single state, the gens Langobardorum 
of Paul the Deacon, the regnum Italic um of Liutprand of Cremona, lasted as 
long as the state did. It is only after the state fell that they were replaced, in 
the minds of the Italian ruling classes, by the explicit affirmation of local 
loyalties. In another sense, though, it is at least not surprising that the 
Carolingian states fell before these new local forces. The Lombard and 
Carolingian states were monuments to the force of the ideology of the Roman 
Empire, for the four centuries after it vanished in the mid-sixth century.^
The strongest force that allowed the kings to keep control of their kingdom 
was simply the consent of their aristocracies to the public ideal of the Roman 
state that their rulers nourished, and as a result of this consent, the 
landowning classes structured their political action around the state. The state 
patronage network was after all, extremely profitable to them. The fact that 
the state survived only through the consent of the upper classes was 
mirrored, too, in the equally important fact that the state barely ever made its 
presence felt among the different strata of the peasantry, the vast majority of 
society, except as a distant coercive force.
33 Martines, Power and Imagination, 8.
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The political settlement of the Lombard-Carolingian state was restricted to 
the aristocracy, and was largely irrelevant to everyone else. The most one 
could say would be that state control was more effective in northern Italy and 
Tuscany than in the South, or elsewhere in Europe, largely thanks to the 
complexity of north Italian cities and of the landownership around them, 
which enabled the state to exploit local rivalries and make interventions, and 
which lessened the possibility of any one family from gaining local control 
and seceding from the state. But local intervention required the use of politics 
of landowning, and this was not public, but private. The state exploited 
private links of dependence, but in doing so, it strengthened these links. At 
the crisis point, at the beginning of the tenth century, these links, based firmly 
on landholding proved themselves stronger than the public ideology of the 
state. In this sense, the tenth century saw a victory of localities over the state, 
for the private bonds of society, personal dependence, community and the 
coercion of the peasantry, were local ones. Even public institutions became 
localized now, in cities and castellL^  ^The ideology of the integrated state was 
replaced by the real force of local society. Italy was torn apart. The localities
^ Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, 192.
35 Woolf argues that "the triumph of the merchant-capitalists over the popolo 
minuto carried with it the destruction of the communes. Internally, the history 
of the communes is one: of perennial instability. The endemic struggles of 
guilds, factions and families had blocked he development of the bureaucratic 
and financial instruments of government and the transformation of the cities 
into states through the establishment of uniform administrations.", see Stuart
70
went their separate ways, fortified by a growing sense of their own separate 
identities,^
R egional States and Gian G aleazzo o f  M ilan
There were some attempts to create territorial states. The territorial state in 
northern Italy was, except in the case of the Venetian Republic, the creation of 
signorie (governments controlled by single families). The largest and the most 
enduring was established by the Visconti of Milan in the fourteenth century 
Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1378-1402) embarked upon a course of 
aggrandizement that came close to creating an Italian kingdom. However, 
Galeazzo could not pursue a centralistic course due to resistance. The 
Ordinances of Galeazzo issued in 1400 make clear that Galeazzo and his 
advisors were interested in the principles that should govern the relations 
between the central and local government. This comes out clearly in the 
following Ordinance: 'In matters concerning the Commune and the City, and not 
the State, (the lieutenant) shall let the citizens do as they wish in accordance with 
their own ordinances and customs.' The explicit distinction between the State 
(stato) and the city seems to justify Burkhardt's famous assertion that 
something new in history had made its appearance: the State as a calculated
Woolf, A History o f Italy 1700-1860. The Social Constraints o f Political Change 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 17-18,
^ Ibid,
37 Griffiths, "The Italian City-State," 101,
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conscious creation, as a work of art. The conception is restricted to the central 
government and the same restriction applies to the rest of Galeazzo's 
dominions, old and new. They were a collection of cities rather than a State in 
the modern sense. The only thing they shared was Gian Galeazzo himself. 
Each of the original 14 (eventually 20) cities under his dominion proclaimed 
him its Dominus (Signore). Each, like Siena, agreed in its contract with him 
that he might be represented by a lieutenant.
Gian Galeazzo did not attempt, as had rulers of Florence and Venice, to 
broaden the base of the central government at the expense of the cities. On the 
contrary, he sought to exercise power indirectly over the countryside through 
the cities. He did have a ducal chancery, and he did establish certain councils 
with competence over more than one city. However, such administrative 
institutions did not necessarily qualify even as embryonic elements of the 
modern centralized territorial state. To see Gian Galeazzo as the precursor of 
Napoleon is to overlook the work of the French Revolution. Galeazzo began 
the building of the cathedral of Milan which Napoleon carried to the 
completion, but Galeazzo never contemplated conferring common citizenship 
upon his various subjects, nor did he dream of giving his collection of cities a 
common legal code. To find his legislation, indeed, one must consult each 
city's collection of statutes. To have effect in all his dominions, an act of 
Galeazzo had to be enacted and registered among the statutes of each city 
separately.
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As a result, the regime of signorie could not alter the basic parameters of the 
deadlock in Italian political development that had set in after the defeat of the 
project of a unitary imperial monarchy in the Hohenstaufen epoch.^« The 
communes were structurally incapable of achieving the unification of the 
peninsula, because of the aptitude of their urban-commercial development. 
The signorie represented a political reassertion of the rural and seigneurial 
circumambiance within which they had always been invested. But no real 
social victory of the countryside over the towns was ever possible in 
Northern and Central Italy: the attractive strength of the cities was much too 
great, while the local landowning class never formed a cohesive feudal 
nobility with an ancestral tradition or esprit de corps. The lords who usurped 
power in the republics were frequently mercenaries, upstarts or adventurers, 
while others were elevated bankers or merchants. The sovereignty of signorie 
was consequently always in a deep sense illegitimate: it rested on recent force 
and personal fraud, without any collective social sanction in aristocratic 
hierarchy or duty behind it. The new princedoms had extinguished the civic 
vitality of the republican towns; but they could not rely on the loyalty or 
discipline of a seigneuiralized countryside. The new princes were usually 
called city tyrants. Thus, despite their modernity of means and techniques, 
their famous inauguration of pure 'power politics' as such, the signorie were
Hohenstaufen were the ruling family of Germany during 1138-1208 and of 
Sicily during 1194-1268.
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in fact, inherently unable to generate the characteristic State form of the early 
modern epoch, a unitary Royal Absolutism.^^
Anderson sees the basic reason for the absence of any ascendant power in 
Italy to unify the peninsula in the premature development of mercantile 
capital in the North Italian cities, which prevented the emergence of a 
powerful reorganized feudal State at the national level. It was the wealth and 
vitality of the Lombard and Tuscan Communes which defeated the most 
serious effort to establish a unified feudal monarchy which could have 
provided the basis for a later Absolutism. The basic reason for the failure of 
the Hohenstaufen drive to unify the peninsula lay elsewhere- in the decisive 
economic and social superiority of Northern Italy, which had twice the 
population of the South and the overwhelming majority of the productive 
urban centers of trade and manufacture.^® The Lumbard and Tuscan towns 
proved strong enough to stifle any territorial regroupment on a rural-feudal 
basis. On the other hand, they were inherently incapable of achieving any 
peninsular unification themselves: merchant capital had no possibility of 
dominating a social formation of national dimensions at this date. Thus while
39 Ibid, 162.
Ibid. "It was the thriving Communes of Lombardy, Liguria and Tuscany 
which imported grain because of their advanced division of labor and 
demographic structure while the surpluses of the Mezzogiorno were 
conversely the sign of a thinly settled countryside."
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the Lombard League could victoriously defend the North against imperial 
invasions, it was not itself capable of conquering the feudal South.^^
This strong sense of localism has, of course, had important implications for 
the national integration process since it was a difficult task for the founders of 
the Italian nation-state to divert allegiances from these localities to the idea of 
the 'nation/ Both in the state-building and nation-building stages of national 
integration, this was the most difficult task to overcome. As a result, it has 
been a crucial factor in Italy's late unification as a modern nation-state in 
1870, since it is very hard to talk about an Italian nationalism as compared to 
French nationalism. The idea of 'nation' was alien to the population that was 
strongly linked to the regional or local level of identification.
The Impact of the Church
In addition to the persistence of the local-regional culture and allegiances, a
second and equally important factor has been the role of the Church in the
Italian peninsula. Macchiavelli thought the national ills had all been caused
solely by the Church and stated:
No province was ever united and prosperous unless it was 
under the sway of one republic or one monarch, as in the case 
of France and Spain. And the reason why Italy is not in this 
condition is none other than the Church, for the Church has 
never had the vigor to extend its sway over the whole
« Ibid., 147.
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country....The Church has kept us under slundry lords and 
princes. These have caused so much discord and debility that 
Italy has become the prey not only of powerful barbarians, but 
also of every assailant.^2
Perry Anderson agrees with this view stating that, "the universalist medieval 
institutions of the Papacy and the Empire acted to check the development of 
an orthodox territorial monarchy in both Italy and Germany. In Italy, the 
Papacy resisted any attempt at a territorial unification of the peninsula."43
However, in the beginning of Lombard rule, that is, before the establishment 
of permanent boundaries between Lombard and Byzantine Italy, the political 
power of the bishops was rather weak. The Lombards, as well as the East 
Romans, primarily attacked the towns, and, as a consequence, bishops 
suffered from this. This was particularly true of central and southern Italy, 
where the bishops were faithful to the Pope. Furthermore, as local Roman 
leaders against the victorious Lombards, the bishops in central and southern 
Italy had large military and political responsibilities. Since the Lombards 
regarded these bishops as their military enemies, the episcopal organization 
suffered considerably in the south. In the north, where bishops accepted the 
Lombards, cooperated with the new kings and opposed the Pope, there were 
comparatively few episcopal vacancies. The basis for strong ecclesiastical 
organizations in the south was further weakened by new settlement patterns.
2^ Luigi Barzini, The Italians (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), 334.
43 Perry Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State, (Great Britain: Verso, 1974), 
143.
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the evolution of hilltop villages, the abandonment and reconstruction of 
towns, the general regionalization of the economy, a hypothetical 
demographical decline and the fact that the episcopal towns in the south had 
often been merely large villages even before the Lombard attack. Gradually, 
as the Lombards underwent the process of territorialization and developed 
new social ties and new beliefs-partic ularly through the conversion to 
Christianity, which was mostly finished at the end of the seventh century -, 
the bishops regained much of their ideological importance. However, they 
were not institutionally attached to the kingdom. *^*
During the Middle Ages Italy was divided into a great number of 
independent political entitites that eventually coalesced into five major states- 
Naples, Florence, Rome, Venice and Milan-and several minor ones although 
none of them developed enough strength to conquer and unify the entire 
peninsula. Peculiar to Italy and marking its entire history was the Papal state, 
which the Popes considered essential to ensure their independence from 
secular rulers anxious to dominate the church. For centuries, the Popes 
battled the German-based Holy Roman Empire, which claimed Italy and the 
authority to intervene in Church affairs. The struggle between papacy and 
empire enabled the Italian states to remain independent.^^
** Dick Harrison, The Early State and the Towns: Forms o f Integration in Lombard 
Italy AD 568-774 (Sweden: Lund University Press, 1993), 172-173.
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The animosity between the Kings and the Popes in the eighth century was 
real, but it has been overemphasized. The kings were never religious 
enemies of the Popes. On the contrary, the Lombards seem to have supported 
the Popes, like Gregory II, against the Iconoclastic Byzantines. The problem 
was purely political: the kings rapidly conquered the remaining Byzantine 
territories, and, sooner or later, they would have to attack Rome. The Popes 
were against integration in the Italo-Lombard kingdom and tried in every 
way to oppose the king- by alliances with the emperors in Constantinople, the 
exarchs of Ravenna and the dukes of Naples, the dukes in Spoleto and 
Benevento, and kings of the Franks. “*6
The bishops were not as powerful as they had been before the Lombard 
invasion and as they were to become. Their influence resulted from their 
ideological and social strength as Christian leaders and as the true 
representatives and incarnations of their towns. In southern and central Italy, 
many episcopal seats were vacant, but in the eighth century, several of them 
had been reoccupied, as in the duchy of Spoleto. The bishops had no 
functions as royal officials- there was no national church comparable to the 
one in Visigothic Spain -, but they did influence legislation. They were used 
as judges in certain courts, and at least some of them served in the army
Spencer di Scala, Italy: From Revolution to Republic, 1700 to the Present 
(Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), xix.
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(although this was probably due to the bishop's own status as a free Lombard 
nobleman). The Pope was relatively weak, both ideologically and politically, 
although his influence was definitely growing. His hypothetical influence 
should have been greatest in his own metropolitan province of Tuscany as 
well as in central and southern Italy
The Church claimed title to Rome and States of the Church that cut the 
peninsula in two. The Papacy opposed the German emperor's hegemonic 
ambitions and it fought any initiative in Italy which might lead to a national 
state. For instance, even though the Papacy encouraged the cities of 
Lombardy to organize the Lombard League against the invasions of Frederick 
Barbarossa, after victory, it maneuvered against its perpetuation out of fear 
that the League might become an agency for transpeninsula cooperation, 
which would jeopardize the Church's dominant position and temporal 
power.
The period 875-1024 witnessed political and institutional change in northern 
Italy. As the Carolingian Empire started to decline, some practices were 
introduced that would change the local-center relations. King Berengar, for 
the first time in Italy, needed to give systematic gifts in order to gain and 
maintain support from the notables of the kingdom. The great bulk of them
Harrison, The Early State and the Towns, 209. 
47 Ibid., 222.
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(incastellamento charters) were to the Church, above all to the bishops. This fits 
the Carolingian practice of balancing the power of counts and bishops, for 
counts controlled the military clienteles over which Berengar had lost 
authority. Bishops, however, were themselves by now not politically weak; 
they had their own followings of tenants and vassals and their vast lands. 
Berengar^s concessions and those of his successors tipped the balance 
decisively and permanently in favor of bishops. This was most visible in 
cities. Bishops began to be conceded full comital powers in their cities, 
restricting counts to the countryside.
By the end of the century, the bishops were dominant in most of the cities of 
Emilia and the Veneto and in many cities of Lombardy. Only those of 
Piedmont and Tuscany remained predominantly lay. In time, the whole 
structure of comital power in northern Italy ceded away. Cities were in the
Bishops intruded into the discussion either because the Roman Church 
limited the use of the term city to those places that were the seats of bishops, 
or because Bartolus recognized that the city magistrates of his day were the 
heirs of a jurisdiction that had once belonged to bishops. Bishops originally 
established their headquarters in the cities (civitates) of the Roman Empire. 
When civil government broke down during the Lombard or Frankish period, 
bishops undertook its responsibilities, often receiving or assuming the 
authority of a secular count. This meant that spiritual administration of the 
diocese was combined with secular administration of the county (contado). 
The boundaries of the two jurisdictions tended to coincide, and both were 
administered from the city which was the capital of both. In the eleventh 
century, however, this dual administration came to an end. The bishop was 
deprived of his secular administration, his place was taken by the commune, 
under magistrates called consuls. These new officials did not confine their 
activity to business within the city walls but assumed jurisdiction over the 
contado as well." Griffiths, "The Italian City-State." 77.
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hands of the bishops. Even in the countryside, comital authority was 
undermined by immunities for Church lands and increasingly for castelli, 
which were becoming autonomous bases for completely new concentrations 
of authority and lordship.^^
The consequences of this transfer of authority were complex and in the long 
run, dangerous for the state, because society became more localized. The 
tenth-century kings were doubtless aware of this but regarded the risk worth 
taking. By making concessions, they could attach loyalties of the new local 
powers to their own persons. Berengar and his successors certainly prevented 
one development: that of the hemorrhage of public power into the hands of 
the secular aristocracy, as occurred in France. Cities and castelli were the 
independent foci of public authority, though in castelli this authority was 
becoming privatized in the hands of lay owners. Power in the countryside 
was thus too fragmented to offer an alternative to that of the bishop in the 
cities. Kings, having granted this power to bishops, were often asked to 
confirm it in successive reigns; their authority was still recognized. Berengar 
may not have been able to prevent the collapse of the state, but at least he 
could, through is grants, determine, into whose hands his authority was
Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, 175. 
50 Ibid, 174.
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devolved. Bishops in this respect, were undoubtedly more reliable than the 
counts.5^
Cities were the best centers for the survival of the public relationships of free 
society. Bishops were not able, for the most part, to maintain a private 
hegemony over urban society in the North; it was too socio-economically 
complex and the sources of power there were too strong. It is doubtful that a 
reasonably prosperous city (as nearly all the cities in the North were) could 
ever have passively become the private possession of a lay family as they did 
in the South, even if the counts had kept control of their cities. In 1014, the 
citizens of Mantua obtained a diploma from Henry II recognizing their public 
rights and properties and giving them immunity against all lay officials and 
bishops. Mantua was not a city that had ever received an episcopal immunity, 
and its counts were the members of the house of Canossa, the most influential 
family in the kingdom, who used the city as a major base. Nevertheless, its 
citizens had retained enough sense of their coherence to resist the Canossa 
and obtain this text, and they were even sufficiently aware of their public 
position to call themselves arimanni. The granting of rights to bishops 
elsewhere may have created the problem of the political separation of the 
countryside from the city; for the first time in Italy the restriction of counts to
51 Ibid, 176.
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the countryside and the fragmentation of rural authority created a strong 
rural aristocracy with judicial rights.®^
The Church was particularly successful in Italy because of the broad 
identification of its vision of society with that of the ruling groups. If, at the 
political level, it had been forced to accept its role as a separate, albeit 
autonomous, organization from the secular polity, it remained intimately 
linked by multiple ties to the various nobilities and oligarchies of Italy. The 
Jesuits had replaced the humanists in the education of the noble young. The 
ecclesiastical hierarchy continued to be recruited from patrician families. 
Granting of benefices, lay control of nomination of priests to churches and the 
appointment of administrators of charitable institutions, were instances of the 
continuous, close links between ecclesiastical authorities and secular 
oligarchies. However separate as an organization, the Church confirmed and 
reinforced the aristocratic ideology of society, from its affirmation of the 
sovereign as the earthly manifestation of divine majesty and its hierarchical
2^ Ibid. "The tendency of the Italian city to extend its authority to the borders 
of its contado has been seen as a typically Italian phenomenon to be contrasted 
with the government of the countryside in Europe north of Alps. There, 
despite the developing towns, control of the countryside generally remained 
in the hands of a rural and feudal nobility or fell under the control of a 
territorial prince or national monarch. The same might be said of the duchy of 
Savoy or the kingdom of Naples. But whereas in northern and central Italy, 
the claims of a higher authority were eventually reduced to a nullity by the 
contention between empire and papacy, the city gained sovereignty over the 
countryside."
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structuring of religious ceremonies and processions to its homilies to the 
humble on the duties of respect, obedience and resignation.®^
Possession of land and exemption from taxes or fiscal privilege thus formed 
the basis of noble and ecclesiastical wealth. It was augmented by the exaction 
of seigniorial and ecclesiastical rights. The structure of Italy's feudal past 
survived in countless forms, from the emperor's claim to suzerainty over 
northern and central Italy and the pope's similar claims over the kingdom of 
Naples, to the survival of minute independent fiefs which constellated every 
area of Italy and impeded attempts to impose centralized, uniform 
administrative structures. These feudal legacies sometimes offered protection 
to the peasants, in the form of commonlands or grazing rights, or fixed dues 
paid for virtually perpetual leases received by ancestors in previous 
centuries.®^
The Church was thus open to attack. However, its influence and penetration 
of Italian society remained profound. The very number of clerics bears 
witness to its attraction: there were over 20.000 priests in Piedmont in the 
mid-eighteenth century, 40.000 in Venetia, over 10.000 in the duchy of 
Modena, 11.000 in the kingdom of Naples, perhaps a majority of the 160.000
®® Stuart Woolf, A History o f Italy 1700-1860. Tire Social Constraints o f Political 
Change, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 22.
®4 Ibid., 47.
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inhabitants of the city of Rome. The Church offered security, the possibility of 
a career, at least the advantage of a benefice.®^
By far the greatest juridical problem facing the communes was that of their 
relationship with ecclesiastical power. The rivalry of Church and State is of 
course a major historical theme throughout western Europe since the eleventh 
century, when the Church, under papal leadership, first stated and pressed 
its claim for separateness and independence. The same drama which 
involved the Emperor Henry and Gregory VII, Henry II of England and 
Thomas Becket, Philip Augustus and Innocent III, was played out with no 
less spirit on the myriad stages of communal Italy.
Since the commune was in some respects the legatee of Episcopal authority in 
the cities, the relations of the twin powers were from the beginning inevitably 
difficult, involving several juridical precedents and boundary problems. As 
the commune's reach extended into the countryside, where the bishop always 
held considerable lands and seigniorial rights, clashes were bound to become 
more serious and frequent.
The situation of the communes vis-a-vis the Church was the same as that of 
contemporary'monarchies and the casus belli were similar. One ground for 
dispute was Episcopal and monastic lordship in the contado and the
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commune's claim to exact military service and taxation from the bishop's or 
abbot's men. Particularly sensitive was the status of newly acquired rights; 
some communes legislated to prevent more land and men from passing into 
ecclesiastical hands. A city might also attempt to assert its control by ordering 
a monastic house to acquire property within its walls as a pledge; this was the 
origin of a bitter quarrel in the twelfth century between Lodi and the papacy. 
The whole question of the rival jurisdiction of ecclesiastical law courts and 
those of the commune was supremely fruitful in disputes. The principal 
points at issue were jurisdiction in suits involving clerics as well as laymen 
and such controversial matters as usury, which might concern important 
secular interests as well as ecclesiastical law. There was less argument in 
cases involving indisputable clerics or such undeniably ecclesiastical matters 
as testamentary or marital law, yet a rich crop of controversial circumstances 
survived around the dubious claimant to clerical privilege or the question of 
appeals from the spiritual to the secular courts, not to mention the bishop's 
seigniorial jurisdiction.®^
The Papal style of government did little to foster a common sense of 
citizenship among its constituent communities, as Pius VII recognized frankly 
in the Preamble to his administrative reforms of 1816: "Our state still lacked 
that uniformity which is so useful to public and private interests, since.
®® Waley, The Italian City-Republics, 55-57.
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5® Ibid., 49.
formed by the successive reunion of different dominions, it presented an 
aggregate of naturally diverse usages, laws, and privileges."®^
What seems certain is that the attitude of the Church was critical in 
determining the extent and nature of regional sentiment. The strength and 
direction of regionalism was largely the outcome of the triangular 
relationship between the Church, the government and the landowning and 
urban elites.®® It is important to note that the ecclesiastical orgaiuzation was 
not something imposed forcefully and alien to the Italian society. Some 
historians ironically argue that the Church was an important actor in the 
formation of the modern state in Italy, because it laid the basic infrastructure 
that was important for the birth of the modern state.®^
North-South Duality: The "Two Italies"
H istorical reasons
Perhaps the most important obstacle that the founders of the Italian state had 
to tackle was the deeply-imbedded duality between the historical and
®7 Adrian Lyttelton, "Shifting Identities: Nation, Region and City," in Carl 
Levy ed., Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics (Oxford and 
Washington D.C.: Berg, 1996), 35.
®® Lyttelton, "Shifting Identities," 37.
®^ See Pierangelo Schiera, "Legitimacy, Discipline and Institutions: Three 
Necessary Conditions for the Birth of the Modern State," in The Origins o f the 
Italian State, ed., Julius Bdrshner, 13; Roberto Bizzochi, "Church, Religion and 
State in the Early Modern Period," in The Origins o f the Italian State, 154.
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cultural traditions of the northern and southern parts of Italy. One 
explanation for this duality has been the geographical peculiarity of Italy, 
which caused two different histories and cultures to flourish in the same 
peninsula.
In several studies on medieval history, it is very common to speculate on the 
assumed fundamental difference between Romans and "barbarians". The 
main issues of consideration were whether the Romans were completely 
subordinated to the invaders, or whether the invaders allowed the Romans to 
keep their laws, or how this tension between these two groups was perceived. 
Even today this difference between these two groups are of major interest to 
students of Italy.
According to this line of reasoning, the Italo-Lombard Kingdom was based 
upon the Langobardorum, the Germanic Lombard tribe, that had conquered 
Italy and kept it under its dominance partly by stressing their tribal identity 
as such. Ethnicity was, in other words, an integrating force. The importance 
of ethnicity, as well as its function in society, has been evaluated in different 
ways. Delogu regards ethnicity as one of the main reasons why the kingdom 
eventually disappeared. According to Delogu, traditional Lombard ethnicity 
was, also after conversion to Christianity, structurally opposed to many 
elements of Italian life: Christianity (and official Catholicism in particular).
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romanization, new values and the like. This resulted in internal tensions (such 
as rebellions) and a general lack of political cohesion.^®
Tabacco also regards ethnicity as a determining factor in Italo-Lombard 
history. According to Tabacco, even in the eighth century Lombard society 
was firmly based on the military sphere and thus on soldiers. The soldiers 
were mainly descendants of the original Lombards (although some Romans 
had been assimilated with the invaders). There was no contradiction between 
the new socio-economic groups and the old tribal structure, since the 
landowning stratum identified itself as constituting the Lombard tribe. 
Tabacco does not perceive this system as detrimental to state and society; at 
least, he does not emphasize the tensions in the same way as Delogu does.^ ^
Similar ideas are found in works by Gasparri, according to whom specific 
Lombard ethnicity constituted the backbone of, as well as the reason for, the 
Italo-Lombard kingdom until the end of the seventh century, when the 
conversion to Christianity and the economic differentiation made the 
landowners (possessores) the new basis of society. The explicit difference 
between Lombards and Romans was followed by the difference between rich 
and poor. However, several old traditions remained intact, although within a
Cited in Dick Harrison, The Early State and the Towns: Forms o f Integration in 
Lombard Italy AD 568-774 (Sweden: Lund University Press, 1993).
Ibid.
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Christian framework, and the social differences of the eighth century were 
interpreted in ethnic terms.^ ^
The historical basis of the duality we are concerned with can be identified as 
the Lombard-Roman tension. When the Roman Empire was dismantled the 
northern part of Italy was controlled by the Lombards. Thus being a Roman 
was something very different from being a Lombard, or Langobard.^  ^ The 
Lombard identity was strong even in the ancient times and a good example of 
it was revealed in the memoirs of the bishop of Cremona, Liutprand. 
Liutprand explains that when he served as deacon and ambassador, on one 
occasion, the Byzantian Emperor Nicephorus, angered by something, called 
Liutprand, "not a Roman but a Langobard". The bishop countered this by 
pointing out how the story of Roman origins was one of fratricide, homicide, 
corruption and evil and that the worst possible insult, would, in fact, was to 
be called a Roman.^ Thus what emerges in the tenth and eleventh centuries is 
a centering of interest in the north and a distrust of Rome and the South.
The Lombard League was the most prominent of a series of provincial or 
regional units, based around established and quasi-independent urban
2^ Ibid.
^ The historical usage of the word Lombard is Langobard.
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centers. To a larger degree, however, these urban leagues hark back to the 
Roman administrative organization of Italy and mark a resurgence of 
regional identity rather than of ethnic or other cultural roots. In effect, the 
emergence of the Lombard League had nothing to do with Langobard 
ethnicity. Indeed, the terms "league" and "regional state" are misnomers, 
since their internal cohesion was weak, and allegiance was primarily to one 
or more dominant city or noble family such as the Visconti of Milan.^  ^Thus it 
is probably fair to argue that by the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the term 
Lombardia was merely a memorial to the last Langobard state. Its people, its 
culture and its architecture could trace links back to the former Germanic 
nation, but by the time of Frederick, the terms Lombard and Langobard must 
be seen as totally different labels.
However, Harrison rejects ethnicity as an integrating force in the way it was 
interpreted by others and argues that ethnicity of the early Middle Ages was 
not perceived in an objective way since the peoples of that time were rather 
heterogenous units grouped around a core of nobility, which defined the 
tribe and carried its tradition. Moreover, he argues, even though some 
scholars argue that the Lombards lived separately from the Romans, there are
^ Liutprand, Relatio, ch. 12, in MGH„ SS Rer. Ger., ed. J. Becker (Hanover and 
Leipzig, 1915, 182-93. Cited in Neil Christie, The Lombards: The Ancient 
Langobards (Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, U.S.A: Blackwell, 1995), 225.
^ W. F. Butler, The Lombard Communes: A History o f the Republics o f North Italy 
(London: 1906), 127-158; Tabacco, The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy, 295-
320, cited in The Lombard Communes, 225.
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no actual traces of distinct ethnic quarters in towns or distinct Lombard areas 
of rural habitation.^^
Robert Putnam traces back the roots of civic traditions in both parts of Italy 
and tries to explain the reasons for this duality.^  ^ He argues that two 
strikingly distinctive political regimes, both innovative and both destined to 
have far-reaching social, economic and political consequences, appeared 
around 1100 in separate parts of the peninsula. In the south, after the 
breakdown of the Byzantine government, a powerful Norman kingdom built 
upon Byzantine and Arab foundations emerged. In the north, on the other 
hand, the attempts to revive the imperial power proved futile and local 
particularisms triumphed all over again. Here the communes became city- 
states and this area was ultimately called communal Italy. *^
Even though economically, the southern towns such as Palermo, Bari, Amalfi, 
Naples, Messina were well-off like their northern counterparts, in its social 
and political arrangements, the South was strictly autocratic. This pattern of 
authority was imposed by Frederick IPs reforms. The highly centralized 
character of the kingdom prevented effective self-government by cities. Thus,
^ Harrison, The Early State, 43, 48.
Putnam et al.. Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
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even though the Southern towns showed some signs of desire for self- 
government, they were soon incorporated by a network of central and local 
officials responsible only to the king. The barons and the townsmen were 
controlled by the royal administration and the civic lives of artisans and 
merchants were regulated from the center. Therefore, any glimmerings of 
communal autonomy was extinguished from the very beginning.^  ^ The 
regime remained a feudal monarchy even under the successive Spanish and 
French rules.
In the north, there was a completely different evolution. The anarchy that was 
endemic to all Europe was also prevalent in the north as well as in the south. 
However, the reaction was somehow different in the North. The remedy was 
sought less on vertical hierarchy, but more on the horizontal collaboration.^  ^
As a result, communes were formed through voluntary associations, groups 
of neighbors and the like, which had no coimection with the public 
institutions of the old regime. Soon, these groups, with strong civic patriotism 
already mentioned, began to press for broader political reform which would 
secure order in their respective cities.
Ibid., 121-122, J. K. Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval Italy: The Evolution 
o f Civil Life 1000-1350 (London: Macmillan, 1973), 38.
69 Ibid., 123.
70 Ibid., 124.
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The civic consciousness in the north was revealed by the organization of the 
Lombard League founded between Verona, Vicenza, Padua and Treviso in 
Northern Italy. Three years later this coalition was strengthened by the 
adherence of another league comprising Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua and 
Cremona, once the Emperor's closest Lombard ally. Other cities, including 
Milan, Ferrara and the main communes of Emilia (Parma, Modena and 
Bologna) joined at the same time.
The Lombard League's military successes forced the Emperor to modify his 
aims in northern Italy. After the Treaty of Constance (1183) Frederick 
resigned himself to a policy of compromise with the Lombard cities and the 
terms of an agreement reached with Milan in 1185 read in many respects like 
a settlement between equal powers. Mutual engagements were made, the 
Emperor promising that 'we shall maintain the city of Milan and aid . . . the 
Milanese to maintain all their possessions and rights' and that 'we shall make 
no alliance with any city, place or person of Lombardy, the March (of 
Treviso) or Romagna except with the consent of the Milanese'. The effect of 
the military struggle was naturally to sharpen the citizens' awareness of their 
constitutional singularity. Something of this enters into the reported speeches 
of the City representatives at Ferrara in 1177, of which we may accept the 
purport if not the exact words. These orators spoke of imperial 'persecution', 
of 'the Emperor's oppression of Italy and the freedom of the Church'. The 
aim of the cities was 'never to relinquish that liberty which [they] inherited
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from [their] fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers': '[they] would 
rather meet a glorious death with liberty, than live a wretched life in 
servitude'/^
Econom ic Reasons
By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the cities of northern and central Italy, 
as much as the countryside, had already acquired that characteristic 
physiognomy of towers and civic buildings, of markets and an economic 
battle which amazed all foreign visitors and distinguished Italy from the rest 
of Europe. In a feudal world, with their universalistic ideals of Church and 
Empire and the supremacy of their merchants in their respective communes, 
independent city states in northern Italy imposed themselves on Europe 
because of an undeniable economic hegemony, soon accompanied by a 
cultural superiority.^  ^ Intimately associated with civic republicanism was a 
rapid growth in commerce. As civil order was established, the northern 
merchants expanded their trading networks, first in the regions around each 
city-state and then gradually further. The prosperity produced by trade 
helped, in turn, to shape and sustain the civic institutions of the city- 
republics.
71 Ibid., 92-23.
72 Woolf, A Historxj o f Italy, 14-15.
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Unlike the wealth of the Sicilian kingdom, based on land, the growing 
prosperity of the northern Italian city-states was rooted in finance and 
commerce/^ Contractual arrangements and the extension of credits were 
prominent features of the commercial activity in towns of north and central 
Italy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Thus by the beginning of the fourteenth century, there were two patterns of 
governance in the same peninsula with their associated cultural features- the 
Norman feudal aristocracy in the South and communal republicanism in the 
N o r t h . I n  the south. Pax was to be secured by the preservation of the 
kingdom from those changes and tensions which were tearing northern and 
central Italy apart. Thus the independent commune was seen as the principal 
enemy. Against the danger to the existing order posed by the towns the 
monarchy looked to traditional allies, first to the Sicilian Church and second 
and above all, to the nobility.
In the North, feudal bonds of personal dependence were weakened; in the 
South they were strengthened. In the North, people were citizens, in the 
South they were subjects. Legitimate authority in the North was only 
delegated by the community to public officials, who remained responsible to 
those with whose affairs they were entrusted. Legitimate authority in the
73 Lamer, Italy in the Age o f Dante and Petrarch, 187.
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South was monopolized by the king, who although he might delegate 
administrative tasks to officials and might confirm the nobles in their 
privileges, was responsible only to God. In the North, while religious 
sentiments remained profound, the Church was also a powerful and wealthy 
proprietor in the feudal order. In the North, the crucial social, political and 
even religious allegiances and alliances were horizontal, while those in the 
South were vertical. Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation and 
even trust were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief virtue, in 
the south, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent 
anarchy ."75
As a result two different societies and ways of life faced each other in the 
same peninsula. "The one, authoritative, romantic, employing all the learning 
of the present to preserve the venerable practices of the past; the other 
individualistic, violent, often squalid, creating the world of the future."^^
74 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 130.
75 Ibid., 130.
75Larner, Italy in the Age o f Dante and Petrarch, 29.
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CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALISM IN ITALY
Despite the background factors that acted as potential obstacles in the way of 
forming a modern nation-state, Italy, nevertheless, did not remain unaffected 
from the revolutionary wave that swept away the whole of Europe after the 
French Revolution in 1789. As a result of the impact of the revolution, Italy 
took its place among the other European states as a unified, centralized, and 
modern nation-state in 1870, a process that, as noted, is referred to as 
Risorgimento (Resurrection or Revival)^ It was a critical period when 
important transformations had taken place in Italy-the collapse of the andén 
regime, the development of a parliamentary system, the breakdown of the 
traditional rural society and the birth of a modern urban life, the transition 
from a feudal to a capitalist economy and the replacement of local or regional
1 Edgar Holt defines Risorgimento as "the process by which Italians belatedly 
conquered freedom from foreign domination, unity under one law and one 
government, relative liberty for the people, and a cautious parliamentary 
regime." Edgar Holt, The Making o f Italy 1815-1870 (New York: Atheneum, 
1971), 2.
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identities by a single national culture.  ^ Thus with Risorgimento a modern 
state was to be established in all respects.^
The Napoleonic Prelude to Unification (1789-1848): The Rise of
Nationalist Tendencies
Italian nationalism did not exist as a political reality before 1796. The Italian 
Jacobins were the first to talk of the creation of a united Italy as a concrete 
political project and their concept of the nation was derived from the French 
Revolution. For the French revolutionaries, the nation was not a given; it had 
to be created. The historical heritage was irrelevant, even dangerous. In the 
Italian case, the crisis of the ancien regime was associated with conflicts over 
reforms, the attempts to raise revenue through increased taxation and the
2 Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgmento: State, Society and National Unification 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 1.
3 Other works on Italian Risorgimento include J. A. Davis ed., Gramsci and 
Italy's Passive Revolution, (London,1979), Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and 
Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict, (Cambridge, 2"«* ed., 1985), A. W. 
Salomone ed., Italy from Risorgimento to Fascism. An Inquiry into the Origins of 
the Totalitarian State, (New York, 1970), P. Bevilacqua, Breve Storia dell'Italia 
Méridionale dall'ottocento a oggi [The History of Southern Italy from 1800 to 
today], (Rome, 1993), D. Beales, Tlte Risorgimento and the Unification o f Italy, 
(London, edn. 1981), J. A. Davis and Paul Ginsborg (eds.). Society and 
Politics in the Age o f the Risorgimento. Essays in Honour o f Denis Mack Smith, 
(Cambridge, 1991), C. Cingari, Mezzogiorno e Risorgimento. La Restaurazione a 
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Church and nobility which resented the attack on their special privileges and 
position in the political hierarchy.^
Thus the outbreak of the revolution in France was greeted in many parts of 
the Italian peninsula with enthusiasm and keen anticipation. The Revolution 
and its aftermath accelerated Italian thinking on liberation and unification. 
The impact of the French revolution and the Napoleonic era upon the 
evolution of Italian nationalism can be analyzed in two phases. In the first 
phase, the impact was positive for the flourishing of nationalist ideas, in the 
second phase it was negative, since it nourished reaction.
French nationalism was suitable for transplantation into Italy, where the 
historical basis for a political concept of nationality was lacking. The adoption 
of this concept was also facilitated by a shift in the meaning of the word patria 
(motherland) and its derivatives. Originally used in a neutral sense to refer to 
a person's place of birth, or, at most, the state of which one was a subject, it 
became charged with a new political significance. The patria could only be an 
association of free citizens, and a patriot was someone who worked for the 
cause of freedom against despotism. Paradoxically, it was the universality of 
the new idea of patriotism which prepared the ground for a new idea of the
* Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 11.
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nation, because it implied a refusal of the legitimacy of the existing absolutist 
states. 5
Not only did the French bring something positive to Italy, but in time the 
high taxes which they imposed and which Napoleon's wars made necessary, 
generated a strong opposition which took place in the development of 
national consciousness whereas the reformers of the eighteenth century had 
worked happily in the context of enlightened despotism, this generation and 
the next were open to much more radical aspirations of political liberty; and a 
causal chain was to lead from ideas of popular sovereignty to those of Italian 
patriotism. Filippo Buonarotti, a Tuscan radical who in the 1790s became a 
Frenchmen by adoption, belonged to those who talked this new language of 
popular sovereignty. He and the more progressive among Italian Jacobins 
were able to glimpse at some possibility of a unified peninsula, and the 
detached position of exiles sometimes enabled them to see more clearly the 
relation between their own home provinces and the Italian nation at large.^
The propaganda for the new ideas of the French Revolution was effective 
because the victories of Bonaparte's armies demonstrated the weakness and
5 Adrian Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," in The National Question 
in Europe, eds., Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 63.
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vulnerability of the old states and created a political vacuum. Austria was 
expelled from Lombardy, and it soon became clear that the other states of 
northern and central Italy retained their independence only on French 
sufferance. One response to the crisis of the old states was the resurgence of 
old municipal aspirations to 'liberty'. But this, curiously, created a base for 
unitarianism: the call for a united Italy found its greatest response in 
provincial cities like Brescia and Reggio Emilia, where it was seen as a way of 
challenging the hegemony of the old capitals (Venice and Modena).
The most important discussion of the national question took place in the 
context of a literary competition organized under the supervision of the 
French as the occupying power in Lombardy. The famous concorso announced 
in September 1796 offered a prize for the best essay on the question Quale del 
governi liberi tneglio convegna alia felicita delVItalia (Which form of free 
government is best adapted to the happiness of Italy).  ^ The winner of the 
competition, Melchiorre Gioia rejected federalism and took the 1795 French
 ^ Denis Mack Smith, The Making o f Italy 1796-1866 (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 
1968), 6.
 ^"In 1796, after Napoleon's successful invasion of Piedmont and Lombardy, 
the French-dominated administration at Milan offered a prize for an essay on 
what type of government would best suit Italy. The circumstances of the 
competition dictated that their general tone would be solidly pro-French and 
anti-Austrian, pro-republican and anti-monarchic. Some contributors 
interpreted 'Italy' as meaning just what they called "the Lombard nation", 
other, even when they included the whole peninsula, left Sicily out
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Constitution as his model. However, he rejected violent revolution as a 
method. Unity should only be achieved gradually, through the spontaneous 
imitation of the positive example set by the republic in the liberated 
territories. This program did not preclude the possibility of compromise with 
the existing Italian states, and it did not arouse fears of the Directory that the 
adoption of a radical program in Italy might favor the revival of Jacobin 
extremism in France itself. Gioia, who became one of Italy's leading 
economists, can be seen as a link between the native Enlightenment tradition 
of practical, modernizing reform and the new Jacobin patriotism. Gioia 
rejected federalism, because it would merely perpetuate those local 
differences which would weaken the Republic. It was the task of the 
legislator to destroy harmful and obsolete local prejudices by a uniform 
system of laws, and thereby create the new customs which would give a 
moral basis to the new state.*  Another reason why Gioia rejected federalism 
was that federalism would provide insufficient guarantees for national 
security. The example of Switzerland, invoked by federalists, was misleading 
because Italy lacked the protection given by the former's mountainous 
terrain. Exposed to the constant threat of invasion by more powerful 
neighbors, Italy needed a political system capable of reacting with more
etc...Nevertheless, there was a clear assumption that some kind of Italian 
nation existed, or ought to exist." See Smith, TJie Making o f Italy, 13.
* Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 65.
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rapidity and decision.^ Thus the idea of a united and single state was the 
most important contribution of the Napoleonic period in Italy.
Although new ideas had taken root throughout the peninsula, they flourished 
most in these provinces that composed a single state, under the name of the 
Kingdom of Italy. Bonaparte had decided to make several million Italians 
into Frenchmen. First the Piedmontese, then the Genoese, then the Tuscans 
and finally the Romans. An artificial line now separated populations who 
intended by their topographical position, by their language and common 
origin, by nature itself to form a single nation. Bonaparte imagined he could 
level the Alps, or rather transport them to his arbitrary line of demarcation by
 ^ Ibid. Smith quotes Gioia on the possibility of a federal solution: "Anyone 
who has analyzed political communities and knows how avid they are for 
esteem, how sensitive to contempt, how ready to take alarm, how difficult to 
reconcile, how fertile in ruses, obstinate in their scheming yet limited in aims, 
will readily conclude that a confederation of various political bodies with 
separate existences, laws of their own and local interests, is inevitably slow 
when it comes to planning, slower still when it comes to carrying plans out, 
and only too ready for disagreement. Each member of the confederation will 
consult its own interests only, will put aside thoughts for the future, will exalt 
its own contribution regardless of that of the others, will shut its eyes to the 
general good, and hence will inevitably oppose decisions lacking immediate 
advantage to itself...If Italy were divided into a number of federal republics, 
the seabord cities would have already fallen to an invader before the general 
Italian congress had decided what to do." In addition to these remarks, Gioia 
also argues that Italy has almost always been invaded by foreign powers 
which have "violated their rights...and made themselves as the masters of 
their estate. Thus in her opinion, " ...it is therefore best to provide her (Italy) 
with the sort of government capable of opposing the maximum of resistance 
to invasion. That government is beyond question a unitary republic: vis unita 
fortior. Smith, The Making o f Italy 14.
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a single decree. This led to an entirely novel phenomenon. Beside the same 
river, in the same country, the national language was encouraged on one 
bank and proscribed on the other. To speak of the independence of Italy was 
a crime in Parma, a virtue in Modena. The whole of French Italy was full of 
people who were French employees, from the prefect to the lowliest tax 
collector. Italian conscripts were used to fill up the ranks of the French 
regiments.^*’
The Kingdom of Italy that was made up by Napoleon, meanwhile was 
governed in an entirely different way. Bonaparte preserved its language, 
created a national army and a military spirit, appointed people of the country 
to all official posts, and indeed left no foreigner there except the Viceroy. Men 
of great ability found themselves at the head of affairs, and this lent great 
impetus to the national spirit. They directed education and guided the 
growing generation. Young men learned the use of arms, the arts were 
encouraged, monuments worthy of ancient Romans were erected and the 
national language and literature were cultivated with enthusiasm.
The inhabitants of different provinces, separated hitherto not by distance but 
by their customs, by the old cleavage between themselves, and the
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government, began to know one another better and perceive one another as 
members of the same nation. From year to year, from day to day, this union 
became more intimate, these feelings grew in strength, these hopes became 
more general. Forced to obey the ruling power, which at that time seemed 
irresistible, they preferred to submit to the French ruler than to the French 
nation. Forced to fight for a foreign cause, they consoled themselves with the 
thought that they were practicing for the day when they would be fighting 
for their own independence... These were the ideas prevailing in Italy when 
in 1812, Bonaparte's star began to pale.^ ^
However, the real intentions of France were different and the Directorate saw 
the uses of Italian patriotism as purely instrumental. Prior to 1796, they did 
not recognize an Italian question, only an Austrian question and even after 
Bonaparte's conquests they valued the acquisition of Italian territory above all 
as a means of bringing pressure on Austria to make peace and concede the 
Rhine frontier. Therefore, Italian unity would be an inconvenient obstacle to 
this policy. Realists argued that it was in any case in France's long-term 
interest to keep Italy weak, divided and dependent. At first, it suited 
Bonaparte to give a greater degree of encouragement to the cause of Italian 
liberty and independence, as part of a personal policy designed to free
10 Smith, The Making o f Italy, 21.
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himself from the restrictions which the Directorate would have liked to 
impose on his sphere of action. But for him too the Italian patriots were a tool 
which should not be allowed to interfere with the requirements of realpolitik, 
or his own personal ambition. This became obvious with the Treaty of 
Campoformio (18 October 1797) which surrendered Venice to Austria.^  ^This 
can be regarded as the turning point when Italian enthusiasm for the French 
turned from positive to negative.
The discordance between the French propaganda and French policy created a
paradoxical situation. The first had encouraged the ideal of a free and united
nation; the second was an obstacle to its realization. Italian patriots were
forced either to redefine their aims or to contest their patrons. Thus patriots
were torn between admiration for French models and the need to assert
Italian autonomy and independence. For a long time, the terms of the
national question in Italy were to be essentially defined by this dilemma. The
easiest way out was through a reaffirmation of Jacobin ideals,^  ^Smith argues:
Italians were perhaps the first people of Europe to realize the 
falsity of the revolutionary doctrines and repudiate them, while 
trying to derive some benefit from the great upheaval. There 
were many men in Italy, cultured, judicious and high-minded, 
who had desired change only in the hope of liberating their
Ibid., 21.
3^ Ibid, 66.
Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 66.
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country and saving it from being eternally the theater of war 
between other nations. These men were soon disgusted by the 
excesses of the revolutionaries; relinquishing their democratic 
dreams and false ideas of exaggerated liberty, they decided to 
make use of prevailing conditions to wipe out old divisions and 
awaken a sense of patriotism.^^
At the same time, disappointment opened the door for Italy's most articulate 
writers and inspired poets who continued the tradition of intellectuals' 
commitment to the national cause. They were singularly responsible for the 
growth of cultural nationalism and its escalation into political nationalism.
In sharp contrast with the liberal ideas that he defended, there was no place 
for national self-determination in Napoleon's imperial vision. The Kingdom 
of Italy was allowed to annex new territory, in the Veneto, the Tyrol and the 
Marche; but the smaller independent states were absorbed piecemeal into the 
French Empire. They were governed directly from Paris by French prefects.!^ 
Napoleon was a unifier by temperament and conviction. This was apparent 
in the program he had sketched out for the Republic of Italy when he became 
its president: "You have only particular laws and you need general laws. 
Your people has only local customs and it is necessary that you acquire
Smith, Tlie Making of Italy, 21.
15 Ronald S. Cunsolo, Italian Nationalism, From its Origins to World War II 
(Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1990), 46.
Lyttelton,, "The National Question in Italy," 70.
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national habits/'^  ^In fact, not just the Kingdom of Italy, but all the territories 
directly or indirectly controlled by Napoleon came to share a broadly similar 
system of administration. The Napoleonic legal codes were extended to Italy 
and Naples with little modification, and the same was true of the prefectoral 
system. Taxation and public debt were reformed and simplified. Napoleonic 
reforms consolidated the new elite of bureaucrats, magistrates, legal and 
financial experts and statisticians which had already begun to form during 
the Enlightenment. In the end, the Napoleonic system emerged as the 
dominant model for the construction of a modern and unified national state.
Some Conclusions About the Impact of the Napoleonic Period
upon Nationalism in Italy
Undoubtedly, Napoleon was remarkably successful in controlling and 
manipulating Italian national sentiment. Nevertheless, the Napoleonic regime 
may have actually encouraged the growth of a feeling of Italian national 
identity. The Napoleonic legacy in this way contributed to the solution of the 
national question in political and administrative terms; the Napoleonic period 
formed the foundations for that "unconditional unitarianism' and uniformity 
of response to diverse local conditions which has often been seen as the 
besetting sin of the new Italian state. However, even the centralized system of
iHbid.,71.
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government and the 'General laws' did not necessarily produce 'national 
habits', and in their absence the former's significance might be distorted.
Both the positive attempts to win consensus by appealing to 'national' 
symbols, and the realities of French supremacy combined to work in this 
direction. In reaction to Napoleon's identification with Imperial Rome, Italian 
writers could only express their opposition by repudiating the Roman 
heritage. The later revival of the 'idea of Rome' obscures the fact that in its 
origins the Risorgimento was predominantly anti-Roman. After 1815, the 
interest in primitive Italic antiquity was largely superseded by the new 
attention paid to the free communes of the Middle Ages as the true nursery of 
Italian nationality. Both in the pre-Roman and post-Roman periods the origin 
of the Italian nation was divorced from Rome as a reaction against French 
imperialism. In the years after 1814, the poetry of Ugo Foscolo became a 
common bond for Italians who emigrated from every part of the country to 
serve Napoleon's regime in Milan. Nevertheless, the idea of Italy remained 
mainly as a literary idea and nothing more. "Occasionally we hear the word 
Italy," wrote one contemporary writer, Pietro Giordani, in 1816, "but it finds 
no echo in people's hearts." Mainly because the local forces were so weak, 
foreign help and ideas and models were needed to bring Italians together in a
Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 71.
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single nation. However, the varied contribution made by other countries is an 
example of different kinds of motive and process which went toward the 
formation of Italy, Inside the country, too, there were many separate currents 
of opinion and action which were to lead toward this one goal, some of which 
in retrospect may seem almost contradictory. The growth of national 
consciousness, namely the quarrels and rivalries between different groups of 
Italians.^“
The French Revolution, followed by the Napoleonic invasion of Italy had 
important effects on the growth of Italian nationalism. Not only did the 
French bring something positive to Italy, but in time the high taxes which 
they imposed and which Napoleon's wars made necessary, generated a 
strong opposition which took place in the development of national 
consciousness. Whereas the reformers of the eighteenth century had worked 
happily in a context of enlightened despotism, this generation and the next 
were open to much more radical aspirations of political liberty; and a causal 
chain was to lead from ideas of popular sovereignty to those of Italian 
patriotism. Filippo Buanorotti, a Tuscan radical who in the 1790s became a 
Frenchmen by adoption, belonged to those who spoke this new language of 
popular sovereignty. The more progressive among Italian Jacobins and he
Ibid., 74.
20 Smith, The Making of Italy, 8,
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were able to glimpse some possibility of a more unified peninsula, and the 
detached position of exiles sometimes enabled them to see more clearly the 
relation between their own home provinces and the Italian nation at large. i^
Ideological Precursors of Risorgimento
From the second half of the eighteenth century, the whole Italian political 
movement revolved around two basic principles which were the two poles of 
Italian political life; the Roman Idea (I'idea Romana) and the Municipal Idea 
(I'idea municipale). The former defended the idea of political unity and thus 
the victory of the monarchy. The latter defended the idea of maintaining the 
glorious tradition of the communes and unite them in a single state. The 
principle of municipality, thus, led to a search for a new order (novus ordo) 
where regional autonomy, administrative autonomy and decentralization 
gained prominence. 22
The Roman idea and the Municipal idea were two contradictory forces. The 
Roman idea identified itself with Italy during the Roman Republic and 
Empire, with complete sovereignty, absolute unitarism, based on the
21 Ibid., 6.
22 Antonio Monti, Uldea Federalistica Italiana e I Progetti di Federazione Europea. 
[The Italian Idea of Federalism and The Projects of an European Federation] 
(Bari: Laterza, 1922) 19.
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principle of "Tm regere imperio populos, Romane, memento" and "Civis romanus 
sum". The second idea on the other hand, referred to the age of communes 
and the Signorie.^  ^ Thus these contrasting ideas persisted for ages even up 
until now in Italy. They can be regarded as the precursors of the unitarist and 
federalist ideas that constituted the main cleavage among the ideologues and 
the politicians of Italian political life.
Unitarianism of Giuseppe Mazzini^^
French Jacobin  Influence on M azzini
Mazzini's unitarianism owed much to the Jacobin tradition. The young 
Giuseppe Mazzini, like the aged Filippo Buonarroti, owed much of his initial 
influence to his ties with French republican leaders.^  ^ He insisted that the 
popular sovereignty of the nation must be indivisible, and viewed all forms 
of federalism as devices for prolonging the hegemony of local ruling classes.^^
23 Ibid., 20.
24 On Mazzini, see also Franco della Peruta, Mazzini e i Riwluzionari Italiani. II 
ParHto d'Azione. 1830-1845 [Mazzini and The Italian Revolutionaries. The 
Action Party. 1830-1845], (Milan: n. p., 1974).
25 Stuart Woolf, A Historp o f Italxj 1700-1860. The Social Constraints o f Political 
Change (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 303.
25 Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 82.
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Mazzini saw European’ literature as the expression of the progress of 
modern civilization and the alliance of peoples employing a widespread 
romantic motif of these years. He looked to the "genius", perhaps with echoes 
of Napoleon, as a figure capable of interpreting the future destinies of 
peoples and humanity through his superior qualities and intuition. Until the 
revolutions of 1830-1, Mazzini combined his practical conspiratorial activities 
with an open cultural campaign in local Ligurian newspapers in which his 
romantic faith in progress and in the function of the writer as the expression 
of public opinion was accompanied by his affirmation of the existence of God 
and his exaltation of patriotic martyrdom.^^
But during those intense, creative months of June-July 1831, Mazzini 
remained close to the sectarian world of Orleanist France, making contact 
with republican groups at Marseilles and democratic leaders in Lyon and 
Paris. The future structure of Young Italy (Giovane Italia) was already 
outlined- membership restricted to ages under 40, a central congregation with 
provincial congregations in Italy and a reduction of the complex, macabre 
sectarian rituals to simple secret passwords. But, most significantly, members
27 Woolf, A History o f Italy 1700-1860, 304-305.
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of Young Italy were obliged to belong to other sects in order to direct them 
towards the aims of the new association,
Saint-Sim onianism  ofM azzin i in the 'Making o f  the Italian  People'
The entire philosophy of natural rights was tacitly rejected and replaced by 
Mazzini's ethical-religious vision of God revealing himself through the 
indefinite, continuous progress of humanity, which was effected by the 
creation of nations : "Where God has wished there be a nation, the necessary 
forces exist to create it" . Mazzini believed that the progressive series of 
European changes inevitably guided European societies towards forming 
themselves into vast unitary masses. Mazzini's program and method, in fact, 
were outlined in explicit polemic against the lack of principles and the 
gradualism and federalism of the old sects in Italy. Italy was to be republican 
because sovereignty resided in the nation and because Italy's past was wholly 
republican; it was to be Unitarian because federalism weakened the nation.^^
Between the initial insurrection and the subsequent determination after Italy's 
liberation; he was prepared to recognize the need for a small dictatorial 
group in the first stage, although subsequently a 'National Council' would be 
the source of all power. Strongly influenced by Saint-Simonian ideas, Mazzini
2* Ibid., 305.
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elaborated on the duality of the "critical" age of individualism and 
skepticism and the coming dawn of the new "organic" age of the people, 
which would be characterized by "association", a universal principle which 
marked the progress of humanity.
But the central theme which linked this ethical-religious philosophy of 
history to the practical realization of the Italian revolution, was Mazzini's 
analysis of the role of the people. Deeply conscious of the absence of the 
"multitudes" in the past Italian revolutions and at their present strength in 
France and England, Mazzini sought for the means to arouse their support. 
Defining the people in Saint-Simonian terms, as 'the most numerous and 
poorest class' Mazzini recognized that their support could only be won by 
painting the material benefits they would gain: "The people had been 
corrupted by centuries of servitude, they were unaware of the new
transitional age in which they lived..... No revolution could succeed without
the masses: But, equally, these 'multitudes' could not achieve the revolution 
without proper leadership."^! For Mazzini the initiative had to come from the
2’ Ibid., 306. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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"intellects", the "middle class", the educated young.^  ^ Thus for Mazzini, the 
solution to unite divided Italy laid in the doctrines of Saint-Simon and their 
followers and their ideal of a civic faith which would overcome in a new 
synthesis the sterile eighteenth century antithesis between reason and 
orthodox belief.33 It was also in Saint-Simonianism that he found the specific 
idea of the end of the era of individualism and the beginning of a new era of 
collective behavior.
Man's central and great duty, Mazzini insisted, is to all mankind. And in 
order to enable man to fulfill his duty to mankind, nationalities and national 
states exist. "The nation is the God-appointed instrument for the welfare of 
the human race, and in this alone its moral essence lies. . . . Fatherlands are 
but workshops of humanity".^ Each nation, according to Mazzini, has two 
important functions to perform. First, it must educate and train its members 
in the light of the moral law: Secondly, it must arrange and direct its activities 
on behalf of humanity at large. "Nationalism," he declared "is what God has 
prescribed to each people in the work of humanity," and he laid down a "law 
of nationality" in relation to humanity and duty: Making its pace with the 
march of humanity; having for its starting point the people; for its stepping
32 Ibid., 307.
33 Lyttelton, "The National Question in Italy," 82.
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stones, the consequences of its principle logically deduced and vigorously 
applied; for its driving force, the strength of all; for its purpose, the 
amelioration of all and, "the greatest good of the greatest number; and for its 
goal, the accomplishment of the task which God has assigned it in the world. 
There is Nationality."^^
Thus for Mazzini, moral values and politics, are inseparable. Ethnographical 
and anthropological elements are not sufficient by themselves, without the 
ethic factor (fattore etico). The nation is not just a political concept, but a 
political principle and thus what forms the nation and which is the fruit of 
liberty and independence is the moral and civil consciousness of the 
citizens.3^
M azzini against Class D ivisions and Conflicts
Inevitably, Mazzini was hostile to all class conflict because of its divisive and 
diversive effects. It was on this issue, perhaps more than on any other, that he 
was to part company definitively with Buonarroti. Although Mazzini was 
ready to admit that the history of the progressive development of the popular 
element through eighteen centuries of events and wars was the history of "the
Carlton J. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1931), 155.
35 Ibid., 155-156.
35 Monti, LTdea Federalistica Italiana, 77-78.
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war between individuals and the universal, between the fractionizing and the 
unitary system, between "privilege" and the "people", he nevertheless 
concluded dogmatically: "We abhor fraternal bloodshed. We do not want 
terror erected into a system, we do not want the subversion of legitimately 
acquired rights, nor agrarian laws, nor useless violations of individual 
faculties, nor usurpation of property"^ .^ In fact, "if you convert a revolution 
into a war of classes, you will come to ruin, or you will not survive without 
unheard-of violence, without acquiring the reputation of usurpers, without 
accusations of a new tyranny."^*
Preoccupied with the danger of alienating the crucial support of the middle 
classes, Mazzini was also convinced that there was no justification for class 
warfare in Italy. Although at moments he recognized the abject poverty of the 
peasantry, which rendered it "disposed towards the most desperate attempts, 
merely if it is comforted and guided."^ ,^ his propaganda was directed 
exclusively towards the urban poor. He himself recognized the difficulties of 
penetrating a world of illiteracy by his method of written propaganda, 'the 
one Mazzinian attempt to write popular dialogues - that of his follower
37 Woolf, A History/ o f Ital}/ 1700-1860, 308.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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Gustavo Modena -soon collapsed. As Mazzini admitted to Niccolo Tommaseo 
in a letter in 1834: "As for speaking to the people, you are right - and I would 
speak : but the paths are lacking, and we wander around in a circle without 
breaking out of it. The people cannot read."
Breaking Aw ay front the French Revolutionary Ideas
Mazzini's immediate reaction - the creation of the association of "Young 
Europe" - was a deliberate attempt to challenge French primacy and destroy 
the influence of the Buonarrotian Carboneria; and by 1835 he could proudly 
claim to have caused its disintegration. By the time the 77-year-old 
Buonarrotti died (1837), Mazzini's own movement was undergoing a crisis. 
Giovane Italia had spread rapidly in northern and central Italy and by 1833 
Mazzinian ideas even inspired isolated groups in Neapolitan provinces. But 
Piedmont was the state where Mazzini counted most support particularly in 
Genoa, Alessandria and Turin, among the young officers and soldiers.'*^
According to Mazzini, it was necessary to free European democracy of the 
myth of the French Revolution:
The past kills us. I state with conviction: the French revolution 
crushes us. It weighs on the party, like a nightmare, and 
hinders its growth. It dazzles us with the luster of its gigantic
0^ Ibid.
Ibid., 311.
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struggles. It hypnotizes us with its victories. - We go down on 
our knees before it. We ask everything of it, men and things. . . .  
Now, our fathers did not ape anyone. They drew their 
inspiration: from contemporary sources, the needs of the masses 
and the nature of the elements that surrounded them. They 
belonged to their time.^ ^
Within this vision of individual national initiatives, sometimes interpreted as 
the mission of guiding nations within great ethnic agglomerates (Slav, 
Germanic, Greek-Latin), Italy possessed a unique place in the regeneration of 
Europe because of the universal function of Rome: "The call for modern unity 
can start for the third time from Rome alone, because the absolute destruction 
of the old unity can begin from Rome alone." The "third Rome" became 
the symbol not only of Italian independence and unity, but of the overthrow 
of the old Europe and consolidation of the new social epoch: Mazzini 
successfully appropriated for the democrats the age-old Catholic, universalist 
image of the Holy City, and offered an alternative to the negative judgement 
of Rome as the major obstacle to Italian unity, enshrined in the lay intellectual 
tradition since Machiavelli and Guicciardini.^  ^Thus the completion of Italian 
unity entailed the destruction not only of the Papacy's temporal authority but 
of its spiritual authority as well. "It would bring about a secular millenium in 
which superstition would be finally banished from the earth and the
42 Ibid., 313.
43 Ibid.
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'regenerated' nations would rise again from the dead, united in harmony by 
the common cult of Humanity.^s
Mazzini's nationalism was essentially democratic. He rejected both the 
elitism of the moderates and the belief in revolutionary dictatorship of the 
Jacobin tradition. He added universal suffrage as a fourth prerequisite to the 
triad of Union, Independence and Liberty. The nation must be co-terminous 
with the people, and without democracy national unity would be an empty 
formula. National consciousness could only be formed through acHve 
popular participation in the struggle for independence. This could be 
realized, according to him, through a guerrilla warfare. However, at this 
point, Mazzini came across a great obstacle that would stand in the way: 
guerrilla warfare would not succeed without the support of the peasants. On 
the other hand, the backing of the clergy had been indispensable for winning 
the peasants to the national cause. The Italian republicans were never 
successful in overcoming the cultural gap between town and country. The 
populist urge to rediscover rural life and folk culture, which was so strong a
44 Ibid.
45 Lyttelton, "The National Question in Europe," 83.
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component of many nineteenth-century nationalisms was largely lacking in 
Italy.46
The Federalism of Carlo Cattaneo
The federal idea in Italy mainly derived from the I'idea municipale, even 
though it may be thought that the federal idea is a poliHcal and the municipal 
idea is a social idea. But they are two complementary ideas and the 
underlying idea of both is the principle of individualism (principio di 
individualita)d'  ^ The northern moderates' optimism about the beneficial 
consequences of economic progress owed much to a writer who consciously 
avoided their facile political deductions and always opposed the romantic 
patriotism of their historical vision and the conservatism of their social 
attitudes. That man was Carlo Cattaneo (1801-69). In contrast to Mazzinian 
attempts to create a Unitarian party, the development of liberal ideas 
remained fundamentally regional.
According to Cattaneo, the progress and liberty of societies were thus 
dependent upon conflict and variety. Cattaneo was inevitably opposed to the 
reconciliatory aspirations of the moderates' politics and philosophy as he
46 Ibid, 84.
47 Monti, Uldea FederalisHca Italiana, 21-22. The municipal idea can be traced 
back to the times of the Etruscans, who had divided Italy into three regions.
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was to the uniformity implied in Mazzini's program. He thought that if the 
decadence of eastern societies stemmed from their uniformity and 
traditionalism, western civilization had progressed because of the constant 
friction of rival ideas and institutions, stimulated by the innovatory effects of 
experimental sciences and application of the scientific method. The cradle of 
experimental sciences were the Italian communes; here were to be found the 
origins of modern civilization, the transformation from "feudal barbarism" to 
the process of incivilimenio (civilizing)'**
Patriotic nationalism was irrelevant in the face of these truths and
symptomatic of inadequately trained minds:
We are convinced... that Italy above all must keep in unison 
with Europe, and not cherish any other national sentiment than 
that of retaining a worthy place in the scientific association of 
Europe and the World. Peoples should act as a permanent 
mirror to each other, because the interests of civilization are 
mutually dependent and common; because science is one, art is 
one, glory is one. The nation of scholarly men is one . . .  it is the 
nation of the intellectuals, which inhabits all climates and 
speaks all languages. Beneath this nation there is a multitude 
divided into a thousand discordant patrias, castes, dialects into 
greedy, bloodthirsty factions, which revel in superstition, 
egoism, ignorance, which sometimes even love and defend 
ignorance as if it were the principle of life and the basis of 
customs and society.“*^
4« Ibid., 334.
Monti, Uldea Federalistica Italiana, 337
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Thus the umtary solution was the only solution in the mind of Mazzini.
Federalism of Vincenzo Giobeiti
By the early 1840s moderate writers had won the support of sectors of 
educated public opinion for their cultural patriotism and their social and 
economic proposals for gradual, peaceful change. But their strength derived 
as much from dissatisfaction with the plots and attempted insurrections of the 
democrats as from their own initiatives. These moderates comprised loosely- 
linked, regionally based groups, not a political party with a national political 
program, as Mazzini had tried to create. It was Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52) 
who gave them such a programme, around which they rapidly built the 
rudimentary structure of a party offering a concrete alternative to Mazzini 
and the democrats. Gioberti presented his program with spectacular success 
in his book Of the Moral and Civil Primacy o f Italians published in 1843.
According to Gioberti, in Catholic regions, reluctance to accept either the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy as a subordination to the secular authorities or the 
Papacy's determined identification with the Restoration lay behind both the 
romanHc search for a deeper individual religious morality and the explicit 
appeals for Catholicism to accept the legacies of the Revolution - liberalism 
and nationalism. The years of the Restoration had witnessed a total 
separation between the reconstruction of the official Church and Catholic
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religious life. The liberal Catholics, in their attempts to achieve freedom from 
the Church and a more genuine religious consciousness, were ultimately 
dependent upon the pope.^ *^
The conclusion he deduced from the failure of liberal revolutions and 
Mazzinian plots was that no reliance could be placed on the people or on 
insurrections, and that in consequence the only hope lay in reconciling the 
various groups of patriots in support of the princes : "The princes are weak, 
cowardly, egoistic, soft, ignorant, contemptuous of virtue and glory; but at 
least they exist; whereas the Italian people is nothing but a voice, an 
abstraction.''^^ There was little that was new in this reversion to the carbonaro 
mentality of the revolutions of 1820-1 and 1831, except the appeal to the pope 
which during the pontificate of Gregory XVI could only represent a pious 
illusion, a myth, as Gioberti himself soon called it. His manner of welding 
Christianity to patriotism reduced religion to a purely utilitarian weapon for 
political ends : "Who cannot see how useful and effective would be this 
spring [of religion], if only there were people who knew how to utilize it to 
arouse the oppressed peoples and establish liberty, instead of relegating it 
and tampering with it, as did the philosophers of the last century, so leaving
50 Woolf, A HistoT}/ o f Italy 1700-1860, 339.
51 Woolf, A History o f Italy 1700-1860, 342.
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the field free far the superstitious, the Jesuits, the tyrants to adopt it for their 
own benefit.52
The publication of the Primato (Primacy of Italians) in 1843 by Vincenzo 
Gioberti was undoubtedly a major success. The first 1500 copies were rapidly 
followed by reprints and Vieusseux proposed a popular edition of 5000 
copies. The Primato had been written explicitly with the intent of attracting 
moderate and clerical support. Hence its omissions, as well as its 
propositions. Nothing was said about the problem of Austrian rule nor about 
the reform of the administration of the Papal States. Gioberti's proposals were 
carefully formulated to assuage Catholic and moderate worries, offering a 
program of national reconciliation to oppose the national revolutionary aims 
of the democrats. Reason and moderation were fused with a rhetorical 
idealization of Catholicism, practical political calculations with a vision of the 
redemption of Italy's mythical primacy. Unity was rejected as unhistorical: 
"To suppose that Italy, divided for centuries, can peacefully be brought 
under the power of a single state is madness."®  ^ Only a federal union fitted 
Italy's traditions and development, as both the moderates and Cattaneo 
maintained. Municipal self-government was asserted against administrative 
centralization, following the arguments in defense of individual rights of
52 Ibid.
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French and Italian liberals and progressive Catholics since the 1820s. But 
power was to be retained in the hands of princes, aided but not restricted by 
^ e^lective aristocracies'', an open class based on intelligence and experience.
But all these suggestions pale before Gioberti's main proposal: the assertion 
of Italian primacy, the freeing of the peninsula from French tutelage through 
the creation of an Italic confederation under its natural leader, the pope, 
aided by the military force of Piedmont. Rome and Piedmont were the 
particular house of Italian charity and strength. In as much as the union of 
Italy must be consecrated by religion as idea and protected by patriotic arms 
as fact, so it seemed that it must start where faith and militia are mainly 
nursed, that is in the holy city and the warrior province.^
The Risorgimento Period (1860-1914) "Making Italy"
The reasons for the adoption of a centralized unitary model and the rejection 
of even a relatively modest variety of regional decentralization are various. A 
few people called for the establishment of autonomous regional governments 
within the new state. Fearing the reactionary tendencies of the Church and 
the peasants, as well as the backwardness of the South, however, the majority
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 343-344.
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of the makers of modern Italy insisted that decentralization was incompatible 
with prosperity and political progress.
The centralizers quickly won the debate. Top local officials were appointed 
by the national government in Rome. Local political deadlock (or even local 
dissent from national policy) could lead to years of rule by a commissioner 
appointed by the national government. Strong prefects, modeled on the 
French system, controlled the personnel and policies of local governments, 
approving all local ordinances, budgets and contracts, often in the minutest 
detail. Most areas of public policy, from agriculture to education to urban 
planning, were administered by field offices of the Roman bureaucracy." 55
According to Zariski, first of all, the mutual distrust and antagonism that 
divided the rulers of the various Italian states during the early years of the 
Risorgimento seemed to rule out a federal bargain. Second, many feared that 
the decentralized system would eventually end up breaking the system apart. 
Third, some powerful domestic motivations played an important role. For 
example, the backwardness of the south and the hostility of the clergy and the 
peasantry at the grass roots aroused the suspicion that decentralization might 
lead either to a complete breakdown of law and order or to a reactionary
55 Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. Making 
Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 18.
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legitimist revival, either of which would threaten the existence of the new
state.
P olitical Integration in "making Italy"
The real nature of the Italian unification is revealed in the following words of 
Domenico Farini, the President of the Senate, who wrote in his diary: "Italy 
was united by the army (i. e. the material strength of the Italian people, her 
volunteers and soldiers) and by the plebiscite; and she can only be kept intact 
by the army and by parliament. From parliament must come the means 
needed to govern her, to strengthen, where necessary, the activities of the 
government."^^
Despite the French inheritance, the politicians of monarchical Italy never 
succeeded in building a modern state machine on Jacobin lines. Prefects were 
appointed, uniform local government instituted, and laws and the 
administration unified. The education system and military service were used 
to spread national consciousness, and as illiteracy declined, the standard 
Italian language spread. The social basis of the regime, however, prevented
Raphael Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State and the Consequences of Late 
Unification." In Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective, 
eds. Marc O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski (New York: Praeger, 1987), 95.
57 Domenico Farini, Diario fi  Fine Secolo, [An End of Century Diary] (Rome: n. 
p., 1961), 1302 (entry for 5 June 1898) In Modern Italy 1871-1982, Martin Clark, 
(London and New York: Longman, 1984), 44.
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the construction of a modern, efficient state. The great weakness of the regime 
was its somehow detached character from the people. The people needed 
material benefits, such as jobs, favors and recommendations, instead they 
were offered patriotism and impartiality. This was an unimpressive and 
hypocritical mixture to those born outside Piedmont. Thus the most evident 
tensions were between local government and parliament. The centralizing 
patriotic establishment tried to impose its authority on both, but with limited 
success.^® The distrust of the ruling elites towards not only the regional 
governments but also the municipal and provincial governments had its roots 
in this period. And it is also in that period that the importance of controlling 
the local government increased.
One important aspect that revealed the incomplete political integration had 
been the limited suffrage. The electorate at parliamentary elections consisted 
of just over 500.000 men in 1870, rising to 622.000 by ISSO.®^  Restricted 
suffrage meant in Sonnino's words "the vast majority of the people, more 
than 90 percent of them, feel estranged from our institutions; they see 
themselves as subjects of the State, constrained to serve it with blood and 
money, but they do not feel that they form an organic, living part of it, nor do
58 Clark, Modern Italy, 57.
5» This meant 2.2 percent of the total population or 8 percent of adult men). 
See ibid., 64.
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Italian state did not enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The traditional
organs of the State were influential and the Italy's ruling elite was really
small, yet the State institutions never really penetrated into the heart of
society. There always existed a gap between the 'State' and 'Society' even
though the 'State' tried to intervene in 'Society' by using its Prefects, police,
courts, tax-gatherers and conscription-sergeants. Clark argues that:
Rome was never a 'dynamic Jacobin center of commerce or 
intellect, from which men could be ruled with a stern hand; she 
was a peaceful heaven, where sheep grazed in the Villa 
Borghese gardens, and where agricultural laborers were hired 
by the day in Piazza Montanara. Eternal Rome remained 
indolent, indifferent and sceptical: a city of bureaucrats where 
men took the broad, long-term view, and gossiped among 
themselves".
Thus, politics in Rome came to be characterized by a pattern of alliances 
known as trasformismo.
Trasformism o and the Incom plete P olitical Integration
Even before the first stage of Italian unification in 1860, economic and social 
relationships in southern Italy had been structured predominantly on the
they take any interest in its existence and development/'^o Thus the new
Sonnino's speech to Chamber of Deputies 30 march 1881, in Atti 
Parliamentari, Cam. Dep., Sessione 1880-1, p. 4855, cited in Clark, Modern 
Italy, 64.
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basis of patron-client ties. Southern Italy is not a unique case in this respect, 
but it was shown by some anthropological studies that it has been the 
characteristic of a wide range of traditional agrarian societies, particularly 
those in which economic resources are scarce and access to them concentrated 
in the hands of a restricted elite.^  ^ vVhat is particularly interesting about the 
Italian case is the politicization of the relationships of traditional deference 
that came about with the introduction of parliamentary institutions and local 
self-government after 1860, and the process by which such a style of political 
behaviour came to shape the working of the entire Italian political system in 
the decades that followed.
Thus trasformismo was the main characteristic of the regime. In its strictest 
sense, it refers to a parliamentary strategy, initiated by Agostino De Pretis in 
1876, by which opposition deputies were induced to shift their votes to the 
government majority in exchange for personal benefits and, above all, access 
to state patronage.^
« Ibid., 67.
62 Judith Qhubb, Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy. A Tale o f Two 
Cities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19.
62 "Parliamentary trasfonnismo had its roots in an extremely restricted 
suffrage: less than 500.000 voters, or 1.9% of the population in 1861, increased 
to 2 million voters, 6.9% of he population in 1882 with universal male 
suffrage introduced only in 1913." Ibid., 19.
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Trasforniismo was a system of government in which potentially disruptive 
elements were absorbed into the governing coalition. So, while the interests 
of northern industrialists and southern landowners might seem in conflict, 
they were reconciled in an effective alliance to the exclusion of the northern 
industrial proletariat and the southern peasantry. The social and economic 
system of the south was left largely undisturbed apart from the incorporation 
of the layer of new bourgeois who had profited from unification by acquiring 
church and Bourbon state lands.^
It was trasforniismo where the seeds of the clientelistic system in Italy are 
found. By delivering a solid block of parliamentary votes to the government 
of the day which might change its complexion from time to time but was 
never supplanted, southern deputies were able to secure prominent positions 
in the government and were allowed control over patronage within their 
constituencies. The local government system, by placing impossible demands 
upon councils, reinforced centralization and consequently, the role of the 
deputy as the man who could get things done in Rome. At the same time, by 
reducing political questions to individuals' problems, the system inhibited 
the aggregation of demands on a territorial basis.^ Once such a system
 ^ Michael Keating, State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics in the 
European State (New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1988), 54-55.
 ^Ibid.
134
became entrenched, "neither ideas nor practical programs were used as 
weapons in the fight for national power, but became the instruments of 
transactions, jobs and influence, elections and positions."^^
The phenomenon of trasfonnismo was even more evident in the Mezzogiorno 
(South of Rome) and particularly in Sicily. Sicilian deputies, usually from the 
landlord class, including those who had enriched themselves with 
dispossessed church and state lands after unification, would rarely speak in 
Parliament but always vote with the government, meeting in private to 
concert their policy and protect Sicilian affairs from Parliamentary scrutiny.^  ^
Prefects who refused to go along with the local bosses could be removed, 
revenues were diverted into private pockets and corruption and intimidation 
were so rife that it was known for juries to protest at not being bribed. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, the Mafia, drawing on old Sicilian traditions 
but reinforced by American repatriates, was thriving, using the machinery of 
the state for its own ends and those of its landed allies but posing as heroic 
defenders of Sicily against the 'foreigners' of the north. So Sicily and south of 
Italy adapted to unification as they had adapted to changes of rulers over the 
centuries, with political and economic elites making an accommodation with 
the new regime. It does not mean that the south did not change, but rather the
^ Chubb, Patronage, Power, 20.
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mechanisms of accommodation of the sovereign power of the day remained 
in place, to be adapted and exploited by successive ruling elites. The Italian 
national revolution had not been achieved.^® Unification, with its promise of a 
national revolution, was not accompanied by a social and economic 
revolution, an attack on the social and economic power of the landed classes 
in the south. By and large, these made their peace with the new order, 
realizing that the new regime was probably a more effective guarantor of 
their interests than the old.
The suppression of peasant disturbances in the 1860s amply confirmed this 
judgment. The old landowning aristocracy was joined by a rising middle 
class made rich on the purchase of disentailed church and state lands and 
together they provided the economic and social basis of trasformismo in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.^^
In a broader context, irasfonnismo may be seen as an attempt on the part of 
ruling elites, particularly after the widening of the suffrage in 1882, to 
forestall the spread of radicalism among northern workers. The economic, 
social and political dualism of Italian society provided successive
Keating, State and Regional Nationalism, 55.
6® Ibid.
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governments with the means to achieve this end. Given the social and 
economic backwardness of the South and the consequent dominance of 
personal politics which facilitated governmental techniques of 'electoral 
management', the Mezzogiorno came to constitute a critical source of political 
stability for governments increasingly concerned with rising radical pressures 
in the North. Sustained by the unconditional parliamentary support of the 
mass of southern deputies, prime ministers like Giovanni Giolitti (1903-1914) 
achieved sufficient maneuverability to successfully manage class conflict- 
through either co-optation or isolation of the opposition- up until the 
outbreak of World War I. For the South this meant a substantial increase in its 
political weight, but at a very high price-renunciation of an active voice in 
national policy and forfeiture of a serious national effort aimed at the 
resolution of the Southern Question. This was so because it was the very 
backwardness of the South that made it such an important political asset for 
national leaders. Southern elites welcomed trasformismo as a guarantee of the 
local status quo; for the masses, instead, it meant resignation to economic 
stagnation and feudalistic class dominance.^“
The Birth o f  M afia as a Symptom o f  Failed P olitical Integration
69 Ibid., 62-63.
70 Chubb, Patronage, Power, 21.
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Given the limitation of the suffrage, the introduction of democratic 
institutions into the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, rather than promoting popular 
participation, had instead solidified and legitimized the absolute power of 
the landed aristocracy and the rising rural bourgeoisie/  ^ Judith Chubb cites 
Guido Dorso who argues that:
Having become the dominant social force, the rural bourgeoisie 
adapted all political activity to its particularistic mentality...All 
political struggle was organized around the municipal treasury.
For this reason, southern politicians always tended to be 
'ministerial'. Under these conditions, political organization of 
the South could not help but consist of a continual mediation 
between successive governments and passive southern masses 
which were excluded from formal institutions. This mediation 
was performed by deputies, who assured the government of the 
votes and the tranquility of the southern masses and received in 
return privileges and exemption for those under their
protection.
In such a political system, the individual was compelled to seek the 
protection of a more powerful patron since to remain outside a clientelistic 
network meant total powerlessness.73
The Economic and Social Integration
71 Ibid., 22.
72 Guido Dorso, La Rivoluzione Méridionale, [The Southern Revolution], (Turin: 
Mondadori, 1969), 153-154 cited in Chubb, 23.
73 Chubb, Patronage, Power, 24.
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The most important problem that faced the unifiers of the Italian state was the 
economic, social and cultural discrepancy between the North and the South 
of the country7 4  The Southern Question (QuesHone Méridionale) has remained 
the most serious impediment to national integration since those times and has 
not been easily overcome. The basis of the question lay in the contrast 
between a modern industrial society in the North and a traditional agrarian 
society in the South. Thus, after the unification the South found itself in a 
relatively disadvantaged economic position vis-a-vis the North, because of 
three important factors: (1) the harsh climate and topography and the 
objective resource poverty of the South, (2) its distance from Central 
European markets, (3) the survival under the Bourbon rulers of the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies with a social and economic structure still organized on a 
predominantly feudal basis.^ ®
Some authors argue that the already existing underdevelopment of the South 
was accentuated by state policies which in the end created a symbiotic 
relationship between the north and the south. Although the social and 
economic structure of the South remained virtually unchanged, the impact of 
unification upon the southern economy was immediate and disastrous.
For certain social characteristics of sections of Italy shortly after Unification, 
see Appendix C.
75 Ibid., 15.
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One of the first acts of the new government was to impose a uniform tax and 
tariff policy upon the entire country. In the South, it meant a sudden and 
drastic increase in taxes which, coupled with very limited public investment 
in the South, drained southern resources to finance northern industry. The 
elimination of high protective tariffs caught firms unprepared for the 
onslaught of northern competition, while opening southern markets to 
commercial penetration by the products of the northern industry. The 
economic situation of the South was further aggravated by the protectionist 
swing in Italian tariff policy throughout Western Europe. The imposition of 
high external tariffs struck the southern economy twice, the loss of traditional 
international export markets provoked a severe agricultural crisis, while at 
the same time, the South was compelled to pay higher prices for 
manufactured products purchased from the north, a process that was called 
by Sidney Tarrow "commercialization without industrialization."^^
With the progressive breakdown of the feudal system, then, southern society 
came to be characterized, in Antonio Gramsci's words, una grande 
disagggregazione sociale (an immense social disaggregation). Unlike the rest of 
Western Europe, the disintegration of feudalism in southern Italy failed to
76 Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1967), 13-14.
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produce an independent entrepreneurial middle class; instead, the social 
structure of the South remained polarized in two antagonistic blocs-the 
propertied elite and the mass of landless peasantry. With the division and 
sale of the communal lands following the abolition of feudalism and that of 
Church properties ^ after 1860 a bourgeois landholding class rapidly came 
into existence; rather than affirming itself as an autonomous and dynamic 
economic force, however, the nascent bourgeoisie focused its aspirations 
exclusively upon the land, and then primarily in terms of social prestige 
rather than productive investm ent.The landed aristocracy rather than the 
industrial or commercial middle classes constituted its model of social values 
and behavior.
The acquisition of large amounts of land by rich landowners in the South was 
a great mistake on the part of the state. Because, future hopes for land reform
^ In the South of Italy alone, 265.000 hectares of demesne (the land on sale) had 
been sold off by 1865, and a further 50.000 hectares were sold off between 
1866 and 1881. See Clark, Modern Italy, 15.
7« Clark cites Sonnino who found that "ecclesiastical property fell almost 
exclusively and with very rare exceptions into the hands of prosperous 
landowners, who were already rich landowners." Sidney Sonnino, in L. 
Franchetti and S. Sonnino, La Sicilia nel 1876, (Florence: 187'^, 286. The main 
reason for this was due to the policy that was pursued by the State Agency 
which sold off the land in public auctions, where the possibility of a poor 
peasant to acquire land was minimal compared to a rich landowner. See 
Clark, Modern Italy, 17.
Chubb, Patronage, Power, 17.
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would be impeded by those very people. The peasants who had got the 
chance of acquiring some sort of common land were forced to resell it to be 
able to pay taxes. Thus this implanted hatred among the peasantry towards 
the new system. Clark argues that 'even though the Southern Question was 
not created in those years, it was made more intractable."®“
In the South, the modernizing processes of urbanization and 
commercialization were thus superimposed upon a traditional agrarian 
economic base. The failure to stimulate not only industrialization but even a 
modernization and rationalization of agriculture prevented the formation of 
stable and homogeneous social classes, for example, on the model of the 
independent peasant proprietor in France or of a capitalist landholding 
bourgeoisie as in the case of the English gentry. With the advent of mass 
communications and models of mass consumption, the South provided an 
ever-expanding market for the products of northern industry, such demand 
being sustained by the rapid expansion of the tertiary sector in the cities and 
by income maintenance in the form of transfer payments and migrants' 
remittances in the countryside. Once the South was integrated into the 
national economic system on these terms, market mechanisms perpetuated
' Clark, Modern Italy, 17.
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and consolidated economic dualism, reinforcing the already substantial 
obstacles to autonomous industrialization of the South.
Cultural Integration
Linguistic unification was achieved after 1860 through education, although 
there were non-Italian speaking minorities in the border areas and local 
dialects continued in daily use.**^  Illiteracy was a serious problem.^ A way of 
tackling educational problems was to set up schools. Before 1911, the lay State 
financed school-building on the Biblical principle: "to him that hath shall be 
given."®4 However, state policies aggravated the north-south disparity. 
Municipalities that were rich enough to pay for buildings received State 
subsidies or loans to cover part of their costs; the others received virtually 
nothing. So the poorest and most backward regions stayed backward. *
Chubb, Patronage, Power, 18.
*2 There were 80.000 French-speakers in Valle d'Aosta, 96.000 Albanian and 
30.000 Greek speakers in the South, 30.000 Slav-speakers in Friuli and Molise, 
but in sum they constituted 1% of the population and did not constitute a real 
problem. See Qark, Modern Italy, 34-35.
According to 1871 census, 68.8 percent of the Italian population aged six 
and over were illiterate which meant 61.9% of the men and 75.7% of the 
women. See Ibid, 35.
81 Clark, Modern Italy, 170.
85 Basilicata received 568.000 lire out of the whole spending of 100 million 
lire. Cosenza, a province of Calabria did not receive anything. In Reggio
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Education in Italy was clearly split. An industrial bourgeoisie was growing 
up, with engineering and accounting skills; yet the country was also 
overproducing lawyers and classicists, who demanded more jobs in teaching 
and administration. Since few technical schools and institutes were in the 
South, this was tantamount to a North-South split.· And it was worsened by 
the fact that the top bureaucracy was still firmly in Northern hands. But the 
pressure for jobs came mainly form the South, and in the long term the 
traditional Northern control of the State machinery was bound to be 
challenged.^^
The standard of living was so low in the south, in Sardinia and in remote 
rural areas elsewhere that, even when free elementary education was 
provided, the peasants could not utilize their rights since they needed their 
children's labor. The irony was that the peasants paid crushing taxes with 
which schools were built and teachers employed, but the peasants were too 
poor to benefit from the exercise.*^
Calabria not a single new school had been built by then; many of the schools 
were still the same temporary huts put up after the 1908 earthquake. See Ibid.
“ Ibid, 171.
«7 Harry Hearder, Italy in the Age o f the Risorgimento 1790-1870 (London and 
New York: Longman, 1983), 249-250.
144
As for the Mezzogiorno, a striking feature of nineteenth-century Italy was the 
presence of so many writers from the south combined with the absence of a 
real southern literature.®® The great southern writers tended to be Italian 
figures, men of Risorgimento, and when they wrote about the south, it was to 
regret its failure to integrate with the north and realize the dream of Italian 
unity. Images of the Mezzogiorno projected in the region itself through myths 
and folk-tales and for those who could read through literature, were such as 
to discourage regional self-assertion.®  ^ Thus in the late nineteenth century, 
there was no realistic literary genre to present the condition of the south as a 
problem.
Some Concluding Remarks
After 1861, the State existed at last, as a set of unified institutions; this 'legal 
Italy' failed to secure the support of the Italian people. The rapid completion 
of the process of unification signified that the process of nation-building
««Ibid.
"In Sicily the myth of Sicilian vespers was sometimes invoked as the 
foundation of an independent identity but the literature of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries portrayed a romanticised view of an unchanging land 
resistant to the successive 'foreign' invasions of the island. On the southern 
mainland, the notion of meridionalita conveyed the same idea. This was to the 
interest of the dominant classes, especially the new bourgeoisie who had 
made their accommodation with the new regime and wanted to resist social 
and economic change." Lampedusa's novel, the Leopard, and the works of 
Sciascia portray how the successive regime left the basis of the social structure 
intact, merely replacing one set of elites with another." See Keating, State and 
Regional Nationalism, 77.
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would have to be completed by state policies. In this sense, the 'legal Italy' 
remained inherently diverse from 'real Italy' and the idea of 'nation' 
remained alien to many Italians even after the Unification. Thus, contrary to 
what d'Azeglio hoped for, the famous Risorgimento had made Italy but was 
not able to overcome the localist tendencies prevailing among the Italian 
people and thus was not successful in 'making Italians'.
The persistent Southern question was the example that best revealed this lack 
of integration. The main tool of integration was 'absorption' of the 
'subversive' sections of the society into the state machinery (trasforniisrno). By 
this way, the State would get rid of oppositions  ^ and gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of the people by absorbing or reconciling each important group. 
However, as a result of the inefficiencies and insufficiencies of state policies, 
the huge cultural, political and economic gap between the north and the 
south persisted.
’0 The best examples of this process of 'absorption' were the absorption of the 
Catholics initially hostile to the new state, by 1913 Gentiloni Pact. This same 
process continued with Socialists and Communists in the twentieth century. 
See Clark, Modern Italy, 2.
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CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL INTEGRATION DURING THE 
FASCIST INTERLUDE 
(1922-1943)
The Causes of the Rise of Fascism in Italy in Risorgimento
Historiography
The Risorgimento that created a unified and modern nation-state in 1870 was 
not a remedy for many ills of the country since the obstacles that were 
mentioned in Chapter 2 constituted major handicaps for the national 
integration process. The rise of fascism was regarded as the first crisis  ^ that 
the Italian state faced and the reasons behind the rise of fascism was mostly 
directed at the failure of the Risorgimento period.
Two eminent Italian ideologues provided two conflicting accounts of 
Risorgimento after the experiences of Fascism and the First World War. The 
Risorgimento period was analyzed by both Liberal and Marxist thinkers and 
historians who arrived at different conclusions regarding the impact of 
unification upon Italy. The first is the Liberal approach of Benedetto Croce
' Massimo L. Salvadori, Storia d'ltalia e Crisi di Regime. Saggio sulla politica 
italiana 1861-1996. [History of Italy and the Crisis of Regime. An Essay on
Italian Politics 1861-1996], (Bologna: II Mulino, 1994), 65.
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(Crocean approach) and the second is the Marxist approach of Antonio 
Gramsci (Gramscian approach). The common point in these two opposing 
currents of historical analysis was the "preoccupation with the apparent 
failure of Liberal Italy to live up to the aspirations and expectations of the
Risorgimento."^
Crocean Account o f  Risorgim ento
The idealist philosopher-historian Benedetto Croce presents a strongly
favorable judgement of the Risorgimento.^ According to him, the leaders of
the Historic Right (Destra Storica) and the architects of Italian unifícahon in
1860 were men of a noble and self-sacrificing character.  ^ He argued that
Liberal Italy's shortcomings could be attributed to decisions made by the
Destra Storica's successors, and equally to the enormous problems that all
Italy's leaders faced. Thus he claimed that Italy's leaders always kept their
commitment to a liberal parliamentary system of government despite
political, financial and diplomatic difficulties. He argued that:
It [the process of Italy's independence, liberty and unity] was 
called Risorgimento, just as men had spoken of a rebirth of 
Greece, recalling the glorious history that the same soil had 
witnessed; but it was in reality a birth, a sorgimento, and for the
2 Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 2.
 ^Charles F. Delzell, ed.. The Unification o f Italy 1859-1861. Cavour, Mazzini or 
Garibaldi? (Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 
1976), 92.
4 Federico Chabod, 'Croce Storico', Rivista Storica Italiana, 64, (1952), 473-530.
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first time in the ages there was born an Italian state with all and 
with only its own people, and moulded by an ideal. Victor 
Emmanuel II was right when he said, in is speech from the 
throne on April 2, 1860, that Italy was no longer the Italy of the 
Romans but 'the Italy of Italians.^
So in Croce's view, there was no causal link between Italian liberalism that 
the founders of the state adopted. He argued that there were significant 
barriers to political and economic progress in Risorgimento Italy. In fact, 
despite the dependence of Italy on foreign powers, its internal disunity, its 
reactionary rulers and its economic backwardness, he believes, the liberal 
regime could be regarded as successful. It was only the First World War that 
destroyed this political system and made the rise of fascism possible.^
Gramscian Account o f  Risorgim ento
Antonio Gramsci, on the other hand, saw a series of links between fascism 
and liberalism.^ He addressed the difficulties that were posed by 
Risorgimento regarding the distinction between the Hegelian distinction of 
'State' and 'Civil Society'. According to him, the first difficulty was the 
cultural and economic divisions that existed between the North and the 
undeveloped South, and the educated classes and the illiterate masses. The 
second difficulty stemmed from the first difficulty and it was the tension
 ^ Benedetto Croce, History o f Europe in the Nineteenth Century (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933), 225.
 ^ Benedetto Croce, A History o f Italy 1871-1915 (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1963); Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 3.
7 Antonio Gramsci, II Risorgimento (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1954).
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between the 'legal Italy' that was the set of liberal institutions resulting from 
political unification, and the 'real Italy' that was the fragmented social reality 
of divergent regional traditions, economic attainment and polarized classes, 
i.e., "the Southern question".®
Gramsci further argued that the Piedmontese project of unifying the 
peninsula was a hegemonic act. This hegemony, in his view, was the 
"formative principle of nations."  ^In the beginning, every national hegemony 
entails dictatorship in order to unite politically various components of the 
nation. Its legitimacy, however, is derived from the national-popular will. In 
his view, PiedmonPs unification of the peninsula by force of arms alone and 
the imposition of Piedmontese institutions on the rest of the country was 
justified by the belief that its temporary domination would allow the 
development of an uncoerced moral unity stemming from the people's 
growing sense of a common nationality.^®
He regards the Risorgimento as a "failed bourgeois revolution" since it 
lacked mass following behind it. According to him, "the bourgeoisie could
® Richard Bellamy and Schecter, Darrow. Gramsci and the Italian State 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 137.
® Gramsci defined "hegemony" as "that species of primacy, of supremacy, of 
majority, which is neither legal nor juridical,..., but consists in the moral 
efficacy, that amonst many similar provinces sharing the same language and 
nationality, one of them exercises over the others." Ibid., 138.
10 Ibid.
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not lead a successful revolutionary struggle against the ancien regime. The 
Italian bourgeoisie was incapable of uniting, and this was the cause of its 
defeat and interruptions in its development. Thus Risorgimento lacked a 
mass following, and a following among the largest section of the Italian 
population-the peasantry. Therefore, Risorgimento was a 'passive 
revolution'. The bourgeoisie in Italy, unlike its counterparts elsewhere in 
Europe, had not been strong enough to overthrow the existing feudal order 
and instead sought a moderate compromise with it.^ ^
The Causes of Rise of Fascism
The Legitim acy Crisis o f  the Italian  State
As explained in the previous chapter, between the interaction of nationalist 
sentiment among limited sections of the population, the influence and 
involvement of foreign powers, and the ambitions of one Italian state. 
Piedmont finally created a united Italian state in 1870. The Risorgimento, as 
the movement for and achievement of Italian nationhood, presented to Italy a 
complex legacy. First, it aroused amongst politically conscious Italians 
exaggerated expectations concerning Italy's immediate prospects of power 
and prosperity; second, in forging a new nation without involving or 
satisfying the mass of the population it created a socio-political system
Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 2-3.
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permeable with potential weaknesses and created a crisis of legitimacy for 
the newly-founded Italian state.^ ^
The new state, endowed with a limited monarchy, a liberal-parliamentary 
constitution and a highly centralized administration, was from the start 
resented by many as an agent of Tiedmontization'. National consciousness 
was uneven and, throughout much of rural, provincial Italy, extremely low; 
loyalties to fallen dynasties and historic regions persisted, whilst for millions 
of peasants the only reality was the locality, any outside authority being 
regarded as an intruder and potential exploiter. Economic and cultural 
differences aggravated regionalism and localism: much of southern Italy was 
barren, impoverished and isolated from progressive developments. 
Metternich had once called Italy a mere 'geographical expression'; now it 
resembled a mere political expression.^  ^ In other words, to the outside, it 
seemed that 'Italian-ness' did exist and that Italy was an identifiable entity; 
but in reality the conception of Italy never a shared or collective value.^ ^
12 Martin Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 2^  ^ ed. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 3.
13 Ibid., 4-5.
« William Brierley and Luca Giacometti, "Italian National Identity and the 
Failure of Regionalism," in Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe Brian 
Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 
173.
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The gulf between the new Italian state and so many of its people was 
reflected in and widened by its liberal policies. Late nineteenth-century 
liberalism was narrowly based; only around half a million male Italians out 
of a population of approximately 32 million were enfranchised between 1870 
and the electoral reform of 1881, whilst between then and the next reform in 
1912 the electorate grew from 2 million to 3 million. For three decades after 
1870 political office was monopolized by the limited layer of mainly upper- 
middle-class Italians who had risen to power during the Risorgimento. 
Increasingly referred to by the revealing term political class', these men, 
divided less by differences of belief or class change than by regional loyalties 
and personal rivalries, treated Italy to a system of parliamentary politics 
lacking clear party boundaries. Instead, through the practice known as 
trasformismo, premiers and their parliamentary managers fashioned 
constantly shifting majorities by extending favors to deputies and their 
constituencies. Elections, both before and after the 1881 reform, were 
characterized by bribery, manipulation and outright coercion of voters by 
local power-cliques and political "bosses". Parliament in consequence 
represented the political class itself and those bound to its members by 
family, local and economic ties in networks now known as "clienteles". 
Parliament's unrepresentativeness was exacerbated by the attitude of Italian 
Catholics. The absorption of papal territories into the emergent Italian 
kingdom during 1860-1, and the final occupation of Rome in 1870, provoked
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the papacy into adopting a hostile posture towards the new state; for the rest 
of the century most devout Catholics did not take part in politics.^^
Thus 'Italy' had a weak hold on the imagination and consciousness of a 
people who were now forced to think of themselves as Italians. However, as 
mentioned above, Italy was culturally fragmented in 1860 and the deeply felt 
regional identities and loyalties that divided the inhabitants of the new 
nation-state persisted. Parochialism and provincialism were deep-rooted and 
reinforced by the living traditions of the Renaissance Communes.^  ^Thus the 
concept of a unified, democratic and liberal Italy had limited popular appeal 
and unification was regarded as a French rather than an Italian invention. 
The monarchy, a fundamental guardian of national tradition, was neither 
popular nor indigenous in Italy. The House of Savoy was French, and many 
Italians regarded it as foreign. Piedmont and its capital, Turin, where the first 
parliament of the new Italian state convened were culturally French. 
Cavour's first language was French and the father of Italy spoke Italian only 
when necessary and then with difficulty.^  ^ As a result, Italy, in 1922, sixty 
years after unification remained a 'state without a nation'.
15 Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 4.
15 Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925 
(London and New York; Methuen, 1967), 13.
17 Mabel Berezin, Making the Fascist Self. The Political Culture o f Interwar Italy 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 43.
18 Ibid., 45.
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N atiotm l Frustration in the International Arena
Hopes that a united Italy would automatically prove internationally 
powerful were soon dashed. Susceptible Italians recognized and sometimes 
resented the important contribution made by other states, especially France 
and Prussia, to Italy's creation; from this stemmed the acute sensitivity 
displayed for decades by both politicians and intellectuals concerning Italv's 
standing as what has been termed the least of the great powers'. Although 
Italy might have done better to settle for the second-class status dictated by 
its deficient natural resources, its consequent economic backwardness, and 
the sheer demands of nation-building, the mood generated by the 
Risorgimento and the climate of intensifying international competitiveness 
after 1870 ensured that it should instead seek Great Power status accorded to 
its fellow 'young' nation', Germany. Patriotic Italians considered the 
Risorgimento incomplete while large numbers of Italian-speakers remained 
subject to Austrian rule in the regions of Trentino and Trieste.^  ^ The 
acquisition of these terre inedente (unredeemed lands) was the dream of 
Italian irredentists up until 1918.
Italy had interest also in territories outside Europe. The presence of large 
Italian communities in Africa, specifically in Tunis and Alexandria, the 
activities of Italian traders and missionaries earlier in the century, and a
1’ Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 5.
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pride in the expansionist histories of Rome, Genoa and Venice had convinced 
men like Francesco Crispi (prime minister in 1887-1891 and in 1893-1896), 
that Italy must again play an imperial role. The reason for this 'imperial 
venture' was also economic. The imperialists believed that the colonies 
Would generate wealth for Italy's own enrichment and its geo-political 
confinement. Expansion to overseas territories would offer millions of Italian 
emigrants an 'Italian' alternative to South America and the United States. 
However, during 1881-1882, Italian ambitions in North Africa suffered 
setbacks when France occupied Tunis and Britain established de facto control 
over Egypt. The only prospect left for the Italians was Tripolitania, Italy's 
loss in North Africa directed its expansionist aims towards Ethiopia, with the 
aim of establishing a protectorate over all or part of Ethiopia. However, the 
imperialist dreams of Crispi were destroyed when the Italian army was 
defeated by Ethiopian forces at Adowa, where 5000 Italians were killed and 
2000 taken as prisoner of war. This was a major turning point in the eyes of 
many Italians since the defeat of Adowa not only discredited the imperial 
idea but the liberal regime who aimed to realize it lost credibility. The 
revenge of this defeat was one of the ideas behind the rise of fascism in 
Italy.20
Econom ic Crisis and Social Unrest
20 Ibid., 5-6.
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Beginning in the 1890s, Italy underwent a belated but far-reaching agrarian 
and industrial transformation which was followed by a political and social 
one. In agriculture, the backwardness of which had greatly contributed to 
Italy's general economic retardation, the introduction of capitalist methods 
and modern machinery created in the fertile Po Valley a new breed of rich 
agrari (agrarians), a numerous class of rural laborers and a significant 
intermediate layer of estate managers and technicians; in other regions such 
as Tuscany the process worsened the lives of poor tenant farmers and 
sharecroppers (peasants who were contractually obliged to surrender to the 
landlord a proportion, often half, of their crop or their earnings). In the north­
western region bound by Milan, Turin and Genoa, rapid industrialization 
occurred with the development of heavy industry and its offshoots: iron and 
steel, metallurgy and engineering, shipbuilding and automobiles, electricity 
and chemicals.
By 1914 there had emerged in the north a powerful class of bankers and 
industrialists, closely bound to each other and to a protective state. As well as 
this new modern and localized working class, another new urban class was 
also emerging which was eager to fill managerial, bureaucratic and white- 
collar positions and to keep its distance from the proletariat. The effect of 
these developments was to alter radically the relationships within northern 
and central Italian society, generating conflicts which in their turn were to 
contribute massively to the rise of fascism.
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Economic development affected southern Italy much less than the north and 
the center. The 'southern problem' shirked by early liberal governments, 
became only more intractable as industrialization and agricultural 
modernization widened the gap between the north and south. For the vast 
and under-employed rural population of the south an escape was offered by 
emigration to the Americas or North Africa; by 1914, when Italy's population 
was 35 million, between five and six million Italians were living abroad. 
Much of the south nonetheless remained economically backward and both 
socially and politically inert.21
The Im pact o f  the First W orld War
The First World War was a very important turning point in the culmination 
of the crisis between the liberal state the rise of a fascist regime. Italy had 
won the war but it was unable to shape the peace settlements. First of all, the 
Fiume question was an important episode that flamed national senHment 
among the population.22 The second issue was the Italian state's failure to
21 Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 6-7.
22 Fiume (Rijeka) was a former Flungarian port on the Croatian coast. In the 
Versailles Conference that took place in the aftermath of the First World War, 
President Wilson refused to concede Fiume or Dalmatia to Italy. Two months 
later when the government fell, the Italian army occupied Istria and Northern 
Dalmatia, but its allies had failed in Fiume. Thus Fiume was lost and the 
government did not do anything. This aroused a nationalist sentiment among 
the Italians and the prime minister was called 'abject coward'. So, a military 
coup was organized by prominent nationalists, top army officers and one or 
two industrialists in Fiume led by Gabriele D'Annunzio, a nationalist poet. 
He stayed there for fifteen months, hurling defiance at 'abject coward'. Thus
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cope with the transition to peacetime economy, which resulted in massive 
unemployment and labor militancy. This caused resentment on the part of 
the industrialists who were not content with the intervention of the 
government to factory occupations. Third, the land occupations especially in 
the South by the soldiers returning from war was a great source of social 
unrest. As a result of the social turmoil in Italy, big landowners and tenants 
were threatened. Fourth and perhaps the most important, no stable political 
framework could overcome these difficulties. The old ruling class had been 
bitterly divided by the war: interventionists' against 'neutralists' . 3^
As a result, the First World War was used by fascists in an instrumental way 
to create the image of Italy as a great imperial power. Even though the 
masses did not follow this policy, nevertheless the War did catalyze a sort of 
national consciousness, but this was achieved at a sub-cultural level, as a 
result of the real trauma that the First World War created among the people.^  ^
The emergence of fascism in Italy was characterized by two processes of 
mobilization: First, the primary mobilization of large sectors of the lower 
classes, second the secondary mobilization of large sectors of the middle 
classes. Both processes had been originated by the consequences of the war as
Fiume became a symbol of patriotic fervor and youthful vitality. See Martin 
Clark, Modern Italy. 1871-1982 (London and New York: Longman, 1984), 203- 
205.
23 Ibid., 211.
24 Brierlev and Giacometti, "Italian NaHonal Identity,", 174.
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mentioned above.^s However, these mobilized sectors represented the 
segments that were not well-integrated into the political system. Thus the 
fascist ideology best served their interests with its emphasis on order, 
discipline and hierarchy, and through the demobilization of the lower 
classes; it displaced frustrations from an individual or class level to a national 
level in terms of such issues as territorial claims and dreams of imperial 
power. All these factors account for the formation and growth of a mass 
movement with a high revolutionary potential and an extreme authoritarian 
nature.
In line with this argument, Juan Linz argued that "fascism was the novel 
response to the crisis-profound or temporary- of the pre-war social structure 
and party system and to the emergence of new institutional arrangements as 
a result of war and post-war dislocations. It would be particularly acute in 
nations such as Italy, which were divided about entry into the war and 
disappointed with the fruits of victorySim ilarly, Lyttelton has argued that 
Fascism was the product of the tensions which economic modernization 
brought in agriculture as well as industry. The slogan of 'the proletarian 
nation' expressed Italy's grievance as a latecoming great power at not being
25 Gino Germani, Author}tarianism, Fascism and National Populism (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), 225.
26 Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in 
Sociological Historical Perspective," in Walter Laqueur ed. Fascism. A Reader's 
Guide (Great Britain: Scolar Press, 1976), 7. For a detailed account of the rise 
of fascism in Italy, see also Adrian Lyttelton, "Italian Fascism," in Laqueur, 
Fascism, 125-150.
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able to obtain a satisfactory share of the profits of imperialist exploitation.^  ^
Benedetto Croce, the famous historian of the fascist period, considered 
fascism to be symptomatic of a temporary moral decline within Italian 
liberalism. Since the turn of the century, he argued, the liberal sense of 
freedom had been debased by materialism, nationalism and a growing 
admiration for heroic figures. The new masses thrust onto the political stage 
during these years lacked liberal sensitivities and were easily manipulated by 
a minority of fascist hooligans, while the governing class was temporarily 
corrupt and incompetent. Fascism was thus an interruption in Italy's 
achievement of ever greater 'freedom'. So Croce perceived fascism as a cure 
to the illnesses of the liberal regime.^»
Rapid industrialization, urbanization, war, and demobilization, it is 
suggested, tore millions of Italians from their customary local, personal, 
socio-economic and cultural relationships. Powerless and without any 
direction, these abandoned souls fell prey to skillful demagogues and well- 
organized minorities who were able to use them to challenge the dominance 
of the ruling elites. In other words, fascism restored a sense of identity and 
community to countless individuals alienated from the state.
27 Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure o f Power. Fascism in Italy 1919-1929, 2^  ^ ed. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 437.
28 Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 54-55.
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Nationalism and Regionalism in Fascist Ideology
The ideology of Italian nationalism was developed originally by the 
philosopher Gabriele D'Annunzio.^  ^It was an ideology bearing many marks, 
almost all of them foreign and completely alien to the Italian tradition of the 
Risorgimento and directly opposed to its traditional and humanitarian spirit. 
Italian nationalism consciously rejected that spirit, declaring that the only 
important thing regarding the Risorgimento was its formation of the 
territorial state. The ideals of nationalism were the destruction of liberalism, 
democracy and socialism, in favor of the despotic dominance of the state, a 
purely abstract and formal entity, but one which assumed the function of an 
idol. The state would be a resurrection of the ancient absolute state. °^
The other most important ideologues of the fascist regime had been the 
philosopher Gentile and historian Gioacchino Volpe. They succeeded in 
presenting fascism as a movement which had overcome the limitations of 
nationalism and reached a new synthesis. They both had hoped that fascism 
would create a truly united nation in Italy. But by 1919, it had to be 
recognized that the war had driven yet another wedge between the state and 
people. The political consciousness of the masses had indeed been awakened, 
but not in the way that they had hoped. Hence Gentile, Volpe and a number
2’ See Jared M. Becker, Nationalism and Culture. Gabriele D'Annunzio and Italy 
after the Risorgimento (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994).
30 Luigi Salvatorelli, The Risorgimento: Thought and Action (NewYork, Evanston
and London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), 185-186.
162
of other intellectuals rallied to the Fascist slogan of the 'defense of victory'. 
The task of fascism in their eyes was to revive and fulfil the unrealized war 
aims of the nation, not only in foreign policy, but also at home. Gentile was 
obsessed with the "urgent necessity of conquering a position in the world for 
ourselves at all costs", and he believed that the failure of Italy to obtain its 
due was the consequence of deficiencies in political education and moral 
unity. These deficiencies were to be overcome by a stringent discipline, 
through which alone the masses could be brought to understand the reality 
and value of the State. For Gentile's idealist philosophy, the State was weak 
because its institutions remained for its masses either as mere names or else 
external and coercive forces. The moral life of the individual was not 
organized by the idea of collectivity.
The problem for Gentile was that of how the higher Italy of the cultured 
Italians could organize and activate the great mass of citizens and thus create 
a true national consciousness.^  ^ This end, he felt, could never be achieved if 
the individualist and utilitarian view of the state as a mere night watchmen 
was allowed to prevail. The State must instead be ethical, a positive 
educational force inspired by a belief in its own mission.^^
My emphasis.
32 Lyttelton, The Seizure o f Power, 375.
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Emilio Gentile examined the fascist regime's symbolic aspects under the 
category of sacralization of politics. He situates the origins of fascism's 
political style within the historical context of the nineteenth century Europe. 
In the wake of the French revolution and later, the church and monarchy, the 
traditional embodiment of the sacred were defeated, the myth of 
Christendom was greatly shattered and the hierarchical model of social 
relations had been virtually liquidated. Also, the modern, secular notion of 
politics, which was coexistent with parliamentary representation, became the 
target of critical appraisals about its ability to unify the polity around 
common goals, particularly in view of the new social groups and classes 
asserting their political voice. In Italy, the critique of parliament and 
democracy, from which fascism originated, was rooted in the historical 
reality of the post-Risorgimento. The unification of the state in 1870 had not 
been followed by a genuine integration of the country's diverse population, 
and over the years the liberal political class had failed to heal the division 
between state and society despite various attempts at forging a civil and 
national spirit. At the beginning of the twentieth century, disillusionment 
over the liberal system and its inability to create a national consciousness 
among Italians fostered the demands for new forms of political style and 
government. Organizational questions on how to control and channel the 
political participation of workers associations, socialist parties, and unions 
paralleled the search for novel values that would endow Italy with spiritual 
unity that it had been lacking.^  ^ The clamoring for new models of political
33 Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, FasciikASpectacle. The Aesthetics o f Power in
rule became more strident in Italy at the end of the First World War, the 
experience of the trenches and the collective mobilization of human and 
material resources seemed to have unified the Italians in their common 
sacrifice for the nation.^
Over the years the regime rewrote the history of ancient Rome and made of it 
a myth, which it celebrated yearly. War, as potentially regenerative and also 
expressive of the virility of the country, became another cultural myth of 
fascism. In general, for the fascists violence signified rebirth and renewal; 
they mystified the March on Rome as a 'revolution'. The rituals of the fascist 
regime were supposed to shape the Italians into fascist men,^ ® The Fascist 
regime was prepared to allow a degree of liberty in the pursuit of cultural 
activities whose political relevance was not immediate or obvious. But those 
circles in the universities, among artists and writers whose ideas were not 
favorable to the regime were isolated from the public by strict control 
established over the main channels of information. Of these, the Press was
the object of by far the greatest attention.36
Mussolini's Italy ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 5. 
 ^ Ibid.
35 Ibid., 6-7.
36 Lyttelton, The Seizure o f Power, 394,
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Prior to the advent of fascism, according to such ideologues as Panunzio, 
Curcio and Bottai, the Italian State had been a spiritual void. Fascism, 
however, had filled that void with its idealism, its demand for faith, its belief 
in the active will, which fired the imagination and hope of the populace, 
binding them to the State so that the State and society could become one and 
the same, namely the Nation. In order for this to be actualized it was 
necessary to politicize the masses so as to encourage them to become the 
protagonists of the 'permanent revolution' rather than becoming its 
unquestioning supporters and followers. Indeed, it was Panunzio's belief that 
'a fragmented and disorganized people which expresses its consent and its 
adherence were succeeded by an 'organized people' which continuously and 
in every moment expresses its consent and its adherence.
The change from the concept of class to the concept of nation involves a major 
change in conceptual framework. In fascism the fundamental unit of analysis 
is the nation. Fascism deifies the nation.^ ® Moreover, the nation is not simply 
the numerical summation of the individuals comprising it, but it possesses a 
history, a cohesiveness, and a destiny of its own. The nation is thus an entity 
that is both real and ideal; it can be physically defined in terms of national 
boundaries and size of population, but it is more than these two features. It 
has a past that differentiates it from other nations and a future potential that
37 Doug Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy. Culture and Conformity, 1925- 
43 (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 98-99.
38 Mark Neocleous, Fascism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 22.
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may and may not be achieved. The nation is seen as a biological organism 
that lives, breaths, grows and dies while individuals are seen as cells that 
perform their function and achieve fulfillment only insofar as the entire 
organism is healthy. The individual simply does not exist without the nation. 
If the nation thus constitutes the highest ethical entity, the state becomes its 
political manifestation, the expression of its will and power.^  ^This particular 
notion of the nation-state was gradually developed yet it dominated Italian 
political thinking for the following 30 years.
Mussolini in his The Doctrine o f Fascism, published in 1932, appropriately
emphasizes the notion of nation-state as follows:
Fascism is...opposed to that form of democracy which equates a 
nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of largest 
number; but it is the purest form of democracy if the nation be 
considered-as it should be-from the point of view of quality 
rather than quantity, as an idea, the mightiest because the most 
ethical, the most coherent, the truest, expressing itself in a 
people as the conscience and will of the few, if not, indeed, of 
one, and tending to express itself in the conscience and the will 
of the mass, of the whole group ethnically moulded by natural 
and historical conditions into a nation, advancing, as one 
conscience and one will, along the self-same line of 
development and spiritual formation. Not a race, nor a 
geographically defined region, but a people, historically 
perpetuating itself; a multitude unified by an idea and imbued 
with the will to live, the will to power, self-consciousness, 
personality.“**^
3’ David F. Ingersoll and Richard K. Matthews, The Philosophic Roots o f Modern 
Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 
231.
io Ingersoll and Matthews, The Philosophic Roots o f Modern Ideology, 221.
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On another occasion in the 'Naples Speech' three days before the 1922 March
on Rome, Mussolini was claiming that "We have created our myth. The myth
is a faith, a passion. It is not necessary for it to be a reality. It is a reality in the
sense that it is a stimulus, is hope, is faith, is courage. Our myth is the nation,
our myth is the greatness of the nation!...For us the nation is not just
territory, but something spiritual... A nation is great when it translates into
reality the force of its spirit.''^  ^One of the problems that the emergent fascist
movement faced in Italy was the absence of a genuine Italian national myth,
despite the movement's own invocation of the myth of the nation. The
reasons for this lie in Italy's failure to begin to become a nation-state until
1861, a major reason for which was the myth of Rome, embodied in the
papacy, and its ubiquitous challenge to national liberation movements.
Mussolini, reaffirming this view, had stated:
Through centuries of conquest at the greedy hands of Barbaric 
hordes, Italy has been, and remains the goal of reverent 
pilgrimage by the notable geniuses of the North,,. The Shines, 
the beacon of civilization. Irrespective of time and fortune, it 
has not been extinguished. Rome as it was in the times of 
Augustus, remains the city toward which men of all nations 
turn-and [he] who loves Rome, must love Italy. Italy is 
preparing a new epoch in the history of humanity.^2
« Cited from Mussolini's 'Naples Speech' in Fascism, Mark Neocleous, 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 20,
^2 Mussolini, Un grande amico delTItalia: Augusto von Platen," Opera, 2, 
171ff, cited in Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins o f Fascism, A. James 
Gregor, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 
1979), 74.
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Neocleous quotes J. L, Talmon who argues that the myth of the unique and at 
the same time universal significance of Rome was so deeply-embedded in the 
Italian mind that the claim to secular, national self-determination seemed a 
poor, inadequate, indeed demeaning challenge in comparison with the myth 
of the universal church, the heir of the imperial myth.^  ^ In this context, he 
argues, the Italian fascists understood that the nation and state become 
crucial. First, the nation should be created, and the only force to create it was 
the state. Thus it is not the nation that creates the state, but it is the state that 
creates the nation.
The idea that the nation, whichever nation it happens to be, must be 
'disciplined' is a central article of belief in the ideologies of the Right, hence 
their habitual claim to moral superiority. However, the 'nation' in this 
context invariably turns out to be the laboring classes while the traditional 
life style, wealth and privilege of the ruling classes are protected and 
guaranteed by much strengthened laws.^ ^
Once the violent revolutionary phase was over, the importance of the Party 
declined rapidly and the dominant characteristic of the State became its 
nationalism. The 'national interest and 'national greatness' were the myths 
around which Fascism moulded the State and which it sought by every *
« Neocleous, Fascism, 24.
** Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, ix.
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available means to fix, as though it was a religion, in the hearts and minds of 
the Italian peopled®
For Mussolini and his supporters, the importance the state possessed can be 
appreciated in the light of Italian history. As noted, although the formal 
unification of Italy was completed in 1871, the country remained deeply 
divided. Unlike Germany Italy did not possess a unified culture nor even a 
common language. Regional dialects persisted and allegiances to local towns 
or provinces were not easily replaced by an affection for the newly created 
Italy. Most obviously, there was persistent antagonism between the 
industrialized North and the rural and the more backward South. In short 
there was an Italy but no Italians. As a nationalist, Mussolini wished to create 
a national consciousness, to forge an Italian nation, and the instrument 
through which he sought to achieve this objective was the Italian state. 
Mussolini's goal was to politicize the Italian people. In his words, 'the nation 
is created by the state, which gives to the people, unconscious of its own 
moral unity, a will and therefore an effective existence.'^®
Fascism inherited a tradition of chauvinistic and expansionist nationalism, 
which developed in the years before the First World War. Nations were 
regarded not as equal and interdependent, but as natural rivals in a struggle
<5 Ibid., xi.
Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies. An Introduction (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1992), 181.
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for dominance. Fascism sought to achieve more than mere patriotism, the 
love of one's country; it wished to establish an intense and militant sense of 
national identity, what has been called 'integral nationalism'. Fascism 
embodied a sense of messianic or fanatical mission: the prospect of national 
regeneration and the rebirth of national pride. Indeed, the popular appeal 
which fascism attracted was largely based upon the promise of national 
greatness. In practice, the notion of national regeneration led to the assertion 
of power over other nations through expansionism, war and imperialism. 
Through the invasion of Abyssinia in 1934, Italy sought to realize the 
grotesque dream of a "resurrection of the empire".^^
In many ways the nation served the same function for fascism as class did for 
Marxism. Fascism adopted from the nationalists the concept of Italy as a 
'proletarian nation', oppressed by the richer, more highly developed 
capitalist nations.“*» Thus, according to official theory and propaganda, 
fascism was a 'totalitarian' system requiring not merely the passive 
conformity of all Italians but their sincere commitment to, and active 
participation in, a heroic enterprise of national regeneration.^^
Fascist Policies in Attempting to 'Make Italians'
17 Heywood, Political Ideologies, 180; Salvatorelli, The Risorgimento, 195. 
1* Ibid.
1’ Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 37.
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The year 1925 saw a revival and extension of the ideological and cultural 
ambitions of fascism. Mussolini and Gentile proclaimed the totalitarian 
character of fascism. The task was defined as that of creating a new national 
consciousness, a new mode of life, a new type of Italian. No field of national 
life was, in theory, to be exempt, it was the 'whole man' who must be 
remodeled.^”
The style in which Italian nineteenth century nation-state builders imagined 
Italy sharply differed from the style in which Italian citizens constructed their 
identities. Non-contingent Italian identities tended to be private and were 
tied to family, region and religion. The cultural communities of family, 
region and religion provided the schemata that were the sources of Italian 
self. The unification and the fascist project were attempts to supplant regional 
identities with national identities. Regionalism was a fact of Italian political 
and cultural life that no Italian regime has successfully overcome. Thus the 
cultural architects of the fascist project tried to transpose the rules of the 
Italian cultural game.^ ^
The Fascist era was marked by a sharp swing in the direction of 
centralization. A series of laws culminating in the Provincial and Communal 
Law of 1934 abolished all elected local and provincial authorities and
50 Lyttelton, The Seizure o f Pouter, 381.
51 Berezin, Making the Fascist Self 48-49.
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replaced them with state appointees. The elected mayor was replaced by an 
appointed podesta advised by an appointed council, consulta. The position of 
the prefect in local government was enormously strengthened although he 
was checked somewhat by the party bureaucracy and the police agencies. 
However, fascist centralization did not represent a sharp break with the 
liberal past; rather it simply accentuated the centralizing tendencies already 
present in the liberal constitutional monarchy of 1871-1922.52
The law of 24 December 1925, which dealt with "The Powers and 
Prerogatives of the Head of Government", set Mussolini officially above all 
other ministries and effectively concentrated all executive powers in his 
hands, for it gave him the sole right to decide what should or should not be 
debated by either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate.®^  Other important 
laws passed on 4 February 1926 were those which abolished the rights of 
communes of fewer than 5000 inhabitants to elect their municipal councils- a 
law which was later (3 September 1926) extended to include all communes of 
whatever size, and even provincial councils, substituting instead both mayors 
(podesta) and councils (consulte) appointed directly by the government; and 
finally that which greatly increased the powers and the status of the 
provincial prefects so as to make them undisputedly the most authoritative
52 Raphael Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State and the Consequences of Late 
Unification," in Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective, 
eds., Marc. O. Rousseau and Raphael Zariski (New York: Praeger, 1987), 97.
53 Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, 9.
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state officials in the provinces (6 April 1926). By early September 1926, the 
State had greatly increased its authority at the expense of both the individual 
and collective freedoms of the Italian people, and had made it impossible for 
anyone not in sympathy with the aims and methods of the regime to express 
dissent in any effective way.^
Another important fascist policy was the repression of ethnic minorities 
which had begun to raise their voices after the First World War. What 
Mussolini seems to have been concerned with primarily was the national 
dignity of the new, ideal Homo Fascistus, and in this sense the racial campaign 
was perhaps intended as just another aspect of the cultural engineering, the 
'fascistization' of the nation, to compensate massively for a sense of racial 
inferiority in comparison with other Europeans.^  ^ From 1922 on, Volpe, the 
famous historian of the fascist regime edited the Archivio storico per la Corsica, 
upon Mussolini's desire, with the intention of furthering the idea of the 
island's italianita [italian-ness].^^
54 Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, 10. For a detailed account of the 
fastest policies regarding over-centralization, see Sandro Fontana ed., II 
fascismo e le autonomic locali [Fascism and the local autonomies], (Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1973) and in particular, Ettore Rotelli, "Le trasformazioni 
delTordinamento comunale e provinciale durante it regime fascista," [The 
Transformation of the communal and provincial laws during the fascist 
regime] in ibid., 73-156. See also Zariski, "Italy: The Distributive State," 97.
55 Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy, 142.
56 Lyttelton, The Seizure o f Power, 413.
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In the newly-acquired lands of Italy, substantial ethnic minorities existed. 
228.000 Germans lived in the South Tyrol, 327,000 Slovenes and 98.000 Croats 
in Venezia-Giulia and they were determined to preserve their languages and 
customs. However, the Fascists were far too nationalistic to permit any such 
thing. They insisted upon the use of Italian in the primary schools, although 
hardly any of the local children could understand it. They also suppressed 
private teaching. Italian had to be the spoken language in public offices, 
courts and the like. As a result of this policy, some local officials lost their 
jobs. In addition, German and Slav names were Italianized. Even the 
inscriptions on the tombstones were changed. This was a real Kulturkampf, 
and it was not restricted to cultural symbols.®  ^ The jobs were at stake in 
teaching and administration and, Italians from other regions were 
encouraged to settle in North-East Italy. After 1934, a new industrial zone 
was set up in Bolzano, partly to speed on the "Italianization" process. By 
1939, there were about 80.000 'Italians' in the South Tyrol, far more than in 
1921.
With these draconian measures, the Fascist regime succeeded only in 
arousing resentment and increasing resistance especially in Val D'Aosta^ **,
57 Clark, Modern Italy, 252.
5« For the autonomy movement and resistance in Val d'Aosta see E, Passerin 
d'Entreves, "La Lotta per I'autonomia e la difesa del francese in Valle
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South Tyrol59 and Sardinia^o, The process of "forced national integration" did 
not work. The local priests led the cultural resistance, continuing to preach 
and teach in German or Slovene, and organizing clandestine private schools. 
Church-State relations became more tense in these regions than anywhere 
else in Italy, and in 1936 Bishop Fogar of Trieste was even forced out of 
office. In South Tyrol, the Germans were isolated rather than assimilated. 
Deprived of schools and urban jobs, they remained defensive and desperate 
in their rural ghettos. In Venezia-Giulia even more severe forms of resistance 
appeared. Italian teachers were driven out of schools, bombs exploded in 
public buildings regularly and local terrorists assassinated police and 
militiamen. There were five Slavs out of the people condemned to death by 
the Fascist Tribunal before 1940. In these regions, anti-fascism became deeply 
ingrained and became synonymous with anti-Italianism.^^
Another important aspect of Fascist propaganda to mention was the growing 
regimentation of leisure activities. It was in this field, where measures of 
social welfare and control went hand in hand, that the policy of Fascism 
made the greatest impact on large numbers of people. This was an area
d'Aosta," in II fascismo e le autonomie locali [Fascism and the local 
autonomies], ed., Sandro Fontana (Bologna: II Mulino, 1973), 233-252.
5’ For the autonomist movement in South Tyrol, see G. Negri, 
"L'autonomismo nelTAIto Adige," in ibid., 205-232.
“ On the Sardinian autonomist movement see S. Sechi, "L'autonomismo in 
Sardegna," in ibid., 301-327.
Clark, Modern Italy, 252-253.
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where the party held an important function after 1926, working through its 
auxiliary organizations, the Dopolavoro (After-Work), the Balilla, the 
Avangmrdia, and the Fasci Femminili.^  ^ The Dopolavoro was the most effective 
instrument of the regime for penetrating the working class.^ ^
In 1928-1929 in schools, the curricula began to be revised so as to give a much 
larger place to direct political indoctrination. In the elementary schools, 
change was sweeping. On 24 February 1928, the Cabinet passed a decree 
ordering that all textbooks for history, geography, reading, economics and 
law used in the elementary schools and the 'supplementary courses' for the 
age group 11-14, should respond to the 'requirements' of the new period 
inaugurated by the March on Rome. A committee was set up to prepare a 
single State textbook whose use would be obligatory in all public elementary 
schools. In the new textbook, every subject was used for propaganda, even *
*2 "The creation of the new Fascist man was not left to schools only. The youth 
organizations of the fascist regime gained further importance after 1926. On 3 
April 1926, they were united and given a legal status under the name of the 
Balilla for children aged 8-15, and Avanguardie (15-18), plus the piccole Italiane 
for the girls, soon became a powerful instrument for the totalitarian 
regimentation of youth. The cadres of Balilla were drawn from the 
schoolteachers, and those of Avanguardie from officers of the Militia." See 
ibid., 408-409.
63 In 1926, the Dopolavoro still had only 280.000 members over half of which 
were railwaymen and postmen. In 1927, however, it had 440.000, and in 1930, 
1.400.000. In the South, the Dopolavoro, like the Fascist unions, was a real 
innovation since previously no associations had existed except the circles 
where notables played cards. Dopolavoro was the other important pillar of the 
Fascist regime. It was within Dopolavoro that an office for 'popular culture' 
was first created. See, Lyttelton, The Seizure o f Power, 401-402.
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music and arithmetic: the children learned to sing Fascist hymns and their 
aggregate were illustrated by figures of the Balilla.^
Another important project of the fascist regime were the public rituals that 
were aimed at creating a new fascist and Italian nation-state and identity.^ ® 
The regime also expended a great deal of effort in reviving traditional 
holidays and fairs and putting a fascist stamp on them. The local events 
aimed at promoting links between the center and periphery were to reinforce 
the idea that fascist collectivity was the nation and the state.^  ^ Public rituals 
were important since they produced a feeling of solidarity-"we are all 
together", "we must share something". Thus, collective national selfhood 
could be enacted and collective memory produced.The first of these public 
rituals was the invention of the events of 27-28 October 1922, as "the March 
on Rome". Public events surrounding the first anniversary of the March on 
Rome established a ritual genre of commemoration that would be repeated 
every year until the regime fell in 1943.*’®
64 Ibid., 410.
65 Berezin, Making the Fascist Self, 66.
66 Ibid., 99,169.
67 Ibid., 250.
6® Salvatorelli argues, "after the March on Rome, the construction of 
Mussolini's Fascist state was completed. National Fascism realized itself fully 
as anti-Risorgimento. It brought the suppression of all liberties, the 
discrediting and destruction of parliament, justice linked to political power, 
party privilege annulling equality among citizens, exploitation of the national
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Consequences of the Fascist Regime
Fascism was essentially a military regime. So, too, was the Fascist economic 
and social policy. Fascist agriculture was a strategic resource designed to 
feed an army; Fascist demographic policy was supposed to breed one. The 
industrial sector became a vast 'military-industrial complex' geared to 
armaments and Empire. The regime could be assessed in military terms. All 
the efforts at mobilization and italianita, however, did not help to make 
Italians. By 1939 the regime had become more unpopular than ever before. 
Fascist Italy failed by its own criteria, and in failing, transformed the Italian 
economy and society once again.^ ^
Like the earlier Roman empires the Fascist regime crumbled first at the 
periphery. The Sicilians nursed their grievances and founded secret 
autonomous associations to struggle against the 'Continentals'. In the South 
Tyrol, most of the inhabitants were 'Optanten' who had voted to leave Italian 
citizenship and who were regarded from 1940 onwards as German citizens 
subject to German law.
economy for the advantage of bands of profiteers, and the subjection and 
pollution of national culture through gross and inconsistent conceptions 
hostile to the humanistic principles fundamental to the new Italy. 
Salvatorelli, Tite Risorgimento, 191.
69 Clark, Modern Italy, 278.
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Even among the population at large, fascism's impact was uneven. 
Throughout much of rural, and especially southern Italy another fascist 
compromise allowed existing power structures to survive, either alongside, 
or actually disguised as those of the party. The village of Gagliano in the 
southern region of Lucania, immortalized by Carlo Levi's Christ Stopped at 
Eboli, exemplifies fascism's failure to impinge on everyday rural life. Urban 
Italians were to be exposed to fascist propaganda through school, press, 
radio, cinema, and the various organizations of the party, but such things 
barely penetrated southern countryside. With one southern power-group, 
however, the fascist regime refused to compromise. In Sicily, the Mafia 
whose ability to operate its own system of administration and 'justice', was 
plainly incompatible with 'totalitarianism'; it was resolutely pursued and 
apparently suppressed; however, the Mafia moved underground. *^^
Although bureaucratic nationalization of the middle classes succeeded at 
least partially, that of the working class and peripheral Italy failed miserably. 
The reasons for this lie in working class alienation from the fascist regime 
and the appeal that the Soviet Revolution had in the working class 
imagination in the pre-fascist period, together with the persistence of the 
deep-rooted local cultural traditions. Thus the objective of creating a national 
identity was reduced to that of making the masses faithful and obedient to
70 Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, 38.
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their fascist masters. In addition, the mobilization capacity of the Fascist 
Party was exhausted: 'fascist leaders and mere hangers-on subsided into a 
repetitive, tired routine, devoid of tension and creative impetus. To all of this 
must be added the Second World War which as well as military defeat, 
meant death, devastation, deportation, starvation and horror which shattered 
forever the fascist grandeur. The failure of the attempt to 'make Italians' did 
not lead, however, to the collapse of the idea of nation. In fact, sub-national 
and sub-cultural notions persisted, which taken together, still gave a sense, in 
many ways, of 'being Italian', though in a different manner.''^
71 Brierley and Giacometti, "Italian National Identity," 175.
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CHAPTER V
REGIONALISM AND REGIONALIZATION IN ITALY IN THE
POST-FASCIST PERIOD
The post- World War II period which is also referred to in Italy as the 
Republican period is an important time in order to understand the causes of 
the present crisis that the Italian state has been going through regarding 
national integrity. During this period, the Italian state pursued policies that
aimed at continuing the national integration process under the democratic 
premises that hopefully would erase the remnants of the Fascist interlude.
The Resistance Movement as a Fragmentary Force Between
the North and the South
The Fascist period had a serious impact upon the process of national 
integration in Italy as mentioned in the previous chapter. The most revealing 
paradox in Mussolini's attempt to "make Italians" was that it did finally have 
the effect of launching a powerful movement of national solidarity which 
was aimed at destroying fascism forever.  ^ The power of the Resistance
1 "The armistice of September 1943 left Italy divided South of Rome between 
Allied and Nazi-controlled areas. Millions of Italians north of this line faced
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movement provided a vital prerequisite for the country's rapid resurgence as 
a liberal democracy. It was the resurgence again in which 'the paese reale (real 
country) had risen heroically to free itself from dictatorship' . 2 Clark argues 
that the real effect of Resistance was political. It not only aborted Fascist 
attempts to restore 'national unity' but a new 'national unity' based on anti- 
Fascist terms was established. The peasants were involved in the national 
struggle to liberate their territories from Fascist rule.  ^Post-Fascist Italy was to 
be a 'partyocrac/ legitimized by the overriding ideology of anti-Fascism and 
national unity.
The most significant consequence of the Second World War was that in its last 
years it gave rise to a Resistance movement. Nevertheless, it was primarily a 
northern phenomenon that served to impede the growth of understanding 
between the North and the South  ^ and at the same time had some divisive 
effects upon Italian politics and society. The role played by the Communists 
in the Resistance movement was very important. In 1943-45, the PCI (Partita
stark choices: to fight alongside Nazis for the Salo Republic, to carry on with 
everyday life at the risk of being sent to German labor camps, or to join the 
Resistance.", See Roger Griffin, "Italy," in Roger Eatwell ed., European PoUticaJ 
Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 
144.
2 Ibid.
3 Martin Qark, Modern Italy 1871-1982 (London and New York: Longman, 
1984), 315.
< Joseph La Palombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 55.
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Communista Italia) became a major force in the emerging anti-Fascist 
establishment, "of dedication to the State and to the interests of the nation 
rather than the Proleteriat".5 Yet, the Resistance was restricted to Northern 
and Central Italy. There had been no popular insurrections in the South, apart 
from Naples in September 1943 before the Allies arrived. The old Southern 
political and economic system remained intact, and the Left parties were very 
weak there. Even in Rome itself there had been no insurrection against the 
Germans.^ As a result, when the 1946 referendum took place, all Northern 
and Central regions, except Latium, voted for the Republic whereas Rome 
and all the South voted monarchist, with a peak vote of 79 percent in Naples. 
The 1946 referendum revealed a very important turning point in the problem 
of national integration with a capacity to predict the forthcoming regional 
problems in the following decades: "the values of Resistance flourished only 
where the Resistance flourished. This had remained true ever since. The 
referendum highlighted the split between a conservative, monarchist South 
and a radical. Republican North and it proved an excellent guide to 
subsequent voting patterns."^
It is also important to note the incredible increase in the votes for the DC 
(Democrazia Christiana) in the aftermath of the Fascist interlude, a
5 Clark, Modem 313.
6 Ibid., 316.
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development which had a crucial impact on the future attempts and 
consequences of national integration in Italy. Taking advantage of the Cold 
War atmosphere and the threat of Commuiusm, the DC had both the financial 
support of the United States and the Church behind it. The 1947 Christmas 
message from the Pope was very crucial in this respect. He warned that "he 
who gives his support, his services and his talents to those parties and forces 
that deny God is a deserter and a traitor."®
The consequence of the 1946 referendum was the resentment and distancing 
between the Left-Wing Northerners and the DC supporters. The Left-wing 
Northerners resented the fact that the DC was relying on the old Roman 
institutions as the police, judiciary, prefects, and civil service, none of which 
was liberal. They felt that their revolution had been betrayed, their claims to 
rule had been ignored, the state they had created had been snatched from 
them. They had defeated Fascism after years of hard fighting; they had 
founded the Republic. Yet, within two years, another 'one-party regime' had 
been established...Ever since 1947-48, radical Northerners have seen the *
Tbid., 319.
* The effect of this message was an enormous increase in the votes of the DC 
which would establish the party as the only party in the postwar period with 
a solid mass support. While the votes of the Popular Democratic Front of 
Socialists and Communists increased from 31 percent in 1946 to 39.8 percent 
in 1947, the votes of the DC increased from 35.2 percent in 1946 to 48.5 
percent in 1947. See Ibid., 325.
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Rome establishment as illegitimate; indeed as 'Fascist'; their resentment has 
proven a constant source of weakness to the Republic'.^
This resentment by the Northerners added another dimension to the already- 
existing gap between the Northerners and Southerners and played a negative 
role in the attempts to 'make Italians'. An important example revealing the 
degree of resentment by the Northerners towards the Southerners was 
revealed in the issue of civil service recruitment. Many of the recruits for the 
bureaucracy were reliable Southerners recommended by priest or bishop, or 
brought in by Allied administrators unwilling to rely on Left-wing partisans. 
The "wind from the North" may have blown a few Northerners into 
government in 1945, but the South wind proved stronger. The machinery of 
the state was meridionalized (Southernized) particularly at the upper echelons. 
Since 1948 over half of Italy's senior civil servants have been Southerners and 
the proportion shown up in surveys increased steadily: 54 percent in 1954, 63 
percent in 1961, 76 percent in 1965. Thus the civil service, which in the pre- 
Fascist times had been small and Northern, became big and Southern. It 
further alienated Northerners, including many Christian Democrats, from the 
postwar State. Moreover, it created a gulf of mutual suspicion and hostility 
between the ruling politicians, who were predominantly Northerners
’ Ibid, 325. See also Raphael Zariski, Italy. The Politics o f Uneven Development 
(Illinois, Hinsdale: The Dryden Press, 1972), 98. Zariski argues that "the 
Resistance experience which was shared only by the Northern Italians 
somewhat estranged the South."
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appealing to anti-Fascist values, and the permanent administrators, who were 
predominantly Southerners with no experience of Resistance,Thus the 
developments after 1945 became effective in party formation in Italy and 
institutionalization of hostilities between the North and the South, thereby 
making the national integration process even harder.
The Italian State's Policies for National Integration in the
Post-Fascist Period
The two major issues that the post-Fascist state in Italy dealt with had been 
democratization, that would eradicate the past remnants of the Fascist period 
and development together with modernization that was expected to 
overcome social and economic inequalities in the country. The most 
important indication of the desire for democratization was the recognition of 
the gap between the politicians and the people and thus the revival of the 
debate on centralization/decentralization. The fascist experience was thought 
to be the result of a too centralized state. It was recognized that some form of 
decentralization was necessary to keep the country intact and to close the gap 
between the state and citizens.
However, attempts at national integration were not very successful and 
produced some unexpected results which will be taken up in this chapter.
>0 Clark, Modern Italy, 338.
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Carlo Triglia argued that in Italy the most important difference compared to 
other cases is that ethnic identities did not play an important role as 
fragmentary forces, because these conditions did not exist in Italy. What 
existed instead was a particular relationship between the center and 
periphery-national government and provinces- based on weak national 
integration, a consequence of the process of national unification and the lack 
of a national myth. i^ Cassese and Torchia argue that the highly centralized 
state was an aim to pursue, unlike France where it was the starting 
condition.i2 jh e  social, economic and political backwardness of southern Italy 
and some areas in the Center and North covering the Alpine and Appenine 
mountain ranges was considered to be the result of backward institutions. 
The regular and uniform application of the more advanced Piedmontese 
institutions^ ,^ it was assumed, would have led to the development of these
areas.
The First W ave o f  Adm inistrative Integration: The 1948 Constitution
iiPercy Allum, State and Society in Western Europe (Great Britain: Polity Press, 
1995,150.
12 My emphasis. Sabino Cassese and Luisa Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 
In The Rise o f the Meso Level in Europe, ed., Jim L. Sharpe (London: Sage 
Publications, 1993), 92.
13 "Piedmontese" institutions were perceived as the state apparatus that a 
modern, unitary and centralized state would have. The region Piedmont, 
located in Northern Italy, even closer to the French border and under high 
French influence had the modern state structure that was inherited from the 
Napoleonic state administration.
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This Napoleonic pattern of thought changed in the aftermath of the Fascist 
interlude that Italy went through even though the history of Italian political 
and administrative institutions during the last 120 years can be described in 
very general terms as a continual effort to reduce asymmetries and create 
uniform conditions throughout the country^  ^ that would culminate in 
'making Italians' as well as 'making Italy'. However, Ragioneri argued that 
this was a "creation of unity through administrative pressure as well as 
through the national government".^®
The basic models characterized by centralization and uniformity to reach 
political and administrative unification were basically imported from France 
through the Napoleonic influence. However, there is a main difference 
between the French system and the Italian one regarding the functioning of 
the system which is attributable to two conditions peculiar to Italy: first, the 
conditions of unequal development within the country, which are 
particularly due to the social, economic and political backwardness of the 
south and some areas of the center and north, and second, the lack of the 
homogeneity of the ruling class. The coexistence of the northern industrialists 
and the southern landowners was an economic and political compromise.
1* Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 91.
15 Carlo Rosetti, "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy," in Demoaacy, 
Clientelism and Civil Society, eds., Luis Roniger and Ayse Güneş-Ayata 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 92.
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although both sides had different interests.^  ^As will be elaborated below, this 
latter factor in a way formed an obstacle to national integration.
Setting up the Italian regions was a complex and tortuous process requiring a 
long period of preparation from 1871 till 1970. The 'regional problem' has 
been a topic subjected to proposals and political contrasts right from the 
unification of the Italian state. The evolution of regionalism was merely in the 
realm of ideas and was not reflected on the institutions. One reason for this 
was that there were no 'regional communities' in Italy^ ,^ in the sense of a 
Basque or Catalan regional communities. Rather, the main territorial units 
that had legitimacy were the communes or municipalities, as also noted in 
Chapter 2. The boundaries of regions established in the Constitution are, in 
fact, the boundaries of the ancient 'statistical departments' set up almost a 
century earlier. The attempt to draw and establish new boundaries was 
rapidly ruled out by sharp disagreement on the constitutive elements of 
regional identity and by the bias against differentiation and particularism 
which has been an underlying institutional experience since unification in 
1861. The fact of Italy as a 'late-comer' among nation state system explains, at 
least partly, why unity and uniformity have been so important and relevant
>6 Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 92.
17 For more details see Adrian Lyttelton, "Shifting Identities: Nation, Region 
and City," in Carl Levy (ed.) Italian Regionalism. Histor}/, Identity and Politics, 
(Washington D. C.: Berg, 1996), 33-52. Also Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso 
Level in Italy," 93.
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in political life. The country's localist and particularist heritage had to be 
converted into a Unitarian nation-state. Otherwise, this particularism would 
render the state vulnerable to foreign attacks and conquests as happened in 
the past. Thus, it is understandable why uniformity was a main target to be 
achieved by the leaders of the state. It is also important to note that the 
different traditions of the pre-unification states were almost never allowed to 
survive, because they were often linked with domination by foreign powers. 
That is the main reason why pre-unificaHon differentiation has never 
emerged as an important feature of sub-national politics in the modern Italian 
state.i®
In 1947-1948, the principle of regionalism had been included in the Italian 
Constitution.^  ^ Christian Democrats from Sturzo onwards were regionalists.
Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 114.
The literature on regionalism in Italy in the postwar period is vast. Some 
important works include, Gaspare Ambrosini, L'Ordinamento Regiomle. La 
Riforma Regionale nella Costituzione Italiana [Regional Laws. Regional Reform 
in the Italian Constitution],(Bologna: Zanichelli Editöre, 1957), Feliciano 
Benvenuti and Elio Caranti, Le Regioni [The Regions], (Roma: PAMOM, 1971), 
Ettore Rotelli, L'Avvento della Regione in Italia [The Advent of the Region in 
Italy], (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffre Editöre, 1967), Enzo Santarelli, Dossier sulk 
Regioni [Dossier on the Regions], (Bari: De Donato Editöre, 1970), Enzo 
Santarelli, II Regionalismo nell'Italia Unita [Regionalism in United Italy. History 
of the Idea of Regionalism up to the Republic], (Firenze: Editöre Bulgarini, 
1973), Robert D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, R. Nanetti, La Pianta e le Radici: II 
Radicamento dell'Istituto Regionale nel Sistema Politico Italiano [The Plant and the 
Roots: The Establishment of the Regional Institute in the Italian Political 
System], (Bologna: II Mulino, 1985), Paola Bonora, Regionalita: II Concetto di 
Regione nell'Italia del Secondo Dopoguerra 1943-1970 [Regionalism: The Concept
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Regionalism had to be introduced because of the collapse of the fascist state 
and the emerging serious threats of revolt or ethnic or linguistic differences 
from mainland Italy.20 This was the case in Sicily and Sardinia, in French- 
speaking Val d'Aosta, in German-speaking South Tyrol and in Slav-speaking 
parts of Venezia-Giulia. Italian politicians had no choice but to grant 
autonomy to these regions to be able to keep the country intact. 
Centralization was considered to be a typical product of fascist 
authoritarianism, and the distribution of power, which regionalism would 
have brought about, appeared to be the most effective solution for 
safeguarding the democratic system. The Regions were regarded as multi­
purpose entities. They were "for the reform of the state", "for the benefit of 
planning", "for greater participation", "as a political instrument to relieve 
social, political and other pressures on the center, by defusing tensions that 
were so typical of I ta ly " .B u t  perhaps the most important reason was to 
shrink the traditional administrative apparatus in Italy.
of Regions in Italy after The Second World War 1943-1970], (Milano: Franco 
Angeli, 1984).
20 See Marco Walter Battachi, Meridionali e Settentrionali nella Struttura del 
Pregiudizio Etnico in Italia [The Southerners and Northerners in the Structure 
of Ethnic Prejudice in Italy], (Bologna: II Mulino, 1959).
21 Ettore Rotelli, "Le Region! dalla Partecipazione al Partite,"["The Regions 
from Participation to Party], in La Crisi Italiana [In The Italian Crisis], L. 
Graziano and S. Tarrow, eds., (Turin: Einaudi, 1979) in Cassese and Torchia, 
"The Meso Level in Italy," 97.
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Cassese and Torchia enumerate the three basic reasons for the regional clause 
in the Constituent Assembly as follows:
(1) The need to distribute power in such a way so as to prevent a single party 
from taking over. It is for this reason that the Christian Democrats were in 
favor of the regions at the time, whereas the Communists were against 
them.
(2) The need to bring rulers and ruled together. For example, the creation of 
points of access and consultation and bringing the institutions closer to 
citizens were the places of resistance of a certain wing of Italian 
regionalism, which was aware of the low level of representative, 
administrative and political institutions at the time. This theme of the gap 
between the institutions and the people is a recurring theme in post-war 
Italian politics.
(3) The need to increase the rate of citizens' participation in public life to 
overcome the democratic deficit.
So, the four regions 'with special statutes' were created. They were allowed to 
elect their own assemblies, and were granted certain legislative and 
administrative powers.^  ^The local elites could preserve their own languages
22 Article 117 of the Constitution specified 17 headings under which the 
region may legislate: municipal boundaries, urban and rural police forces, 
fairs and markets, public charities, health and hospital assistance, vocational 
training and financial assistance to students; local museums and libraries, 
urban planning and tourism and the hotel industry, regional transport 
networks (excluding railways), regional roads, aqueducts and other public
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and cultures, manage their own economies and welfare systems. This remedy 
worked and the regional agitations died down when the regions obtained the 
powers they demanded. The words of the President of the SudHroler 
Volkspartei to de Gasperi reflected this content. He said: "no one better than 
you, born in Trentino, can understand the desire for autonomous government 
rooted in our people for centuries. Autonomy is not a threat to national unity 
but the finest way of capturing the hearts of our people."23
However, the powers allocated to regional and local government are not 
extensive by international standards. Italian regionalism is distinct from 
strong forms of federalism in various ways. Fewer powers are devolved, 
there are virtually no areas of 'exclusive' legislative powers attributed to the 
regions, financial autonomy is extremely limited and there is no formal 
representation of regional authorities in the legislature. ·^* Another area of 
limitation is that in addition to the general powers allocated under Article 
117, the Constitution adds an additional category of regional legislative 
power. However, it grants the central state the power to take back, as well as 
to delegate authority. Regional legislation is to be constrained 'within the
works, lake navigation and ports, mineral and spa waters, extractive 
industries, hunting and inland fisheries, agriculture and forestry and 
artisanship. See David Hine, Governing Italy. The Politics o f Bargained Pluralism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 266.
23 Ibid.
Hine, Governing Italy, 259.
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limits of the fundamental principles decided by the State', and the region is 
free to legislate 'provided that such legislation is not against the interests of 
the Nation, or of other Regions'. Such a principle gives the center an 
important advantage in its relations with regional government, although the 
relationship is not entirely on e-sid ed .However, most articles in the 1948 
Constitution were not applied properly and ended up with a shift towards 
centralism. The main reasons for the failure of the implementation of the 
regional clause in the Constitution were political. The DC was afraid that the 
creation of regions would increase the votes of Communists in some regions. 
In addition, even though the Fascist regime was overthrown, many 
bureaucrats with a centralized mentality remained in office; they strongly 
opposed the creation of regions. As a result, underdeveloped conditions of 
some parts of the country were used as an excuse to revert back to the 
centralized policies that were associated with the welfare state.2^
The Second W ave o f  Adm inistrative Integration: TJte 1970 Regionalization  
At the end of the 1960s, the economic growth and the emergence of a non- 
Fascist national identity especially among the newly-recruited ranks of the 
bureaucracy provided the necessary environment for regionalization to take 
place. In addition, by the late 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, the old 
centralized system started to break down further. It was unable to provide
25 See Hine, Governing Italy, 267. Hine calls this type of administration as 
"centralized collegiate decision-making". Ibid., 270.
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Welfare services. Italian welfare state policies were expanding in three 
directions: larger amounts of financial resources were allocated to cover an 
increasing number of people, authority was ever more concentrated in the 
political center and the scope of public policies was broadened to cover new 
areas of need. At the same time, the economic recession of the early 1970s 
brought about a deeper crisis of trust-perception of an increasingly wide gap 
on the one hand between the social and economic expectations generated by 
the broad spectrum of political development, economic and social policies of 
the welfare state and, on the other hand, the actual outcomes. The result was 
increasing votes of protest in favor of the radical parties, demands for direct 
democracy and a call for institutions closer to people.^^
Nanetti argues that the combination of the economic, social and political 
crises of the late 1960s and 1970s led to the transition to a second phase of 
evolution in the welfare state system that can be referred to as "social 
capitalism", in which public policies are formulated for the creation, support 
and pervasive distribution of private wealth by sub-national governments.^®
26 Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 96.
27 Raffaella Nanetti, Growth and Territorial Policies: The Italian Model o f Social 
Capitalism (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 7. See also Sabino 
Cassese, "Italy: A System in Search of an Equilibrium," in Regionalization in 
France, Italy and Spain. Papers presented at a seminar on Nation-Region 
Conflicts in Economic Policy-making in France, Italy and Spain, 9-10 June 
1983 at the International Center for Economics and Related Disciplines, 
London School of University (London: Imediaprint Limited, 1984), 11-20.
28 Nanetti, Growth and Territorial Policies, 8.
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According to Nanetti social capitalism is a mass phenomenon. The society 
must have the ability to use the public resources for promoting broad, 
socially based rather than narrow, individual private gain, and there must be 
a sense of public interest well rooted among politicians and members of 
bureaucracy as well as society at large. Otherwise, public resources will be 
siphoned off for private corruption.
Indeed, debate about the creation of regions and devolution of power to them 
was very intense. Aima Bull cites J. Earle, who summed up the various 
reactions to the regional experiment at the beginning of the 1970s as follows: 
"At best, ...[devolutionary power] can inject new vigor and more direct 
democracy into the machinery of government, acting as a vehicle for progress 
and enrichment of life at all levels. At worst, it can insert a parasitic layer of 
maladministration...adding to the opportunity for clientelism, intrigue and 
corruption."^  ^ As a result, in addition to the already-existing five special 
statute regions, fifteen ordinary regions were created.^  ^ However, the
29 Ibid., 9.
30 J. Earle, Italy in the 1970s (Newton Abbot and Vancouver, David and 
Charles, 1974), in Anna Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," in Regionalism in Europe, 
ed., Peter Wagstaff, (Oxford: Intellect Books, 1994), 72. Bull thinks that both 
forecasts turned out to be correct. Ibid., 72.
31 On the second phase of regionalization that took place in the 1970s, see also 
Percy A. Allum and G. Amyot, "Regionalism in Italy: Old wine in New 
Bottles?" Parliamentary Affairs, 24 (Winter 1970/1), 53-78; Sidney Tarrow, 
"Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A Comparison of Italy and France," 
Comparative Politics, 7 October 1974; J. L. Sharpe, "The European Meso: An
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demand for the creation of regions did not come from below. The main drive 
for regionalization came from above, as in the case of 1948. In addition to the 
reason stated above by Nanetti, another explanation is provided by Cassese 
and Torchia. They argue that the regional reform was a "simultaneous cause 
and effect of the expansion process of the political class".32 This is because the 
new institutions would generate an increase in the number of positions 
reserved for people through some form of election who are essentially 
appointed by political parties.^  ^ Thus the devolution of powers served in 
particular the interests of the DC and PCI. The Christian Democrats, whose 
party had been in power for twenty years and had permeated not only the 
center but all areas of political, social and economic life by means of a 
network of institutions under its control were seriously threatened by a 
Communist revolt that took them as the main target. As P. Farneti pointed 
out, devolution shifted the focus of social discontent away from the center, 
transferred responsibility for public services to newly created bodies and
Appraisal," in The Rise o f Meso Government in Europe, ed., L. J. Sharpe, 1-39 
(London: Sage Publications, 1993). For the map of regionalization, see 
Appendix D.
32 Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy,", 113.
33 "The main reason for expanding the number of posts available to political 
class has been the difficulties that politicians have had when they imposed 
their priorities and policies on the state bureaucracy and public agencies. The 
easiest and most painless way of overcoming the resistance of bureaucrats is 
to increase one's own importance and maneuvering space by creating new 
political bodies providing additional offices." Cassese and Torchia, "The 
Meso Level in Italy,"113. See also Sabino Cassese, "Centro e Periferia. I 
grand! tornanti della loro storia," ["The Center and The Periphery. The great 
moments in their history."] Rivistu Trimestrcile di Diritto Pubblico, 1.
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obliged the left, especially the PCI, in managing the crisis in those areas that 
were affected worst by internal migration and industrialization and 
uncontrolled urbanization of the cities in the North.^ Moreover, the DC, by 
turning over the administrations of a few regions to PCI, hoped to continue 
its national domination while siphoning off pressure from those groups 
permanently excluded from the exercise of power.
The PCI, on the other hand, saw in the regions the possibility of emerging 
from its political isolation, demonstrating its ability to govern, and increasing 
its legitimacy in the public mind by proving its political and administrative 
ability. When the PCI, seeking new political and social alliances, launched its 
historic compromise policy in September 1973 in order to recreate the climate 
and conditions which paved the way for the founding of the Republic and a 
democratic Constitution, the regions became the chosen ground for 
experiments attempted later at the central level.
The advocates of the regions thought that the creation of regions would 
compensate for the low degree of territorial representation and close the 
democratic deficit that stemmed from the highly centralized character of the 
Risorgimento state. Thus those newly-created bodies would be the medium
34 Yves Meny, "The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France and 
Spain," in Regionalism in European Politics, ed., Roger Morgan (London: Policy 
Studies Institute, 1986), 16-17.
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through which 'civil society' could transmit their demands to the central 
authority.
The "Southern Problem" and State Policies for 
Economic and Social Integration
The most important problem of the Italian state with respect to national 
integration remained the Southern problem (Problema del Mezzogiorno).^^ The 
huge economic gap between the South and North of Italy was still there 
impeding the efforts at national integration. The Italian state undertook some 
projects to develop the South and achieve a successful integration of the 
country. The first phase of the postwar development policy (1950-57) had 
three main elements: land reform, foundation of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 
(Southern Development Fund) that was entrusted with the administration of 
funds for development purposes which were supposed to be normal 
investment procedure (extraordinary intervention), and fiscal and financial 
measures to encourage private investment in industrialization.^  ^ The main 
assumption behind the extraordinary intervention in the South rested on 
'development theories' This approach was based on the dual belief that the
35 Raffaele Brancati, La QuesHone Regionale. Federalismo, Mezzogiorno e Sviluppo 
Económico [The Regional Question. Federalism, The South and Economic 
Development], (Roma: Donzelli Editöre, 1995), 14.
36 For the Southern problem, see F. Roy Willis, Italy Chooses Europe (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 160-177.
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disadvantage of the South in natural resources and location could be 
overcome by recent technological progress and that the shortcomings of the 
classical theorists of the South could be removed by treating the question as 
part of the new international issue of underdeveloped countries. For instance 
the Swiss economist Freidrich Vochting suggested some solutions to the 
Southern problem. He argued that the South should begin a program of 
carefully chosen industrial projects suited to the resources and market in the 
area and protect them by imposing a regional tariff barrier against goods 
coming from the North.^  ^This view was completely opposed to the ideals of 
integration, and found little support in Italy, except among Sicilian 
separatists. Instead the most favorable suggestion that enjoyed wide-spread 
popularity and acceptability was that of giving primacy to agricultural 
development accompanied by the creation of the infrastructure for 
development.^® As a result, as the first stage of its official policy toward the 
South, the government aimed to create industrial infrastructure such as roads, 
bridges, schools and commuiucations, and encouraged investment by private 
sector firms. The private firms who could invest in the South would enjoy the 
benefits of "external economies". However, by 1957, it was observed that this
Friedrich Vochting, Die Italienisch Südfrage, cited in ibid., 163.
3* The most important proponents of this view were Professors Giuseppe di 
Nardi, Fancesco Vito, but especially Professor Pasquale Saraceno, vice 
president and one of the principal promoters of the very effective Associazione 
per lo Sviluppo dell'Industri nel Mezzogiorno (SVIMEZ) [Association for the 
Development of Industry in the South], a collaborator in the formulation of
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incentive did not prove to be an effective stimulus for the private firms to 
invest in the South. Thus the state decided to give greater financial 
encouragement to firms to invest in the South and participate directly in the 
financing of industry in the South.
In the first phase of the intervention, the Cassa was really efficient. The 
investments used to aid the peasant farmers had increased productivity, 
absorbed labor in productive work, and brought marked social benefits to 
more than 100.000 families who had been settled in new homes. The 
transportation system of the South, both roads and railroads, had been 
improved. Water had been brought to several million people through the 
construction of water mains. A small beginning had been made in private 
industrial investment aided by credit institutions in which the Cassa 
participated.^^
However, the period of special intervention was not free from problems. The 
policies pursued by the Cassa were criticized to a great extent and 
interestingly enough, the criticisms revealed the ongoing difference between 
the North and the South. Some Northern critics argued that the program be 
dropped, in order to relieve the financial burden on the North at the moment 
when Italy's entry into the European Economic Community was going to
the Vanoni Plan, and vice chairman of the National Planning Commission. 
See ibid.
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make it necessary for the Northern industrial complex to invest its available 
capital in more directly productive enterprises. The Cassa's reply to this 
demand was in the negative; they argued that there had been no alternative 
to spending 25 to 30 percent of the funds in the North, since the ongoing 
projects would be left on the way if it is done otherwise.^*’
The second phase of the development policy (1957-1965) coincided with the 
formation of the European Economic Community. The law enacted on July 
29, 1957 extended Cassa's activity until 1965 and ended the priority given to 
agricultural improvement and infrastructural investment. Instead the 
emphasis was placed on future investment for improving industrial 
production.**  ^ According to the first laws (1957 and 1959) the development 
effort was to be concentrated in selected development areas (poll di sviluppo).
However, the second phase of the development policy, too, was not free 
from problems. The industrialization policy has not only been pursued 
through the incentives coming under the heading of extraordinary 
intervention. Industrial policy legislation enacted for the whole of the country *·
223 billion lire had been invested in private industrial projects in 1950-1956.
0^ Willis, Italy Chooses Europe, 167-168.
·** "Three methods of stimulating industrialization were to be coordinated: (a) 
the activity of the Cassa was reoriented to the creation of carefully delimited 
'areas' and 'nuclei' of industrial development; (b) the state holding 
companies, especially IRI and ENI were required to make 40 percent of their
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has generally contained clauses favoring enterprises located in the 
Mezzogiorno. In spite of these provisions, the North-Center (where more than 
80 percent of the manufacture is located) has taken the major share of 
industrial incentives other than those specifically directed at the
Mezzogiorno.^2
As a result, state policies aimed at integrating the South economically and 
socially were not very successful and were subject to severe criticisms. 
Graziano, for instance, stated that the programs of southern development 
have transformed the Mezzogiorno from a poor, self-sufficient region to one 
which is less poor but more strictly dependent on the rest of the country.^  ^ In 
the same vein, Carello argues that the Mezzogiorno's inferior position in the 
Italian and international economies has produced eight negative 
consequences: rural exodus, economic deserts, social disintegration,
anomalous urbanization, anomalous consumerism, hypertertiarization.
investments in the South; (c) by further fiscal and financial benefits, private 
sector was encouraged to found industrial plants in the South." See Ibid., 169.
2^ The most comprehensive account available of the activities of public 
agencies operating in the field shows a decline in the relative share of the 
South: from 60 percent in the 1971-79 period to 52 percent in the 1980-1987 
period. See Commission of the European Communities. Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economy Reports and Studies. The 
Economic and Financial Situation in Italy, No: 1 (Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the EC, 1993), 128.
« Willis, Italy Chooses Europe, 191.
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emigration and the entrepreneurial Mafia and the Mafia model of capitalist
accumulation.^^
Perhaps the most important consequence of this unbridged gap^  ^ which has 
had a crucial impact on the rise of regionalist parties as Lega Nord in 
Northern Italy was the massive emigration from the South to the North as a 
result of state policies. Southern immigrants in the Northern cities aroused 
much resentment and even 'racial' hostility among the inhabitants. The 
immigrants were blamed for crime, illiteracy, sponging on welfare and 
overloading the available public services-transport, public housing, schools, 
and the like.
The Impact of European Integration upon 
National Integration in Italy
Supranational integration has added another dimension to the regional 
problem in Italy since the "the Southern Problem" has turned out to be a 
problem of the then European Community (now European Union). Since the 
beginning of the European integration, the Mezzogiorno became one of the *
** Adrian Nicola Carello, The Northern Question. Italy's Participation in the 
European Economic Community and the Mezzogiorno's Underdevelopment (London 
and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1989), 115.
For differences between the productivity levels and distribution of RTD 
factors by Regions, and distribution of employment in intensity in high
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less developed regions of Europe.“·*’ The Community has adopted policies to 
overcome these disparities between regions of the Community. But first, one 
should summarize how the EC perceived regionalism in general.
Part of the myth surrounding the creation and evolution of the European 
Union predicted a progressive weakening of central authority and state 
power and erosion of loyalties to central institutions and the transfer of 
authority and loyalty to new transnational centers of decision-making.^  ^ A 
related assumption, derived from the myth surrounding sub-national 
regional movements in Europe today, is that the unification of a continent 
requires its decentralization as well, with the natural and logical beneficiaries 
of such decentralization being the regions. A natural accompaniment to the 
emergence of united Europe is the emergence of a sub-national regional 
dimension.^® Thus one can postulate a relationship between supranational
technology industries in Mezzogiorno and the remainder of Italy, see 
Appendices E, F, G respectively.
In the Southern Italy, the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was less 
than 75 % of the Community average in 1988. On the issue of Italy and the 
European Community, see Antonio D'Atena, Le Regioni Italiane e la Comunita 
Económica Europea [The Italian Regions and The European Economic 
Community], (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffre Editöre, 1981).
•7 Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and International 
Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
Lawrence Scheinman, "The Interfaces of Regionalism in Western Europe: 
Brussels and Peripheries," In Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, ed., Milton 
Esman (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977), 65.
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integration and sub-national regionalism: national territory is redefined in 
regional terms in conjunction with the absorption of the state into European 
federal structures.“*^
The increased emphasis on the regional level of integration and regional 
disparities were prevalent from the inception of the European integration and 
actually the problem of Mezzogiorno was recognized in the protocol attached 
to the Treaty of Rome. Article 2 of the Treaty referred to the objective of a 
"harmonious development of economic activities ... and a continuous and 
balanced expansion," while in the preamble the contracting parties stated 
their general desire "for reduction of the differences existing between the 
various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions". However, 
there were only a few provisions made in the treaty for the creation of 
instruments which could contribute towards this 'harmonious development 
and the reduction of regional disparities. Thus the Rome Treaty had left the 
basic responsibility for dealing with the problem of regional disparities to the 
national authorities. *^*
-*9 Ibid., 65-66.
"Regional disparities were important but not of primary importance and 
Was not considered as a major policy concern at the time of the signing of the 
treaty. In addition, large transfers of money across frontiers were considered 
as politically impossible." See Loukas Tsoukalis, The New European Economy. 
The Politics and Economics o f Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 209-210.
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The accession of United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark into the Union in 
1973 was the main reason lying behind setting up the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. With setting up of European Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1979, the so-called New Community Instrument (NCI) was 
created in order to provide, through the European Investment Bank, 
subsidized loans to the less prosperous members, namely Ireland and Italy. 
The Community's interest in the problem of regional disparities became 
greater by the Second Enlargement Process and the entry of such relatively 
poor countries into the Community as Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
Commission's 1985 White Paper which promoted the single market project 
expressed apprehension about huge regional disparities between and within 
the countries.®  ^ Thus a new approach was adopted in 1985 with the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs) that was intended for the 
Mediterranean regions of France, Italy and the whole of Greece. The creation 
of IMPs was in recognition of the special development problems of these
51 "Economic integration, by increasing the possibilities for human, material 
and financial resources to move without obstacle towards the most 
economically attractive regions, could lead to an increase in regional 
disparities." Commission o f the EC, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper 
from the Commission to the European Council, CB-43-85-894-EN-C, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1985, cited in Mark Wise and 
Richard Gibb, Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 
1990s (England: Longman, 1993), 201. On the impact of the Single Market 
upon regions, see Robert Leonardi, Regions and the European Community: The 
Regional Response to the Single Market in the Underdeveloped Parts o f the EC 
(London: Frank Cass, 1992), Giuseppe Palmeri, "L'Atto Unico Europeo e le 
Competenze delle Regioni Italiane," ["The Single European Act and the
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regions and the relative bias of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
against southern agricultural products.^^
The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) constituted an important turning point 
in the increased importance devoted to the regions.^  ^ The SEA created a 
fundamentally different environment for regional governments. Even though 
it reiterated the old aim of reducing the gap between well-developed regions 
or social groups and less favored ones, the main novelty was that an EC 
■'social dimension' was accepted as an 'indispensable corollary of the large 
markef.^^
The Commission's belief that an effective EC regional policy, formally 
referred to as "economic and social cohesion", was necessary for the
Responsibilities of the Italian Regions."] Conjranti, Marzo-Aprile 1989, No: 2, 
29-37.
“  Tsoukalis, The New European Economy, 215. On the implementation of IMPs 
in Italy, see also the report prepared by Robert Leonard!, La Rivoluzione 
Regionalista in Europea: L'Atto Unico Europeo e II Fondo Regionale [The Regional 
Revolution in Europe: Single European Act and The Regional Fund], 
(Bologna: Nomisma, 1990).
Sonia Mazey and James Mitchell, "Europe of Regions: Territorial Interests 
and European Integration: The Scottish Experience," in Lobbying in the 
European Community, eds., Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 95.
Commission of the EC, The New Structural Policies o f the European 
Community, European File, 7-8/90 (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC, 1990).
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successful functioning of the single European market, together with the 
increasing willingness and assertiveness of the regions led to the formation of 
the Consultative Committee of the Regions on June 24, 1988 (Article 198a of 
the Maastricht Treaty). The creation of a consultative body representing 
regional and local government contained the promise that lower levels would 
be more directly involved in decision-making processes which concerned 
them but from which they had so far been excluded.^® This channel increased 
possibilities for the regions to represent themselves and lobby for their 
regional interests in Brussels. Indeed, since then, many regions have opened 
offices that primarily aim to influence the decision-making process in the 
Commission to their interests. The Commission encourages this process and 
the activities of European-wide organizations of local and regional 
authorities.®^
In addition, although the specific role of the ERDF was repeated in promoting 
regional development, the SEA also required the Commission to subrmt 
comprehensive proposals on the role of all three Structural Funds (ERDF, 
European Social Fund and the Guidance Section of EAGFF) in reducing socio-
®5 Thomas Christiansen, "Second Thoughts- The Committee of the Regions 
after its First Year" in What Model for the Committee o f the Regions? Past 
Experiences and Future Perspectives, ed., Renaud Dehousse and Thomas 
Christiansen (Badia Fiesolana, Fiesole: The European University Institute, 
1995), 36.
56 Renaud Dehousse and Thomas Christiansen eds.. What Model for the 
Committee o f Regions? Past Experiences and Future Perspectives (Badia Fiesolana, 
Fiesole: The European University Institute, 1995).
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economic disparities.^  ^As a result the Council of Ministers adopted a reform 
package for doubling the Community Funds available for regional 
development and other social measures in real terms between 1988 and 1993 
when the Single Market was due for completion. The new strategy for 
European integration therefore hoped to overcome the dominating role 
previously played by most of the national governments, by identilying the 
regions as primary subjects in the process of policy-making.®®
Wise and Gibb, Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 
1990s, 224. "The European Union's four structural funds are: 1. The European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF): aid to disadvantaged regions 
(infrastructure, productive investment, aid to small firms, local development, 
etc); 2. The European Social Fund (ESF): promotion of employment 
(vocational training, recruitment aid, etc.); 3. The Guidance Section of the 
European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF): adjustment 
of agricultural structures and rural development; 4. The Financial Instrument 
for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG): adjustment of fisheries structures.", European 
Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy and Cohesion, 
Structural Funds 1996: Summary o f the Annual Report, Fact Sheet, 15.11.1997, 2.
®® Piera Magnatti, "EU Structural Policies and Industrial Development: 
Application of the Subsidiarity Principle in the Italian Case," Paper presented 
at the Conference on "Competitiveness, Subsidiarity and Objectives: Issues 
for European Industrial Strategy. Crete, September 9-10, 1994, 6. "The Single 
Market program with its promise to open national frontiers to the four 
freedoms-the free movement of capital, services, goods and people-changed 
the basic assumptions about the operation of regional economies.®® 
Furthermore, a number of crucial institutional and procedural reforms such 
as the enlargement of the community competences, the extension of majority 
voting in the Council and the systematic use of regulatory competition, 
demonstrated that a significant part of public policy-making was now 
moving outside the control of domestic actors.®®, see Christiansen, "Second 
Thoughts," 34.
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In the period 1994-1999, the Structural Funds were to pursue six priority 
objectives.59 Priority was given to 'Objective 1', designed to help those regions 
where income falls below 75 percent of the EU average, and which are 
characterized by a relatively high percentage of the labor force engaged in 
agriculture, thus lagging seriously behind in terms of overall economic 
development. Mezzogiorno was one such region. Thus two-thirds of the 
increased resources of the combined Structural Funds were allocated to this 
aim. Furthermore, this money was to be directed mainly at the poorest parts 
of the Union in a deliberate effort to define regional problems in a Union 
rather than a national context.*'’
The Obstacles to the Implementation of Regional Policies
of the EU in Italy
Center- Region Cleavage
" Obiective 1: structural adjustment of regions whose development is 
lagging behind; Objective 2: economic conversion of declining industrial 
areas; Objective 3: combating long-term unemployment, integration into 
working life of young people and of persons exposed to exclusion from the 
labor market; Objective 4: adaptation of workers to industrial changes and to 
changes in production systems; Objective 5(a): adjustment of agricultural and 
fisheries structures; Objective 5(b): economic diversification of fragile rural 
areas; Objective 6 (Finland and Sweden): structural adjustment of regions 
with an extremely low population density." European Commission, Structural 
Funds 1996: Summary o f the Annual Report, 2.
^ Wise and Gibb, Single Market to Social Europe: The European Community in the 
1990s, 224-225.
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The process of European integration with its recent emphasis on the regions, 
of course, has had an important effect upon Italy where a huge regional 
disparity existed between the North and the South. However, policies of 
economic and social cohesion targeted to decrease the underdevelopment of 
the Mezzogiorno have met some obstacles, the most important of which is the 
state-region cleavage that has existed in Italy.
An example of the impact of the regional policies upon the regional problem 
in Italy was provided by Piera Magnatti's detailed study.^^  Magnatti has 
questioned the failure of many EU regional interventions implemented in 
Italy and assessed the reasons for this. She has noted that in Southern 
Member States and Ireland, expenditure on regional incentives has increased 
and is now among the highest in the Community in relation to the GDP. 
Especially in Italy, regarding regional incentives, expenditure per head 
remained substantially ahead of the rest of the Community.^^
In Italy, some major policy changes took place in regional incentives policy 
since 1980. Before, the Mezzogiorno had been considered as a special 
intervention area since the post-war period and a central agency (Cassa per il
Magnatti, "EU Structural Policies and Industrial Development".
The regional incentive expenditure per head of population in assisted 
regions for Italy in ECU 1990 prices is 185.19 ECU in 1980, 238.72 ECU in 
1985,404.63 ECU in 1990.
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Mezzogiorno) was created in order to manage all the interventions directly 
from the center. The main reason behind this initiative was that the local 
administrators were not considered to be capable of keeping up the 
industrialization process. In 1986, new legislation for the Mezzogiorno was 
introduced. Eligibility for aid was extended, three-year rolling programs 
were started, Mezzogiorno was divided into three grades of area, and 
discrimination in rate of support was introduced. Rates of maximum support 
was increased. In 1988, under Commission pressure, certain parts of north 
Mezzogiorno was re-designated as from 1990 and others from 1992. In 1990, 
discrimination on rates of support was increased. In 1992, "Special 
Intervention" for the Mezzogiorno was abolished from 1993 onwards.^
As regards to the application of the EU regional policies in Italy, the most 
significant factor is that this new structural approach has not been 
implemented. In several cases, in particular in the case of the southern part of 
Italy, the Integrated Mediterranean Programs and the actions promoted 
under Objective 1 (i.e. cohesion at the Regional level ), which require an 
active role from local authorities has not worked. Consequently, the 
Commission redirected part of IMFs grants from southern Italy to France. 
Even though some regions, such as the northern ones as well as Molise, 
Abruzzi and Puglia have succeded in implementing their programs and.
^ Ibid., 13.
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therefore received Community subsidies, the least-favored areas have not 
been able to organize a local network of productive partnership and 
therefore, they missed the opportunity because prolonged dependency on the 
central government reduced their capacity to promote endogenous 
development.^
In Italy another problem in the policy-making and implementation of the 
im p 's was that there was a "division of labor" rather than a collaboration 
between the national and regional levels. The national level has often refused 
to cooperate with the Regions that were considered to be antagonists rather 
than partners. Thus regarding the realization of Objective 1, the centralist 
approach which distinguished national intervention for the Mezzogiorno had 
been prevalent during the definition of the Development Plan. In contrast 
with, for example, France which has proposed five different Development 
Plans for each of the five regions, Italy has presented a single Development 
Plan for all the eight regions of the Mezzogiorno. Thus as a result, it was 
observed that since the favorite interlocutors for the Commission have been 
the bodies representing qualified reference points for their local economic 
systems, the presence of participants belonging to Objective 1 areas has been 
very scarce. This vacuum was filled by the national governments. In this 
perspective, the effects of the research and innovation policies on cohesion
64 Ibid., 19.
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have been very scarce.^  ^Thus the first obstacle to successful implementation 
of the Community policies was the persistent centralized character of the 
Italian state despite the regionalization tendencies.
Institutional W eakness o f  the Regiotml Governments in the South 
Another important obstacle to successful implementation of the regional 
policies of the EU has been the weakness of the institutional capacity and the 
lack of a strong regional government in the Mezzogiorno. Marc E. Smyrl has 
noted that the central purpose of the European Community Regional Policy 
(ECRP), that was adopted alongside the Integrated Mediterranean Programs 
(IMP), approved by the Council in 1985 and carried out in the 1980s, was to 
increase the discretionary authority of regional-level decision-makers.^  ^ In 
other words, the IMP aimed at direct involvement of sub-national authorihes 
in planning and managing EC-funded economic development programs, by 
strengthening the regional leaders vis-a-vis the national center and an 
"empowerment" of the regions. By involving levels of government most 
directly concerned, the Commission's economists hoped to encourage the 
creation of innovative responses to particular problems afflicting the 
Community's various regions in line with the above-mentioned "economic
65 Ibid., 21.
Marc E. Smyrl, " Building Institutional Capacity: Implementing European 
Community Regional Programs in Liguria and Tuscany," Italian Politics and 
Society, Spring 1996, No. 45, 7-16.
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and social cohesion through partnership" among the Community, national 
and sub-national levels of authority.^^
However, because of inter-regional differences, the effects of the ECRP 
differed from region to region as well.^ ® The key to explaining this variation 
lies both in choices made by regional authorities themselves and in the nature 
of regional and infra-regional political society. First of all, the Italian regional 
governments were not as strong as they seemed to be, because they did not 
have taxation powers. Around 90 percent of the regional financial resources 
was made up of transfers from the national government. The regional 
authorities did not have the liberty to dispose of this money as they saw fit 
either. Second, regions have a relatively weak position in structures and 
networks of interest representation. The regional governments, as newcomers 
to the political scene, have found it difficult to aggregate and represent 
regional level interests, a role for which they seemed 'functionally' 
predestined. Instead, the deep-seated localism of Italian politics encouraged
"Faced with the ongoing challenges of the Single market and the new 
challenges posed by economic and monetary unification, the Commission's 
medium-term budgetary proposals covering the period 1993 to 1999 (the 
Delors II package) have called for another significant increase in structural 
expenditure to promote economic and social cohesion. In consequence, the 
funds devoted to structural policies will increase by 41% from over 21 billion 
ECU in 1993 to 30 billion ECU in 1999, including the new Cohesion Fund. 
Structural funds in 1999, will, therefore, be three times their real value in 
1989." Magnatti, "EU Structural Policies," 11.
Smyrl, "Building Institutional Capacity," 7-16.
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intra-regional groupings at the provincial level or below. At the same time, 
the vertical role of the political parties provided a direct link between locally- 
organized interests and the national level.^ ^
The IMPs revealed the wide variance in regional governments' experience in 
planning and efficiency, and required a consistent policy of regional planning 
by regional governments in order to spend allocated funds. °^ The 
implementation of the IMF's demonstrated a similar division of the regions' 
managerial capacities: regions such as Umbria, Emilia-Romania, Tuscany, 
Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, the Marche, and Lazio which had had 
experience in regional planning and had no difficulty in implementing the 
IMPs whereas regions such as Calabria, Sicilia and Campania with little or no 
experience in planning and interregional cooperation, ran into several 
problems.^^
69 Ibid., 8.
Carl Levy, "Introduction: Italian Regionalism in Context," in Italian 
Regionalism. History/, Identity and Politics, ed., Carl Levy (Oxford and 
Washington D.C.: Berg, 1996), 18.
For the institutional performance of in the Italian regions and the 
relationship between "civicness" and the institutional performance of 
regional governments, see Appendix H.
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Thus in Italy, coordination problems impeded structural programming and a 
significant proportion of allocated EU funds were never spent. Jurgen Grote 
observed that:
...relations between the European Union and the regions, for 
example during the implementation of the IMP and under the 
reformed structural funds, take place in an extra-legal space 
without any basis in constitutional or other legal provisions.
Within this disarticulated context, structural programming 
appears to have been a pressure for reform and rationalization 
of regional-national relations in the direction of informal
partnership.^^
A second implication for the political impact of the European integration, the 
recent developments within the EU form and shape new social and political 
movements and alliances. No longer able to rely on national diversionary 
policies, regional governments and movements have started to consider 
possibilities for indigenous development as well as ways to influence 
Community policies. In addition, EU provides a new context for older 
political demands. Autonomist and separatist movements, which in the past, 
often perceived the Community as one step more remote, and therefore more 
objectionable than national governments, have increasingly come to frame 
their demands in European terms.^  ^ For instance, the fact that regional or 
local authorities may open offices and lobby in Brussels have different
2^ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Channels of Subnational Representation 
in the European Union." In What Model for tlxe Committee o f the Regions? Past 
Experiences and Future Perspectives, ed., Renaud Dehousse and Thomas 
Christiansen (Badia Fiesolana, Fiesole: The European University Institute, 
1995), 14.
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repercussions in states with a federal or decentralized structure compared to 
those centralized structures/  ^ For instance, in Italy, the only two offices 
opened in Brussels are from Lazio and the Mezzogiorno, While the Lazio 
office is funded by private firms rather than the regional government of 
Lazio, the Mezzogiorno office is funded by the Italian state and not by the 
regional governments/®
Cultural Reasons
Another reason for the failure of the EU cohesion policies in the South can be 
attributed to cultural factors, even though this would assume a deterministic 
approach. Robert Putnam, in his well-known work. Making Democracy Work. 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, has found that the civic engagement that is 
necessary for democratic experience was lacking in Southern Italy. The 
powerful conununes of the North did not exist in the South. For long 
centuries the South was mainly under the rule of autocratic regimes which 
impeded the development of a communal culture, and instead led to 
clientelistic relations. The mafiosi power provided a kind of privatized
73 Ibid., 7.
74 For a detailed overview of the issue, see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 
"Channels of Subnational Representation in the European Union," 175-198.
7® Ibid., 31-32.
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Leviathan in the absence of effective state power7^ Clientelism on the other 
hand, tended to preserve social fragmentation and disorganization in the 
South. So, in other words, collective action, let alone cooperation, was missing 
at the regional level. The clientele has been the only associations which 
actually showed real operative energy in a civil society which has been 
divided within itself for centuries.^
These factors altogether impeded the development of strong regional 
governments in the South. Clientelism's origins are said to lie in the South. It 
belongs to a society that has remained a Gemeinschaft, a community that is 
regulated by vertical relationships and personal ties rather than by notions of 
citizenship and rights. Me Carthy cites the example of the character Don 
Ciccio, in Tomasi di Lampedusa's famous novel, II Gattopardo (The Leopard). 
Don Ciccio votes for the old monarchy because the King of Naples has sent 
him gifts of money so that he can study music. A more cynical version of the 
same explanation is that 'amoral familism' permits no social contracts other 
than those based on short-term advantage. The exchange vote in which the
76 For a detailed account of Mafia and clientelism, see James Watson, Mafia 
and Clientelism (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), Paolo Pezzino, 
Mafia: Industria della Violenza [Industry of Violence], (Scandicci, Firenze: La 
Nuova Italia, 1995).
^ Robert D. Putnam et al.. Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 144,147,
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elector barters his vote for a pension or a job serves as an example/*  Percy
Allum, on the other hand, points to a different aspect of clientelism and how
it was internalized by the masses. He argued:
Clientelismo, as an integral part of Italian parliamentarism, has 
an ambiguous face as well; that is, in addition to its obviously 
corrupting aspects, there is a legitimating aspect, too. The 
southern 'notable' is simultaneously the protector of his 'clients' 
against the threats of the outside world, usually personified in 
his hostile state. Hence the patronage tie can assume a sacred 
aspect sanctioned by St. Augustine and confined in popular 
saying: Senza santi non si va in paradiso (without saints you can 
not go to heaven).^^
Clientelism is "the attainment and retention of power through the private 
expropriation of public resources and through the use of the state to 
expropriate public resources."*** Rossetti argues that the formation of 
institutional centers, especially of cohesive and flexible constitutional centers, 
is of paramount importance in this connection. According to him, in complex 
societies, clientelism becomes the predominant form of political exchange if 
the integrity of the constitutional order is not protected by an autonomous 
constitutional review. However, a constellation of historical conditions has 
prevented the consolidation of an autonomous configuration of this kind in 
Italy. First, the nation-building elite was a political elite which created the 
new nation by executive orders and decrees. State institutions, the civil
Patrick Me Carthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State. From the Origins o f the Cold 
War to the Fall o f Berlusconi (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 62
Allum, State and Society in Western Europe, 115.
*0 Me Carthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State, 62.
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service and the judiciary were therefore a creation of the executive power. 
Secondly, the role played by political groupings and later by parties in 
shaping the modern Italian political system was affected by the territorial 
power of illegal associations over constituencies. The chief power instruments 
of the state fell into the hands of an elite dependent on the clientelistic, 
particularistic and illegal interests of their 'constituencies'.A good example 
of the clientelistic nature of region-center relations was revealed by Me 
Carthy in his illustration of the Gava Family in Naples.®^  *
*1 Rossetti, "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy," 99. Me Carthy argues 
that the Naples earthquake of 1980 unleashed a flood of government funds 
and contracts for clearance or rebuilding were distributed with no proper 
controls. Some 30 percent of $40 billion went on to Camorra (Neapolitan 
Mafia) owned firms. McCarthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State, 73.
»2 In the early 1950s the Christian Democrat party (DC) gives Naples as a fief 
to the Monarchist, Achille Lauro, who in turn split his own party and became 
the mayor of Naples. While denouncing Christian Democrats locally, he 
helped them nationally. In 1957, Lauro developed delusions of grandeur and 
ran hard against the DC in the regional elections, raising the Monarchist vote 
to nine percent in Sardinia. Suddenly the Minister of Interior learned of 
corruption in the Naples town hall and suspended Lauro. His power passed 
to the DC proper, in the shape of Silvio Gava, but in fact to the Gava family 
proper. Silvio was a government minister in the mid-1950s, his son was 
president of the provincial government from 1961 to 1969 and his son-in-law 
held the Fiat franchise in Naples. Silvio extended his network to friends who 
were members of the Consortium for Industrial Development and leaders in 
the Chamber of Commerce. Since control of credit was vital, in 1959 the Gava 
family gained control of the Istituto per lo Sviluppo e ITndustrializzazaione del 
Meridione (Isueimer), [Institute for the Development and Industrialization of 
the South]. Six years later the publicly owned bank of Naples fell to them.
The significance of the family lies in the fact that their control over the 
local federation gave them power in both the city and regional government, 
which increased and was increased by their economic power. Their power 
base depended on their ability to appropriate the public money that flowed to 
the South. They were able to do so because of their positions in the national 
DC and in the government, which they obtained because they controlled the
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P olitical Reasons
Valeria Fargion reveals the North-South gap in the application of social 
assistance policies; she analyzes the effects of regional decentralization on the 
development of social assistance policies in different parts of the country. 
While in most southern regions an archaic system of poverty relief is 
dominant, the center-north is characterized largely by a modern system of 
social services.**^  However, the differences in the performance of regional 
governments can not be fully explained by referring exclusively to historical 
legacy, but must also take into account the political variables.®  ^ Party politics 
and the party clientele play an important role in this context in Southern Italy.
According to Hine, the performance of all regions has been disappointing in 
so far as they have become an integral part of the Italian political system and 
are themselves entrenched in 'partyocracy'.®  ^ The parties act as channels 
through which regions and regional party leaders can bring pressures on the 
center.®*’ Despite their limited financial autonomy, the regions operated large 
deficits in the 1980s in the knowledge that the center and the national
local DC. This meant the passage to systemic clientelism. Me Carthy, The 
Crisis o f the Italian State, 71-72.
Valeria Fargion, "Social Assistance and the North-South Cleavage in Italy" 
South European Society and Politics, 1: 3, (Winter 1996), 135-154.
»4 Ibid., 135.
For Northern and Southern public satisfaction with National, Regional and 
Local Governments, see Appendices I and J.
86 Hine, Governing Italy, 271.
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taxpayers would bail them out, which regularly happened. From this point of 
view, the pessimistic forecast that the regions would add another layer to the 
clientelistic Italian body politic can be deemed to have been correct. The 
recent Italian scandal known as Tangentopoli (from the word tangente meaning 
a cut paid by private and public companies to political parties in exchange for 
public contracts and favorable treatment) has involved many local and 
regional executives throughout Italy.*  ^ Thus the development of closer ties 
between the center and the periphery opened up new opportunities for the 
consolidation of covert and illegal power domains. Politicians have acquired 
a quasi monopolistic control of political markets that has allowed them a 
share in economic ventures under government patronage.®®
The South was the key region in the DCs bid to become an autonomous mass 
party.®^  Between the late 1940s and mid-1960s the percentage of its 
membership that lived in the North declined from nearly 50 percent to 28 
percent whereas in the South the corresponding figures were 18 percent and 
30 percent and in the islands 7 percent and 17 percent. The main reasons were
*7 Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 73. See also Bruno Dente, "Centre-Local 
Relations in Italy: The Impact of Legal and Political Structures," in Center- 
Periphery Relations in Western Europe, eds., Yves Meny and Vincent Wright 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 139,146.
®* Rossetti, "Constitutionalism and Clientelism in Italy,"95.
For a detailed account of the clientelistic policies of the DC in the postwar 
period, see Simona Piattoni, "Clientelism Revisited. Qientelistic Politics and
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northern irritation with inefficient public services and the battery of 
government agencies that allocated money to the South. The plans for state 
intervention drawn up by Saraceno, Morandi and their helpers were 
distorted and the Cassa, which was supposed to be used for special 
government intervention, became a discretionary fund for politicians. At first 
it provided infrastructure, and the alliance between the Christian Democrats 
and northern industrialists was evident in the way that the machines to build 
roads and the fertilizer for the pilot agriculture programs were made in the 
North. This pattern continued after the Cassa had expanded into setting up 
industrial plants. However the distribution of Cassa funds and the locating of 
public sector plants were fought over by the rival political clans in the 
South. °^
Failure of National Integration?
Although there were a lot of hopes placed in regionalization and creation of 
the meso level of government for better access to people and thus providing 
more democracy and modernity, the policies adopted by the state did not 
reach the targeted aim. Reasons for the failure were several:
1. The Problem of Legitimacy: Regional reform was a reform from above. It 
had a long period of gestation (1861-1970) but a rapid process of
Economic Development in Postwar Italy," Italian Politics and Society, 49, 
(Spring 1998), 44-62.
Me Car thy. The Crisis o f the Italian State, 71.
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implementation (1970-1977). Thus regions met a lot of problems as far as 
the legitimization and institutionalization of the new level of government 
were concerned.^  ^ Although migration, improved transportation and 
communications have made the country more homogenous and 
territorially integrated, the diversity inherited from Italy's late unification 
was still marked. For many Italians, identification with the distinctiveness 
of the locality remained pronounced. Regions, cities and towns had their 
own traditions, culture and sense of identity.
2. The Problem of the Convergence of Competences: Dente argues that the 
overall effect of the transformations brought about by regionalization has 
increased the system's internal heterogeneity.^^ brought about
a convergence of competences; with the creation of regions, "the regions 
turned increasingly towards the commune and province administrations, 
either by intervening in matters of local competence or by taking over 
representation of the lower levels of government. This shift in interest not 
only increased the heterogeneity of local government, but also provoked a 
strong reaction from the more powerful communes that were worried at 
losing their importance."^  ^ Thus in Dente's opinion, regional reforms
’’ Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy," 91. 
’2 Hine, Governing Italy, 259-260.
 ^Dente, "Centre-Local Relations in Italy," 125.
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increased fragmentation in the country since regional intervention in the 
implementation of the stage of state laws has introduced further elements 
of differentiation from one area of the country to another.^^
3, The Problem of Interest Representation: Regions had a relatively weak 
position in structures and networks of interest representation. Being a 
relative newcomer to the Italian political scene, regional governments 
found it difficult to aggregate and represent regional-level interests, a role 
for which they were functionally pre-destined. Instead, the deep-seated 
localism of Italian politics encouraged intra-regional groupings at the 
provincial level or below. At the same time, the vertical role of the parties 
provided a direct link between locally-organized interests and the national 
level.^  ^ In addition, regional constituencies did not coincide with electoral
Ibid., 129-130. Cassese and Torchia argue that the attempts to render regions 
more effective also failed. The regions tried to set up some administrative 
units that are larger than municipalities, called comprenscfri. Because most of 
the municipalities were very small and unable to carry out administrative 
tasks and services that require the larger scale necessary for modern personal 
service delivery. However, again due to the resistance of the local 
government, the comprensori disappeared. Thus the resistance of the local 
government was a crucial factor in slowing down and weakening the 
evolution of any meso. Cassese and Torchia, "The Meso Level in Italy,"98.
’5 Dente, "Centre-Local Relations in Italy," 132. Dente also points out an 
apparent contradiction in the existing literature on Italian administrative 
system. The Italian system has been simultaneously described as highly 
centralized and highly fragmented. In fact, both explanations are true, since 
the former is true from a legal point of view and the latter is true from an 
administrative point of view. So, he argues, both levels are separate but 
should be taken into account simultaneously. Ibid., 127.
Smyrl, "Building Institutional Capacity," 8.
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constituencies. Thus the regions did not have a crucial political significance 
in the eyes of the political class. Having been created as a result of political 
considerations, the regions functioned primarily on the basis of strong ties 
with pressure groups and on the mediation of political parties rather than 
on the existence of strong and autonomous bureaucracies. Thus many 
regions, due to this fragility, found themselves politically decapitated 
when the number of elected members were found criminal in the 
Tangentopoli scandal.^7
4. The Problem of Limited Competences: A major weakness of the regions in 
regional reform was their lack of significant autonomous taxing powers. 
As of 1980, some 90 percent of their financial resources was made up of 
transfers from the national government. The regional authorities did not 
have the liberty to dispose of this money since the bulk of the regional 
income was passed on automatically to provincial and local governments 
in policy areas, such as health care.^ ®
As a result of the above factors, the Republican period faced serious 
difficulties in the national integration process. The state policies that aimed at 
integrating the peninsula in social, economic and cultural sense have partially
97 Bruno Dente, "Sub-National Governments in the Long Italian Transition,' 
West European Politics, 20:1, (January 1997), 180.
Smyrl, "Building Institutional Capacity," 8.
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failed due to the historical heritage of Italy that acted as a negative force 
concerning integration. Provincialism has proven to be a force that is 
unsurmountable and the "process of making Italians out of Piedmontese, 
Lombards, Tuscans, Sicilians and so forth, is far from complete."^  ^ Zariski 
argues that the regional and local dialects have survived to the present day 
and have given way only slowly and grudgingly to the standard national 
tongue. Moreover, the sluggish rate of Italian urbanization, industrialization 
and economic growth did much to keep parochial loyalties alive.^ ™
Thus the new superstructure that was attempted to be based on a society that 
is deeply influenced by the historical heritage in question not only did not fit 
well, but also created further problems regarding national integration that 
culminated in the revived debate about the form of the state; a further 
decentralization, federalism or even secession of the North from the South 
that were brought into the agenda with the emergence of the regionally-based 
party, Lega Nord.
Raphael Zariski, Italy. The Politics o f Uneven Development (Illinois, Hinsdale: 
The Dryden Press, 1972), 97.
100 Ibid.
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CHAPTER VI
NEO-REGIONALISM AND NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION
IN ITALY IN THE 1990s
By the beginning of the 1990s, the regional question once more gained 
prominence in Italian politics. This time, however, the problem was no longer 
the Questione Méridionale (Southern Question) characterized by its 
underdeveloped nature, but instead it was replaced by the Questione 
Settentrionale (Northern Question) which is characterized by the demands of 
independence of the North from the rest of Italy. With the 1992 elections that 
marked the beginning of a new era in Italian politics, a regionally-based 
party, Lega Nord (Northern League), brought into the political agenda for the 
first time the viability of the political and administrative system in Italy and 
proposed the separation of the Northern part from the rest of the Italy. This 
proposal was called a "bloodless revolution"^ or a "conservative revolution"^ 
since it questioned the "collapse of the First Republic".^ This opened a new
1 Spencer di Scala, Italy: From Revolution to Republic. 1700 to the Present 
(Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), 326.
2 Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, "The Northern League: Conservative 
Revolution?," in Carl Levy ed., Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics 
(Oxford, Washington D.C: Berg, 1996), 131.
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debate on the national integrity and unity of the country, a phenomenon that 
the Italian state faced for the first time so seriously since the Unification in 
1870.4
The Domestic and International Factors Behind the Emergence
of the "Northern Question"
The rise of the northern question in the lOOOs^  can not be understood without 
explaining the background factors. The 1990s were years in which the Italian 
system had undergone a major transformation. Gianfranco Pasquino argues 
that in fact 1990s can also be labelled as a period of ‘'political transition'. The 
Italian political transition is marked by the disappearance of the old political 
alignments, the emergence of new political actors and coalitions in the 
political scene, heavy criticisms directed at the 1948 Constitution and the 
institutions and rules that it set, the approval of new electoral laws and 
perhaps most important, the increased sensitivity of the voters towards
3 Martin Qark, Modern Italy 1871-1995. Second Edition (London and New York: 
Longman, 1996), 397.
4 See Gian Enrico Rusconi, Se cessiamo di essere una nazione. Tra etnodemocrazie 
regionali e cittadinanza Europea [If we are ceding to be a nation: Between 
regional ethnodemocracy and European Citizenship], (Bologna: П Mulino, 
1993); Aldo Schiavone, Italiani senza Italia. Storia e Identita [Italians without 
Italy. History and Identity], (Torino: Einaudi, 1998); Ernesto Galli della 
Loggia, La Morte della Patria. La Crisi dell'Idea di nazione tra Resistenza, 
antifascismo e Repubblica [The Death of The Nation. The Crisis of The Idea of 
Nation between Resistance, Antifascism and The Republic], (Bari: Laterza, 
1998); Giorgio Восса, La disunita d'ltalia [The Non-unity of Italy], (Milan: 
Garzanti, 1991).
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political parties and their programs so that they punished and rewarded the 
parties, office-holders, incumbents and challengers. All these factors together 
were indications of a major polihcal transition in Italian politics,®
Domestic and international developments acted as interacting variables 
bringing about this political transition. The collapse of communism, the 
increased pace of European integration marked especially by the growing 
importance devoted to the project of "Europe of Regions" were the 
international variables, while the electoral referendums. Operation Clean 
Hands, and the legitimacy crisis of the state acted as domestic variables 
affecting political transition in Italy.
The C ollapse o f  Communism and the End o f  the Cold W ar 
The first reason behind the collapse of the old party system that is also 
referred to as partitocrazia, has been the collapse of communism and the 
dismantling of the Soviet Bloc. The most important impact of this 
international event upon Italian politics was the consequent collapse of the 
two major parties of the Italian party system, the PCI (Partita Communista 
Italiana) and the DC (Democrazia Christiana). The party system in the postwar
® Gianfranco Pasquino, "Shaping a Better Republic? The Italian Case in 
Comparative Perspective," Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias 
Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Estudio, 
Working Paper 1994/62, November 1994, 1. For a detailed account of the 
crisis of the Italian state, see Paul Ginsborg, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in 
Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker ed,. The New Italian Republic. Front the Fall 
o f the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 19- 
39.
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era was shaped and structured by the cleavage between communism and 
anti-communism. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and a number of related 
transitions took place in Eastern Europe, the communist-anti-communist 
cleavage in Italy became obsolete. The change of the name of the party from 
the Italian Communist Party to Democratic Party of the Left and transforming 
the symbol from the classic hammer and sickle to an oak tree were important 
indications that the Communist threat  ^ could no longer be revived. The 
sudden disappearance of the communist threat was a shock to the Christian 
Democrats as well, who used the anti-communist rhetoric to attract votes.®
The European Integration and "Europe o f  Regions"
The second international factor that played an indirect, yet an important role 
in the rise of the northern question in Italy has been the political 
developments taking place in the European Union, of which Italy was a 
member state. As noted in the previous chapter, the most important novelty 
in the process of European integration, especially after tlie Maastricht Treaty 
was the increased importance of the 'subsidiarity principle". It revelead the
 ^Italy had the largest Communist Party in Western Europe during the Cold 
War years.
» For the crisis of these parties with the collapse of Communism, see also, 
Stephen Heilman, "Italian Communism in the First Republic," in Stephen 
Gundle and Simon Parker, ed.. The New Italian Republic, 72-84; Patrick Me 
Carthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State: From the Origins o f the Cold War to the Fall 
of Berlusconi, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 123; Mark Gilbert, The 
Italian Revolution. The End o f Politics, Italian Style?, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1995), 66-86.
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fact that the regions have gained further responsibilities and would assume 
an active role in the European integration process. The creation of the 
Committee of Regions and the increased lobbying offices of the regions in 
Brussels were indicators of this role at the supranational level. Thus the 
region became a key level of political dialogue and action, where national, 
continental and global forces interacted.^
However, this direct interaction envisaged between the regional and 
supranational level have had an important political impact on the interaction 
between the regional and state level. Since Europe provided a new context for 
older political demands of the regions, autonomist and separatist movements 
have increasingly come to frame their demands in European terms.i'’ The 
integration also emphasized privatization, deregulation and a general retreat 
of the state. Thus the European integration and global market integration 
through GATT, MNCs, and capital mobility have forced the nation-states to 
revise their centralistic territorial management and thus devolve more power 
to the regional governments.
Electoral Reforms through E lectoral Referendums
 ^ Michael Keating, "Europeanism and Regionalism," in Barry Jones and 
Michael Keating, eds.. The European Union and the Regions (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 3.
10 Ibid., 7.
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The first domestic development that had affected the rise of the Northern 
Question was electoral reforms through electoral referendums.^  ^ Between 
1981 and 1990, fourteen national referenda had been held usually on issues 
unwelcome to the parties. In 1989-1990, a Christian Democrat from Sardinia, 
Mario Segni, founded a Committee for Electoral Reform and began collecting 
signatures to promote a reform from below by popular vote, Segni favored 
direct election of mayors, and single-member constituencies in parliament. 
The Constitutional Court amended the proposal by reducing the number of 
preference votes, which voters could give to particular candidates of their 
chosen party, from three or four to just one. This, according to Segni, could 
decrease factionalism within the parties.^^
The electoral referendum took place on June 9, 1991. Behind the electoral 
referendum there was a political movement in the making-political, social 
and cultural mobilization against the fragmentary effect of proportional
u Referenda are the other important mechanism of checks in the Italian 
constitution. Since 1970, the enabling legislation activated the dormant 
constitutional provision permitting referenda, and this provided citizens with 
the opportunity to circumvent the Chamber and the Senate. However, a 
referendum can annul existing legislation but can not introduce legislation. 
Thus the referenda are only abrogating ballots. In addition, to call for a 
referenda, the promoters should obtain 500.000 valid signatures that would 
be approved by the Court of Cassation. Then the Constitutionality of the 
proposals of the referendum must be debated by the Constitutional Court. 
For more details, see Gilbert, The Italian Revolution, 98.
12 Martín Clark, Modern Italy 1871-1995, 2^  ^ ed. (London and New York: 
Longman, 1996). See also Gilbert, The Italian Revolution, 93-97.
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representation. 13 The participation rate was 62,5 percent and more than 90 
percent of the voters approved the electoral reform which paved the way for 
further mobilization, 14 A greater number of citizens signed the popular 
request for two other electoral referendums. Hence, the Electoral Referendum 
Movement became a democratic attempt to challenge partitocrazia and 
reconstruct the entire political system, giving the message to the parties that 
they have to fix their ways. As a result, the 1992 elections, which marked a 
breakthrough in the political system of Italy was held under the new system 
proposed by Segni. The single preference made little difference in itself, but 
it was a huge symbolic blow to the old parties and their regime i®, since it 
meant that the old political order established during the Cold War years 
Would no longer be prevailing.
43 Pasquino, Shaping A Better Republic?, 8. On the question of proportion see 
Gilbert, The Italian Revolution, 89-93, Gilbert argues that the postwar electoral 
system that was used to choose the members of the Chamber of Deputies also 
Worked to insure that all currents of political opinion were represented in 
strict proportion to the votes they garnered at the ballot box. Only parties that 
garnered less than 300.000 votes nationwide and which had failed to win a 
seat directly in a single electoral college could not obtain a place in 
parliament. However, in 1953, the system was in paralysis due to a high 
degree of fragmentation. In that year, the DC, taking advantage of the narrow 
absolute majority it had won in the 1948 elections passed, with the 
Republican, Social Democrat and Liberal support, an electoral law that 
seemed to have been designed to allow it to govern perpetually. This law 
gave two-thirds of the seats in parliament to any coalition that won 50 percent 
of the vote. This law was opposed bitterly especially by the left who called 
the law legge truffa (swindle law).
14 Patrick Me Carthy, "The Referendum of 9 June," in Stephen Heilman and 
Gianfranco Pasquino eds., Italian Politics. A Review. Volume 7 (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1992), 11-28.
15 Clark, Modern Italy, 397.
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The second domestic factor that triggered political transition in Italy and 
indirectly affected the rise of the Northern Question has been the changing 
nature of the magistrates^  ^and the Marti Pulite (Clean Hands) investigations 
that were aimed at putting a full-stop to clientelistic politics, corruption and 
organized crime that characterized especially the Cold War political system 
in Italy. None of the three problems were new in Italy. Indeed every decade 
from the forties to the eighties had been marked by some specific scandal that 
involved top politicians. Operation Clean Hands started in Milan in mid- 
February 1992 when Antonio Di Pietro arrested Mario Chiesa, the Socialist 
Manager of a Milanese charitable institution, in the act of taking a 7 million 
lire ($4000) bribe from the owner of a cleaning company. This, however, was 
only the beginning of a huge web of systemic corruption in Milan, called 
Tangentopoli (Bribesville)i^, meaning a cut paid by private and public 
companies to political parties in exchange for public contracts and favorable 
treatment.
On the changing status and powers of the magistrates, see Me Carthy, The 
Crisis o f the Italian State, 63-80.
For a detailed analysis of the corruption scandals in Milan, see Donatella 
della Porta, "Milan: immoral capital," in Stephen Heilman and Gianfranco 
Pasquino eds., Italian Politics, 98-115; A. Carlucci, Tangentomani. Storie, affari e 
tutti I documenti sui barbari che hanno saccheggiato Lo scambio occulto. Casi di 
corruzione politica in Italia Milano [Tangentomania. The stories, affairs and all 
the documents on the barbarians who robbed the occult exchange. The cases 
of political corruption in Italy], (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1992).
18 Anna Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," in Peter Wagstaff, ed.. Regionalism in 
Europe (Oxford: Intellect Books, 1994), 73.
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Soon the judges found out that Milan was only the tip of an iceberg of 
corruption. Investigations spread all over Italy. Prime Minister Craxi, himself 
indicted, resigned as Socialist leader; when his parliamentary immunity 
expired he fled to Tunisia. Other figures included names such as the Foreign 
Minister, De Michelis and the entire DC leadership in Naples. By 1993, 
prosecutors had requested the lifting of parliamentary immunities of 395 
deputies and senators, (1/3 of the total); 18 percent of all local councillors 
were under investigation, and several top civil servants and businessmen, 
were put into prison or committed suicide. By 1994, the number of people 
arrested amounted to 3,000.^  ^The web of corruption brought to trial even the 
president, Giulio Andreotti, who was unanimously considered the most 
powerful politician of postwar Italy. He was put under investigation for 
alleged ties with the mafia, as well as for having ordered the killing of a 
journalist who specialized in uncovering political stories. The list of 
accusations has been extensive and broad to cover most of the areas 
investigated by the Italian judges. As noted, clientelism and patronage were 
at the core of the relationships established between several parliamentarians, 
mostly Christian Democrats and Socialists, and their voters, mostly, but not 
exclusively in the South.
Concerning the strength of the mafia and organized crime in Italy, the most 
important blow to the political regime was the assassination of Giovanni
19 Clark, Modern Italy, 7.
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Falcone by the mafia. The appointment of the most prominent of the Palermo 
investigators, Falcone, by the Minister of Justice in 1991 to be Director of 
Penal Affairs at the Ministry of Rome was an indication of the revival of the 
anti-Mafia war. Falcone proposed important changes; new centralized police 
and judicial agencies were to be set up to combat organized crime. House 
arrest for convicted criminals awaiting appeal court verdicts was abolished. 
Above all, in January 1992, the Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed many 
of the maxi-trial convictions, to the surprise and dismay of the convicted. 
Retaliation of the mafia was the assassination of Falcone and his colleague 
Paolo Borsellino. This event showed that the mafia overreached itself. 20
The Italians were no longer prepared to put up with the scandals of 
clientelismo. Levels of corruption exceeded tolerance levels. Even though the 
magistrates took on the role of mediator of the will to change and began the 
task of dismantling the system, the renewal of the political system required 
more than just the work of the magistrates. A 'political answer', from new 
political forces was necessary. Since the political class was completely 
discredited, and the new social forces could not identify a political class 
ready or able to take the place of the old one, they took on the job themselves, 
giving direct expression to their anti-political, productivist, utilitarian culture
20 Ibid., 399.
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and background. This political transformation in the North culminated in the 
formation and the rise of the Leagues.21
The Crisis o f  Legitim acy
Thirdly, as a consequence of the collapse of communism, the pressures 
exerted by the process of European integration that brought with itself 
economic globalism and the unveiled corruption scandals, clientelism and 
organized crime, the parties of the Cold War period faced a crisis of 
legitimacy .22 This legitimacy crisis was best revealed in the 1992 elections 
when the DC and the reformed Communist Party, PDS obtained the worst 
results in the postwar period. (DC: 29.7 percent and PDS: 16.1 percent 
compared to DC: 38.7 percent and PCI: 34.4 percent in 1976). The most 
important novelty was the emergence of a regionally-based party, the 
Northern League (L·ga Nord) which brought with itself the debate about the 
riforma dello stato (reform of the state). Related to the crisis of party legitimacy 
of the old order already mentioned, one factor specific to the rise of Lega
William Brierley and Luca Giacometti, "Italian National Identity and the 
Failure of Regionalism," in Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, Nation and 
Identity in Contemporary Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 
180.
22 Bruce Haddock, "The Crisis of the Italian State," in Robert Bideleux and 
Richard Taylor eds., European Integration and Disintegration (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996), 117; Qark, Modern Italy,; Massimo L. Salvadori, Storia 
d'ltalia e Crisi di Regime. Saggio sulla poUtica italiana 1861-1996 [History of Italy 
and the Crisis of Regime. An Essay on Italian Politics 1861-1996], (Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1994).
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Nord23 was the ''crisis of the center-periphery integration in Italy'.2“* 
According to this view, the despondency of the modern nation-state has 
manifested itself more acutely in Italy than elsewhere in Europe. In Italy, the 
embodiment of local and regional identities into a centralized state 
dominated by political parties was only partially successful. Political parties 
succeeded in holding the fragile Italian nation-state together since they 
benefited from the freezing effect of the Cold War and their ability to insert 
themselves within relatively stable political and social subcultures. As a 
result, the Lega Nord, as a new type of social movement, attempted to 
constitute a new political identity in Italy by counterposing the crisis of the 
political center with the purported vitality and rationality of the periphery."^ 5
The Erosion and Decline o f  the T raditional A ffiliation s
A second reason for the rise of the Lega Nord, according to Mannheimer, is 
the erosion and decline of the importance of the subcultures and traditional 
affiliations (appartenenza), in addition to the disappearance of the importance
On the rise of the Lega Nord, see Robert Leonardi and Monique Kovacs, 
"The Rise of a new catch-all party," in Stephen Heilman and Gianfranco 
Pasquino eds., Italian Politics: A Review. Volume 8 (London and New York: 
Pinter Publishers, 1993), 50-65; Oliver Schmidtke, "The Populist Challenge to 
the Italian Nation-State: The Lega Lombarda/Nord," Regional Politics and 
Policy, vol. 3, 1993, 140-162; L. Costantini, Dentro La Lega: Come nasce, come 
cresce, come comunica [Inside the League: How it was born, how it grows, how 
it communicates], (Rome: Koine Edizioni, 1994).
24 See Dwayne Woods, "The Crisis of the Center-Periphery Integration in Italy 
and the Rise of Regional Populism. The Lombard League," Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 27, No: 2, January 1995,187-203.
25 Ibid., 189.
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of the right-left division in politics.^  ^ Traditional affiliations to the parties 
were regarded as a subculture such as Communist or Catholic, characterized 
by well defined values. The cohesion of the subculture was reinforced by the 
definition of an 'enemy'. For instance, the 'enemy' in the case of the 
Communist subculture was communism and for the Catholic subculture the 
'force of the capital and the 'patrons'.^^
The erosion of these subcultures can be explained by the gradual 
disappearance of these 'enemies' which in turn was due to the progressive 
secularization of the Italian society and the decadent experience of the 
communist regimes. The result was the erosion of the raison d'etre of these 
identities. Lega Nord filled this vacuum by offering a new identity and by 
creating new 'enemies' such as the Roman partitocrazia or the Southerners or 
the immigrants.28 Thus following the decline of the votes for the 'historical 
political forces'2^  and with the end of Cold War released DC voters turned to 
the Lega.^
26 See also llvo Diamanti, La Lega. Geografía, Storia e Sociología di un Soggetto 
Politico [The League. Geography, history and sociology of a political subject], 
(Roma: Donzelli Editore, 1993), viii.
22 Mannheimer, La Lega Lombarda [The Lombard League], 18-19.
2« Ibid., 21. See also John Dickie, "Imagined Italies," in David Forgacs and 
Robert Lumley eds., Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.
29 Renato Mannheimer, "La Crisi del Consenso per I Partiti Tradizionali," 
[The Crisis of Consensus for The Traditional Parties"], in Renato Mannheimer
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The Changing Econom ic Conditions in the North
A third reason for the rise of the Lega Nord is related to the economic factors. 
According to Carlo Trigilia, it is possible to distinguish three Italies^i, three 
large areas where the economy is embedded in a particular social context, 
shaped by local institutions and specific relationships between the center and 
periphery. The first of these three Italies is the area of the oldest industrial 
regions of the North West, the so-called Industrial Triangle which includes 
Turin, Milan and Genoa. The second is the north-eastern regions. The so- 
called 'Third Italy', i. e. the Northern Italy, enjoyed a high degree of cultural, 
social and political integration which was a crucial resource for the
ed. La Lega Lombarda [The Lombard League], (Milano: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli 
Editor!, 1991), 13.
30 Patrick McCarthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State: From the Origins o f the Cold 
War to the Fall o f Berlusconi (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 135. "The 
percentage of the electorate voting for the two major parties declined from 
more than 66 percent in 1975 to around 45 percent in 1990. Both the leading 
parties of the governmental coalition suffered in the 1992 elections: the DC 
dropped 4.4 percent to below 30 percent and the PSI slipped 0.7 percent. In 
Italy, as in other countries skepticism about government grew: whereas in 
1967 only 33 percent of people surveyed felt that the government was honest, 
85 percent held this view in 1980...In a 1989 comparative survey 29 percent of 
the people felt that the government was competent and 49 percent felt it was 
not. The equivalent figures for West Germany were 51 percent and 16 
percent.". Ibid., 132.
31 The concept of 'three Italies' is borrowed from Arnaldo Bagnasco, Tre Italie. 
La problemática territoriale dello sviluppo Italiano [Three Italies. The territorial 
problem of Italian development], (Bologna: II Mulino, 1977). See Appendix K.
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development of local systems of small firms- the industrial districts which 
specialized in the flexible production of consumer goods.^^
The strength of local traditions, that is focused personal and local trust has 
been an important factor that led to economic activity based on small firms, 
family businesses, and informal relationships with the employees. It is true 
that the co-existence of various social systems of production with different 
social bases has been responsible for the economic development of Italy, but 
it has also been an obstacle to the consolidation of such development. It has 
been a resource in the sense that institutional, socio-economic and political 
factors, historically rooted in some local societies, favored economic 
dynamism and compensated for the public disorder and inefficiencies with 
adjustments from below. This was seen first in the case of mass production, 
embedded in the institutional context of the Northwest and later in the case 
of the small-firm development embedded in the cultural and social 
framework of the 'Third Italy'. Both these areas with their leading role in 
economic development, helped to compensate for the backwardness of the 
South, where economic activities were largely dependent on political 
redistribution. On the other hand, the co-existence of economic systems with 
different territorial bases has hindered the consolidation of a strong national 
culture and institutions, and in this way impeded the development of more 
complex, innovative and long-term economic activities.
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Two aspects are important in this respect. First, strong regional differences in 
culture and institutions made the aggregation and representation of interests 
at a national level more difficult, therefore blocking attempts at political 
reform and favoring distributive policies. Secondly, localism favored an 
economic dynamism based on small firms in many areas of the center-north, 
but paradoxically by sustaining economic growth and exports, it slowed 
down change in social and economic policies at the central level. Such 
policies, in turn, helped incomes and economic dynamism in the short run 
but in the long run they ended up seriously undermining this dynamism due 
to their inefficiency.^^
By the end of the 1980s, and the beginning of the 1990s, worsening public 
disorder ended up jeopardizing the old private dynamism that the small 
firms was based upon. Both small and large firms, exposed to international 
competition were increasingly penalized by the costs of the state not only in 
terms of high inflation and high interest rates, but also in terms of low 
efficiency of infrastructure and services and greater tax burden. In addition, 
Italian participation in the EMS supported by Banca dTtalia in order to 
stimulate a reorganization of public policy, ended up becoming a constraint 
on firms without being able to change government policies. In the end, the 
fragile development of the 1980s led to the crisis of 1992, with the devaluation
32 Carlo Trigilia, "Italy: The Political Economy of a Regionalized Capitalism,' 
Southern European Society and Politics, Vol. 2, No: 3, (Winter 1997), 53-54.
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of the lira, the exit from the EMS and first moves towards a policy of 
reduction in public deficit.^ Thus as a result of the worsening economic 
situation, together with growing inefficiencies of state policies and increasing 
fiscal burden, a process of political mobilization started in the northern 
regions in Italy. It was no coincidence that the Lega Nord appeared especially 
in small firm areas.^s
Definition and Evolution of the Lega Nord
The Lega Nord which is the aggregation of different leagues under the 
leadership of Umberto Bossi, is a political formation that emerged in the 
1980s in Northern Italy. It contested the ordinary status of the Northern 
regions of Italy which expressed antagonism towards the traditional party 
system^  ^ and aspired for territorial autonomy and even secession from the 
rest of the country. The Lega Nord was identified with the Barbaric hordes of 
the ancient times as well.^  ^Thus the symbol of the party, that is a Lombard 
warrior, emphasized this ethnic character of the party from the beginning.^»
Trigilia, "Italy: The Political Economy of a Regionalized Capitalism," 74-75.
54 Ibid., 67.
55 See also Renato Mannheimer, "La natura compositiva delLelettorato 
leghista," ["The compact nature of League Voters"] in Giacomo Sani e Renato 
Mannheimer eds.. La Rivoluzione Elettorale: L'ltalia ira la prima e seconda 
repubblica, [The Electoral Revolution: Italy between the first and second 
republic]{Mi\an: Anabasi, 1994), 119-48.
Diamanti, La Lega, 6.
57 A. Fusella, Arrivano I Barbari. La Lega nel racconto di quotidiani e periodici [The 
Barbarians have arrived. The League according to newspapers and
247
In order to come up with the profile of the typical Lega voter, a series of 
questions was asked to Northern Italians in 1992. The results of the 
interviews showed that in matters of taxation, they preferred that the taxes 
they paid would be spent for their own region- Regarding education, they 
said that they would prefer schoolteachers coming from the region where 
they taught. About the traditional parties, they stated that the traditional 
parties argue among themselves, but basically they are all the same. On the 
issue of the immigrants, their view was that the non-European immigrants do 
not integrate easily, since they are different from 'them'. Another question 
was about marriage. The answer was that it would be better if people 
married those from their own part of the country. Lastly, on the issue of 
regionalism, they said the North, the Center and the South are very different, 
thus it would be better if they had more autonomy from one another.^^
The evolution of the Lega Nord went through six phases.^o
periodicals], (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993); Franco Cardini, La vera Storia della Lega 
Lombarda [The Real Story of the Lombard League], (Milano: Oscar 
Mondadori, 1991).
See Appendix L.
See John Dicke, "Imagined Italies," 115.
Diamanti., La Lega, 19-20. For the background information about Lega 
Nord, see also G. de Luna, ed., FigU di un benessere minore: storia della Lega 
1979-1983 [Children of a minor wealth: history of The League 1979-1983], 
(Milan: La Nuova Italia, 1994).
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a. The first phase (1983-1987): This period witnessed the emergence of the 
Venetian League founded by Franco Rochetta in Northeast Italy. The League 
reflected the crisis of consensus on the solid Christian Democrat areas and the 
uncertainty that prevailed in the social structure of small enterprises. These 
enterprises were centers of development in the 1970s. In fact, Veneto, a region 
of strong Catholic traditions, was a leading economic area with these small 
enterprises and small family firms. However, the Church, as the guardian of 
universal values and identity, had managed to keep the Veneto society 
together. With the secularization process that had started in Italy in the 1960s, 
the role of the Christian Democrat party changed. It was no loner able to 
mediate between the national and local values and identities. No alternative 
identity or value system was proposed by the DC to replace the Catholic 
identity.
This 'identity vacuum' was filled with more of an ethnic sentiment that was 
revealed in the "Venetian nation." However, in time, the Liga Veneta lost the 
stage to a new movement in Lombardy. As a movement, the Lombard League 
was founded on 12 April 1984, although the first issue of its periodical, 
Lonibarda Autonomista, containing the basic manifesto, had been published 
two years previously, on 1 March 1982. The manifesto was titled, "Lombardia 
to the Lombards, Padania to the Padans".^  ^The basic premises of the League 
read as follows: "Our fundamental common interest is the liberation of
The original title was "Lombardia ai Lombardi, Padania ai Padani,". For 
the complete version of the Manifesto, see Appendix M.
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Lombardia from the suffocating hegemony of the centralist government in 
Rome, through Lombardian autonomy in the wider context of Padano- 
Alpina autpnomy."42 In 1985 local elections, the candidates of the Lega 
Lombarda won representation in two councils, Varese and Gallarate.^^
b. The Second Phase (1987-1990): The center of the autonomist movement slid 
towards the Northwest and the definition of "nation" was placed with 
more of a "regionalist" one which reflected the "community of interests." 
Lombardy becomes the territory where the "producer population" resided 
as opposed to the centralized state and the assisted South. At this phase the 
movement took the name, Lega Lombarda.
In the June 1987 general elections, the Lega Lombarda garnered 3.0 percent of 
the vote for the Chamber of Deputies and 2.5 percent for the Senate, which 
gave it a seat in each house. In the European Parliament elections in 1989, the 
Lega received 6.5 percent of the popular vote in Lombardy, and in the 
regional elections the following year its share of the vote increased to 16.4 
percent.
"Lombardia ai Lombardi, Padania ai Padani," Lombarda Autonomista, Marzo 
cited in Umberto Bossi, II Mio Progetto [My Project], (Milano: Sperling
r
Kupfer Editori, 1996), 7. For the complete version of the Manifesto and 
Party Program, see the appendix.
43' i^arrell and Levy, "The Northern League," 135.
« Ibid., 135.
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c. The Third Phase (1990-1992): On 4 December 1990, six of the leagues 
operating in Northern Italy-the Liga Veneta, Piemont Autonomista, the 
Emilia-Romagnola, the Alleanza Toscana, the Unione Ligurie and Lega 
Lombarda- signed a pact in Bergamo. The pact was subsequently formalized 
at a congress in Milan on 10 February 1991, giving birth to the Lega Nord. 
Bossi was nominated secretary and Rochetta was given the largely 
ceremonial office of p res id en t . I t  is in this period that the Lega emerged 
with its rhetoric against the party system and traditional institutions. At 
the general elections of 1992, it had 8.7 percent of the national vote for the 
Chamber of Deputies and 8.2 for the Senate, but in Lombardy itself its vote 
reached 20.5 percent. It came to have 55 members of the Chamber of 
Deputies and 25 of the Senate. In the local government election in Mantua 
in 27 September 1992, its vote of 33.9 percent established it as the leading 
force in the region.
d. The Fourth Phase (1992-1994 ): The Lega moved from the regional level of 
politics to the national level. In the local elections of June 1993, it became 
the largest party in the Milan City Council; its candidate, Marco 
Formentini was elected mayor.
45 Joseph Farrell and Carl Levy, "The Northern League: Conservative 
Revolution?" in Carl Levy ed. Italian Regionalism. History, Identity and Politics 
(Oxford, Washington D. C : Berg, 1996), 135.
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e. The Fifth Phase (1994-1996): In the 1994 general elections, in just three 
months the percentage vote of Lega Nord dropped from 41 percent in the 
first ballot to 16 percent. The net result of the 1994 elections was 
concentration of Lega Nord's vote in the North. With the help of the 
winner-take-all system, the Lega returned 122 members to the Chamber. 
The strongholds of the Lega Nord vote were Veneto, Lombardy, Friuli and 
Piedmont, such provinces as Belluno, Treviso, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, 
Bergamo, Como, Varese, and the hinterland of Milan and Cuneo. In these 
provinces the Lega Nord obtained more than 25.5 percent of the vote,^ ^
f  The Sixth Phase (1996-today): The year 1996 was a turning point for the 
Lega Nord and its political strategy. The Lega definitively changed its 
character. It transformed itself from a versatile and heterogenous political 
actor into one with a project so specific and distinctive as to make any 
kind of political mediation difficult: "secession" and the creation of an 
independent state in northern Italy within a federal Italy.^^
The change in character during this sixth phase came about and was 
reinforced in two stages: The first stage coincided with the election of 21
‘‘^ Ibid., 136.
Ilvo Diamanti, "The Lega Nord: From Federalism to Secession," in Roberto 
D'Alimonte and David Nelken eds. Italian Politics: The Center-lxft in Power 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 65.
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April, in which the Lega Nord scored an unexpected success. With nearly 
four million votes, more than 10 percent of the total, the Lega Nord was the 
largest party in the North and the fourth in Italy as a whole.
This result relaunched the Lega Nord in Italian politics after a period of 
relative decline. Above all it pushed the problems and demands which the 
Lega Nord articulated into the fore. The Lega put forward the proposal of 
forming a Liberation Committee for Padania (CLN della Padania) that would 
work for the independence of the North from the rest of the country.^® 
Another target that was set by the Committee was to achieve recognition of 
Padania in Europe. Once it was formed, the Committee of Liberation stated 
that the provinces under Lega administration would not accept official visits 
of the representatives of the Italian state. These provinces were Varese, 
Brescia, Bergamo, Mantova and Pavia in the region of Lombardy, and 
Padova, Verona and Treviso in the region of Veneto. The Committee also 
stated that they would search for a way of certifying the birth of Padania on 
the part of the government, parliament, the political organizations of the 
foreign states, as it was done in the cases of Vatican and Slovenia before. The 
Committee also declared that its representatives would establish contacts 
with similar movements that sought independence from their mother
Corriere della Sera, April 25,1996.
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The second stage started on September 15, 1996, when for the Lega, 
"secession" became a strategic objective rather than a tactical threat^o The 
leader, Umberto Bossi defined the aim of the Lega as independence of the 
North in a federal I t a l y H e  very frequently started to mention "liberating 
Padania", "Padania as a promised land", "the end of the unitary state" and 
the like. He gave increasing importance to initiatives that marked the 
distancing of "Padania" from the Italian state. The so-called "Parliament of 
Mantua", in which the Lega's members and local administrators met 
periodically, was flanked by a series of organs which challenged legality and 
the Italian national identity in an increasingly open manner.^^
countries. One example that they referred to was the Basques, under the
leadership of Herri Batasuna,^^
The Lega called demonstrations along the length of the River Po to coincide 
with its "proclamation of the Padanian nation". During the demonstrations, 
the "Green Shirts" (Camicie Verde) were presented as an autonomous militia 
for the Lega. The demonstrators proclaimed that the evenPs aim was the self- 
determination of the Padanian peoples. The rites were designed to promote a
Corriere della Sera, June 5,1996.
Diamanti, "The Lega Nord: From Federalism to Secession," 75.50
The increasing threat of secession was revealed in an antagonism towards 
Bossi and his party in the caricatures of the daily, Corriere Della Sera and in 
some other journals. For some examples, see Appendices N, O, P, and R.
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•i* Corriere della Sera, April 25, 1996.
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The Lega called demonstrations along the length of the River Po to coincide 
with its "proclamation of the Padanian nation". During the demonstrations, 
the "Green Shirts" (Camicie Verde) were presented as an autonomous militia 
for the Lega. The demonstrators proclaimed that the evenPs aim was the self- 
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■1’ Corriere della Sera, June 5,1996.
50 Diamanti, "The Lega Nord: From Federalism to Secession," 75.
5^  The increasing threat of secession was revealed in an antagonism towards 
Bossi and his party in the caricatures of the daily. Corriere Della Sera and in 
some other journals. For some examples, see Appendices N, O, P, and R.
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sense of collective identity around territory, community and property. It was 
revealed with the slogan calling on the people to participate "for the freedom 
of your land, to be master in your ho use".
The "secessionist" rhetoric, ironically, prevented most of the Lega supporters 
from participating in the demonstrations alongside the Po river. Diamanti 
argues that the media promotion was in part responsible for this. The 
dramatization of the event by the media, other political forces, state 
institutions and the magistracy, who started investigations of the "Green 
Shirts" and of the legality of threats to national unity were other reasons 
behind the failure of the demonstrations.^
The Ideology o f  the Lega Nord
The crucial point in Lega Nord's ideology is that it wants to unbind Italy and
to restore government as far as possible to local political entities.^  ^The aim of
the Lega Nord is revealed in its manifesto: "...W e have a fundamental
common interest to which our division into parties of every political identity
must be subordinated.... The fundamental interest of ours is the liberation of 
Lombardy from the insatiable and suffocating hegemony of the centralist
Ibid., 75-76. 
'' Ibid., 76.
Ibid., 78.
55 Bossi, II Mio Progetto, 7-10.
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government in Rome, via Lombard autonomy within the far wider context of 
northern Italian autonomy."^^
The declaration of principles in the Manifesto was accompanied by a fifteen- 
point program of specific political goals, which was later amended into a 
definitive twelve-point agenda in 1983. In this latter document the Lega Nord 
stated that it was for:
■ self-government for Lombardy, and supercede the centralized state with a 
modern Federal State that respects all of the peoples which constitute it;
■ precedence of Lombards in assigning jobs, houses, welfare and financial 
contributions;
■ regional control and management of the fruits of the Lombards' labor and 
their taxes;
■ a school system and public administration in the hands of Lombards, not 
'denaturized' ones;
■ construction of a Europe founded on autonomy, federalism, and mutual 
solidarity and respect between peoples, and thus between the Lombards 
and all peoples. In addition, the Lega emphasized its dislike of the 
"opportunistic mentality" of the parties in Rome.
56 Ibid.
57 Daniele, Vimercati, I Lombardi alia nuova crociata: la lega dalVesordio al trionfo: 
cronaca di un miracolo politico. [The Lombards in a new crusade: the league 
from the beginning to the triumph: chronicle of a political miracle], (Milano: 
Mursia, 1990), 49.
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The Components o f  the Lega Nord's Ideology  
1. Neo-Federalism
The most important component of the ideology of the Lega Nord is the return 
to federalist ideas. The birth of the federalist pillar of the Lega dates back to 
the meeting of the present leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, with the 
leader of the Valdotaine Union, Bruno Salvador! in 1980. Salvador!, having 
seen Bossi's interest in federalist thought, proposed the publishing of a small 
newspaper to him, Nord-Ovest (North-West), for diffusing in Lombardia the 
idea of autonomy. The same year, Bruno Salvador! died in a traffic accident 
and left the floor to Bossi for the birth of a new political organization, the L·ga 
Lombarda. Bossi, in his autobiography explains the ideology of the party in 
those years as follows:
It was an intense and fascinating period of organizational work 
and cultural search. My effort, which I think, in the final 
analysis was successful, was to popularize the federalism thesis, 
an ideology that was rather refined but distant from the 
sensibility of the masses. For years the masses had been 
indoctrinated with the Marxist and Crocean ideologies. I was 
making up slogans such as 'Rome, the robber', 'Enough for the 
colonial school', 'Lombardia, the goose that lays the golden 
egg', 'No to the Southerners' excessive power'. We decided to 
spread anti-Southern feelings in Lombardia, and in other 
Northern regions, and, thus, attract the attention of the wider 
public and mass media.^ ®
He goes on:
We were suggesting more autonomy in Lombardia and other 
regions of Italy, the birth of a new federal state, the revision of 
the central fiscal system, the defense of the traditions and the
58 Umberto Bossi and Daniele Vimercati, Vento del Nord La mia Lega [North 
Wind. My League My Life], (Milano: Sperling and Kupfer Editor!, 1992), 42.
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local cultures, the protection of the small industry and 
agriculture that created the richness of the region, the 
dismantling of the privileges to the Southerners in the public 
examinations in obtaining posts, accommodations, assistance 
and financial contributions.^^
According to Anna Bull, federalism of the Lega Nord, as put forward in the 
party's 1992 electoral program appears to have been crudely inspired by 
Bagnasco's 'three Italies' thesis. The Lega Nord advocated the creation of a 
Federal State made up of three macro-regions or Republics each considered 
as a homogenous unit from the socio-economic point of view.
The setting up of the three macro-regions or at least the Northern one was to 
be achieved in accordance with the existing legal and constitutional rules and 
procedures. Article 132 of the Italian Constitution stipulates that it is 
legitimate to provide for the fusion of existing Regions by Constitutional 
Law, on the condition that this is proposed by a number of Municipal 
Councils representing at least a third of the interested population, and that 
the proposal is approved in a referendum by a majority of the same 
population.
The crux of the ideology lay in the refutation of the Risorgimento values. 
Bossi explains this as follows: "We put the blame on the founding fathers of
59 Ibid., 43.
“ Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 76.
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the Risorgimento, from Mazzini to Cavour...We brought into the center of the 
debate the ideas of Cattaneo and Ferrari, as well as Jefferson, Hamilton and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who admired the ancient Greek poUs and defended 
the thesis that 'the true democracy can be achieved only in relatively small 
communities/"^  ^ According to Bossi, the unitary state formed by the 
Risorgimento was imposed from above and had never succeeded in erasing 
the etno-cultures that divide Italy. The only remedy to the problems of the 
"res publica" was to be solved by adopting the formula of "integral 
federalism" (federalismo integrale). As Bull has argued Lega Nord's federalism 
can be defined as "instrumental in descent" despite the Lega's claim that they 
are Cattaneo's natural heirs. Donzelli had pointed out that the federalist 
current of thought that can be traced back to the Italian Risorgimento 
tradition can be defined as "instrumental in ascent", i.e. federalism which 
identifies strong ethnic, linguistic, social and cultural differences within a 
territory seen as capable of achieving national unity. The federal system is 
seen in this context as a system, an instrument to bring about the 
harmonization and real unification of a state's regional components.
2. Anti-Southem Stance
Another important pillar of the ideology of Lega Nord has been its anti- 
Southernism. The emergence of Lega Nord is a symptom of growing
Bossi and Vimercati, Vento del nord, 43.
62 Donzelli cited in Bull, "Regionalism in Italy,", 75.
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resentment in the richer Northern regions regarding the corruption and 
inefficiency of the state. The immense sums of money pumped into the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno, for instance, was seen as totally counter-productive, since 
they seriously distorted and restricted economic growth. All that happened in 
effect was that potential investment capital was channeled away from the 
North. Thus by propping up established clientele networks, including the 
mafia, state funds were seen as essentially perpetuating the status quo.*’^
It was further asserted by the Lega that Rome thinks of Lombardy as a 'milch 
cow'. In the manifesto it states: "Lombardy is not an idiot who will pay other 
people's debts. Lombardy is not going to follow Rome passively into 
bankruptcy because it has no intention of sacrificing the rights of its citizens, 
the sweat of his sons, the diligence of its people and the personality of its 
people on the altar of Roman misgovernment."^ In the eyes of the Lega 
Nord, the "Southernization" of the Italian state as evidenced by the
«3 Haddock, The Crisis of the Italian State," 116; Woods, "The Crisis of the 
Center-Periphery Integration," 198. The first split within the party, marked 
by the expulsion of the movements second in command. Franco Castellazzi 
was also a good indicator of how serious Lega considered the corrupt 
practices of the parties of the old order. The conflict between Bossi and 
Castellazzi was more than a personality clash or a power struggle. Castellazzi 
represented the factions within the movement that wanted to adopt a more 
conciliatory position towards the Christian Democrats. In cities where the 
League had done well electorally but did not receive enough votes to form a 
government, Castellazzi wanted to enter into alliances with the Christian 
Democrats or the Socialist Party. However, Bossi disagreed on the ground 
that governing alliances would expose the movement into cooptation and 
corruption by the traditional parties.
« Vimefcati, / Lombardi alia ntiova crodata, 148-150.
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emergence of a widespread corrupt and clientelistic system of government is 
a clear sign that the process of national integration, far from promoting 
homogenization of the country around 'Northern' laws, practices, institutions 
and economy, has succeeded only in imposing the South's deviant practices 
upon the whole of the country.^^
The appeal to Europe is also emphasized in relation to Lega Nord's anti- 
Southern stance. According to Lega, Northern Italy is already a fully 
European country and is ready to meet the requirements of European 
integration. Thus it will not tolerate the thought of missing the 'European 
Train' because of the inefficiency and backwardness of the Center-South. 
Indeed, this is the main argument for the "secession" hypothesis.^^
The anti-Southern stance has best been revealed in Bossi's words:
What is the meaning of having frontiers between Piedmont and 
Savoie, or South Tyrol and Austria? Their ethnicity is 
substantially identical, from a naturalistic point of view. From a 
socio-cultural point of view, ...nothing unites Trentino and 
Lombardy with Calabria and Campania. Therefore, I say: why 
not replace the fixed frontiers and the centralism by a plurality 
of institutional centers each with specific and limited 
responsibilities? Why not eliminate, in other words, the rigid 
frontiers between very similar realities, as for example 
Lombardy and Baviera, while introducing separate decision­
making centers each with real autonomy, in different realities 
which were arbitrarily unified, such as the North and South of 
Italy?"67
65 Bull, "Regionalism in Italy," 75.
66 Zdravko Mlinar ed.. Globalization and Territorial Identities (Brookfield, Vt, 
U.S.A.: Avebury, 1992), 51.
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After the victory in the 1992 elections, Bossi stated that the North had chosen 
federalism and Europe and the South had chosen Africa and Fascism.^ ®
Criticisms and Fragmention within the Lega Nord
The radical change in Lega's ideology after the 1996 elections, marked by the 
emphasis on "secession" and "independence" made the Northern Question 
central to political debate. The state could no longer ignore the uneasiness in 
the North revealed by the continuing rise of the Lega Nord. Criticisms were 
intense. The Church, the media, the government and the opposition leaders 
stated that the unity and integrity of Italy is a sine qua non condition, thus they 
discarded the possibility of independence of the North. The Pope made a 
declaration upon Lega's previous proposal of creating a Northern Church®^  
and declared that "the unity of the Italian state was indispensable", that "the 
cultural and ecclesiastical (patrimonial) unity of Italy is much older than its 
political unity", and that "the local autonomies should be given credit".
This view was further strengthened in the book published by Diócesi of 
Milano, which argued that the remedy to the present crisis of Italy would be
Bossi andVimercati, Vento dal Nord, 161-162. (with the translation of Anna 
Bull).
La Repubblica, April 7,1992.
This proposal was made by the Torinese deputy of Lega Nord, Mario 
Borghezio who stated that "they, the Northerners, want a separate Church in 
the North. This Church would not be church of 'God of Money', but a Church 
of Religion." Corriere della Sera, November 26,1995.
™ Corriere della Sera, May 7,1996; Corriere della Sera, May 10, 1996.
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strengthening the regional autonomies and thus creating a "solidary 
federalism" 7 1
Even the United States declared its support for the "integrity and 
indivisibility" of the Italian state based on the premise that a secessionist 
movement in that specific geography of Europe would upset the strategic and 
political balances that the NATO and the European Union has been trying to 
maintain. Clinton further stated that Italy was regarded as a bridge to the 
Balkans and the Middle East and it can perform this role as long as it has 
domestic integrity and stability7^
These criticisms towards the "secessionist" rhetoric of the Lega Nord were 
also accompanied by polarization and split within the party. The "reformists 
and federalists" formed the moderate pole, the "secessionists and the 
militants" formed the extremists, and "marginalized" were the territorial 
units, such as Veneto.
The first split in the party was the dismissal of Irene Pivetti. She said that she 
had left the party because the racist and independist rhetoric adopted by the 
party disturbed her. She further argued that the independence of the north 
was not compatible with the ideas of federalism, which the Lega was
Commissione Diocesana "Giustizia e Pace" ["Justice and Peace"], Diócesi di 
Milano, Autonomie Regionali e Federalismo Solidóle [Regional Autonomy and 
Solidary Federalism], (Milano: Centro Ambrosiano, 1996).
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cherishing before. In tíme, another split occurred. The very ideologue of the 
Lega Nord, Professor Gianfranco Miglio, resigned and set up an alternative 
movement which claimed to protect the true aims of the League movement 
that had been betrayed by Bossi, Maroni and Formentini.^  ^ He basically put 
the blame on the character of Bossi. He has argued that Bossi was always a 
liar.75 He claimed that from the cultural point of view, the level of Bossi is 
close to zero. He further stated: "I never managed to understand what he had 
studied. In his autobiography he talked about having read Pareto, Weber, 
Adorno, Marcuse, Cattaneo, Gioberti, Hamilton, and the like. But in many of 
the conversations that I had with him, I never saw even a hint about the ideas 
of these intellectuals."^^ Another defect in Bossi's personality, Miglio argued, 
was his jealousy for the other people in the party organization. That is why he 
blocked the entrance of many qualified people to the party. Miglio also stated 
in his memoirs that he was very disappointed by the fact that the federalist 
proposal was never put into action after the votes of the Lega started to 
increase.
Corriere della Sera, June 13, 1996.
73 Corriere della Sera, November 26,1995.
Farrell and Levy, "The Northern League,",144.
75 Gianfranco Miglio, lo, Bossi e La l^ga. Diario Segreto dei Miei Quattro Anni sul 
Carrocio [Bossi, The League and I. The Secret Diary of my Four Years on the 
Bandwagon], (Milano: Amoldo Mondadori Editöre, 1994), 37.
76 Ibid., 38.
264
other Federalist Proposals
Gianfranco M iglio's Federalism
Gianfranco Miglio is an important name in the federalist debate that has been 
taking place in Italy. For the last thirty years Miglio has been theorizing about 
the necessity of a federal Italy. The originality of the Miglio proposal is that it 
is the only proposal that combines the political culture and "juridical (or 
constitutional) engineering".^ Miglio referred to the Italian nation as a 'myth' 
constructed by a particular elite in order to press their own advantage and 
interest .Far  from the state in 1861 reflecting the Italian nation, Miglio 
argued that the Piedmontese propagandists effectively fabricated the idea of 
the nation as a means of legitimizing the dominant dynasty.7^
The bottomline of Miglio's thesis is that there are two diverse political 
cultures in Italy--the Northern/European and the Southern/Mediterranean. 
The former is characterized by activism, the latter by indolence. The former 
subscribes to pluralism and the market, the latter is interested in seizure of 
power. The cohabitation of these two different cultures can not be free from 
tensions. The only way of assuring an efficient cohabitation is through a
^ See Gianfranco Pasquino, Lo Stato Federáis [The Federal State], (Milano; II 
Saggiatore, 1996), 78.
78 Gianfranco Miglio, "Le Leghe Regionali: D mito della nazione," ["The 
Regional Leagues: The myth of nations."] in his II nerbo e le briglie del f olere 
[The whip and reins of power], (Milan: Edizioni del Sole 24 Ore, 1988), 303.
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federal system where diverse political cultures are not in intense competition 
with each other.Miglio sees the 'right of secession' as a 'natural right' 
essential for the preservation of cultural diversity,«^
The federalist proposal of Miglio is implicitly based on the assumption that 
the Northern culture is superior to the Southern one. He argues that a strong 
and reliable center is necessary to govern. In the absence of such a strong 
center, the center cannot cope with the centrifugal tendencies of the periphery 
and in this case the outcome is the secession of the North. Thus it is up to the 
South to speak out and take on the challenge. The solution suggested by 
Miglio, is a referendum about the formation of macroregions: the Canton of 
Padania in the north consisting of Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia- 
Romagna, the Canton of Tuschia in the Center composed of Toscana, Marche, 
Umbris, Abruzzi, Molise, Lazio, and the Canton of the Mediterranean in the 
South composed of Campania, Calabria, Basilicata, Puglia. In addition there 
will be the five special-statute regions mentioned above. The governments of 
these regions will be elected by the people.
7’ Ibid., cited in Haddock, "The Crisis of the Italian state," 116.
8“ Gianfranco Miglio, Come Cambiare. Le Mié Rifarme [How to Change. My 
Reforms], (Milano: Mondadori, 1992).
81 Miglio's preface to Gianfranco Morra, Breve storia del pensiero federalista [A 
Short History of the Federalist Thought], (Milan: Amoldo Mondadori, 1993), 
5-6, cited in Haddock, "The Crisis of the Italian State," 117.
82 Gianfranco Miglio, "Towards a Federal Italy," Te/os, 90, Winter 1991-1992. 
On the federalist scheme, see also Marcello Staglieno ed., Una Costituzione per
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Giovanni Agitelli Foundation's "Twelve-Region" P roposal 
Another scheme for federalism has been suggested by the Giovanni Agnelli 
Foundation, that proposes a consolidation into twelve large regions, instead 
of the present twenty.»3 This scheme, in fact, was made in 1864, by Pietro 
Maestri, even before the unification of the Italian state was achieved. The 
scheme envisages the merger of regions with similar characteristics. They are 
large enough to accept a balanced relationship between them and the State, 
but they are not large to encourage any secessionist tendencies. These regions 
would be able to compete with the regions of the other European states and 
would acquire financial autonomy.*^
In this scheme of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, some regions would 
remain as they were such as Lombardia, Emilia-Romagna, Sicilia, Calabria 
and Sardegna. Whereas some other regions and also some large provinces 
would merge to form a macro region. These regions were grouped as 
follows: (Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Trentino-Alto-Adige), (Valle d'Aosta, 
Piemonte, Liguria), (Marche, Abruzzo, Molise), (Toscana, Umbria- the
prossima trent'anni: Intervista sulla terza repubblica [A Constitution for the next 
thirty years: Intervievs on the third republic], (Roma: Laterza, 1990).
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See the map of twelve regions in Appendices S and T.
Giuseppe Balistrieri, "Federalismo o regionalismo? [Federalism or 
regionalism?]. In Paul Ginsborg, ed., Stato dell'Italia [The Italian State], 
(Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 1994), 221.
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province of Perugia), (Lazio, Umbria, Province of Terni), (Campagna, 
Basilicata, Province of Potenza), (Puglia, Basilicata, Province of Matera).®^
An Assessment of Neo-Regionalism in Italy in the 1990s
Despite all the ups and downs in Lega's votes and oscillations in its ideology 
from autonomy to federalism and from federalism to secession, the 
phenomenon of the Lega Nord is the most crucial factor in understanding the 
present crisis of neo-regionalism that reflamed the fragmentation between the 
North and South of Italy. The anti-Southern rhetoric, that was referred to as 
"neo-Orientalism"®® was revived and brought into the political agenda by the 
Lega Nord.
The importance of the Lega Nord stems from the fact that it established a new 
basis of communication with the society attributing a lot of importance to 
individual leadership with new organizational models and new 
communications, transforming the dominant values or changing them into 
new forms.®  ^Besides, the Lega Nord from 1980-1993 constitutes the principal 
factor of rupture and the innovation in the Italian political system. It has
Pacini, Marco, ed., Un Federalismo dei Valori. Percorsi e conclusioni di iin 
programına della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli 1992-1996 [A Federalism with 
values. Directions and conclusions of the program of Giovanni Agnelli 
Foundation], (Torino: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1996), 171.
86 Jane Schneider, ed., Italy's "Southern Question". Orientalism in One Country 
(Oxford and New York: Berg, 1998).
»7 Diamanti, La I^ga. xi.
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accelerated change in the process between the voters and parties, offering 
representation to the social and territorial sectors whose economic weight has 
increased more than the political weight and became a channel from which 
the demands for party changes and the traditional institutional changes 
spread out. Thus with the emergence of the phenomenon of Lega Nord, the 
Italian political system has passed to a stage of instability,^®
The sudden rise in the votes of the Lega Nord alarmed even the armed forces. 
Representatives of the armed forces proclaimed the goal stated as 
'independence of the North from the rest of the country through secession' 
unconstitutional and indicated that they might intervene if the members of 
the party were awarded delicate political positions in the aftermath of the 
elections. This aspect of Lega's rise caused rumors of a coup in conjunction 
with the 1994 elections and contributed to the resignation of the army chief of 
staff in October 1993.®^
Most recently, in the beginning of 1998, the public prosecutor of Verona, 
Guido Papalia claimed that the leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi 
should be tried for attacking the integrity of the State, destroying the national 
sentiment, and forming military associations with a political scope. It was
«»Ibid., viii, vii,
89 Di Scala, Italy: From Revolution to Republic, 332.
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also uncovered that Bossi's telephones were tapped.^° This reveals the fact 
that the state no longer ignores the threat of "secession"; that can not be 
tolerated.
In this respect, the "Europe of Regions" scheme seems to be creaHng further 
tensions between the richer regions of Northern Italy that look more to 
Europe than the Southern regions that were perceived to drag down the 
efficiency of the North. This incompatible duality of Italy, according to the 
Northerners is what keeps Italy weaker politically and economically in the 
European Union. Thus, within the new framework of supranational 
integration that is introduced by the European Union, the failed task of 
"making Italians" reveals itself even more strikingly. Even though the Lega 
Nord may not be regarded as representing the entire population of Northern 
Italy, it can not be denied that it has an important weight in Italian politics 
that should be taken seriously. So far, the Lega has not been able to present its 
cause as successfully as its partners in Spain or England, however, if the 
present crisis in the Italian state is prolonged, it will gain further weight in 
the national, supranational and international political arena.
90 La Repubblica, January 30,1998; La Stampa, February 18,1998.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
This study has been an attempt to contribute to the theories on national 
integration and fragmentation, by analyzing the past and present causes of 
the recent rise of regionalism in Italy. The rise of neo-regionalism in Italy in 
the 1990s, marked by the wide-spread debate that has been brought into the 
political agenda by the establishment of a regionally-based party for the first 
time led scholars to question the success of Risorgimento (the process 
through which the present Italian state was founded.) For the first time since 
the Risorgimento, norms upon which it has been based started to be 
questioned and in the process the national integrity of the country was put at 
stake.
The reason behind the rise of a debate that put the national integrity of the 
country at stake was the argument by the regionally-based party in northern 
Italy, the Lega Nord, that the present state system in Italy has collapsed and it 
has to be replaced with a federal-type of state in which Italy would be 
divided into three macro-regions-the North, the Center and the South. In this 
macro-regional scheme, the North of Italy would secede and establish a 
separate, independent state. Even though the Lega Nord was the most
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prominent actor in this debate about the form of the state, it was not only the 
Lega who came up with this idea about federalism. Many sectors of the 
Italian society, too, started questioning the wisdom of the centralized state 
"imposed" from above in 1870. Among these sectors was even the highly 
respectable and influential Giovanni Agnelli Foundation that also stated that 
there was a need to reshape the Italian state by dividing it into twelve regions 
instead of the present twenty regions.
It is often assumed that the highly centralized Roman Empire and the highly 
decentralized city-states or communes had been the premises upon which 
present-day Italy has been founded. However, despite the existence of the 
Roman Empire, Italy had never been under an absolutist or centralized rule. 
There have always existed many different cultures and ethnic groups in Italy 
and it has always been hard to define who constitutes an Italian. Likewise, 
the strong affiliations to the city-states, such as Venice, Florence, Genoa and 
the like acted as a great obstacle for the creation of a sense of national 
identity. Moreover, the allegiances to these city-states and to even smaller 
localities persisted throughout all of Italy's history, making national 
identification problematic.
The Renaissance contributed to the promotion of a cultural unity in Italy 
through the attempts at creating an Italian language. However, because of the 
internal pressures and the external intervention in internal affairs the
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Renaissance did not last long. The decline of the Renaissance led Italy to lose 
whatever cultural, economic and political unity was achieved during that 
period and, as a result, the peninsula was fragmented to hundreds of small 
principalities, dukedoms and the like. The lack of unifying capabilities on the 
part of these small political entities once more strengthened local allegiances 
that had continued to exist. From then on the "Italian national identity" faded 
even more and became something difficult to define. The conception of Italy 
was no longer shared or collective; in particular the long historical rift 
between the North and the South of the country became even more evident 
after the Renaissance.
The French revolution and the subsequent occupation of some parts of the 
Italian peninsula by Napoleon marked the most important turning point in 
Italian history. For the first time, there emerged in Italy a "nationalist" fervor. 
This fervor carried to Italy the notion of "one nation, one state", that was 
nonexistent until then in that country. At the same time, the occupation far 
exceeded its intended aim and raised an anti-French, anti-revolutionary 
sentiment, that carried "nationalist" undertones as well.
The most important legacy that the Napoleonic regime left in Italy had been 
the acclaimed need for the "unification" of the peninsula around Italian 
nationhood. That was regarded as the sole remedy to the vulnerability of the 
country to foreign attacks. However, it was no easy task for the founders of
273
the state because of the mosaic-like structure of the peninsula. It was the little 
state of Piedmont under French influence that first took up the task of 
unification. The question of the "Italian nation" became central again with the 
Risorgimento, which marked the beginning of the unification process that 
culminated in the birth of the Italian state in 1870. With Risorgimento 
(Resurrection), the old, centralized, Roman state was aimed to be resurrected.
The Piedmontese aim was to unify the different states, principalities, cities 
and communes under the banner of a unitary Italian state, as did France. The 
main philosophical figure behind this view was Giuseppe Mazzini. However, 
a unitary state was not regarded as the best type of state by some other 
philosophers and ideologues. One such example was Carlo Cattaneo. The 
proponents of federalism argued that a unitary state would not last long since 
it would be difficult to maintain the unity of different localities and to divert 
allegiances of the people from their localities to the central, unitary state. 
However, the federalists were weak so the Piedmontese initiative prevailed. 
As a result. Unification came about as a result of the Piedmontese initiative 
which prevailed over the federalist proposals of various other thinkers and 
philosophers.
The creation of Italy was not free from problems. The two major issues at 
stake were the "Roman Question", and the "Southern Question". The Roman 
question was the problem of integration of the territories of the Papal States
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that opposed the unification of the peninsula under the leadership of 
Piedmonte. The "Southern Question", likewise, had to do with the 
problematic nature of the integration of the Southern territories of Italy, 
including Sicily and the island of Sardinia, with the rest of the country. Both 
questions seemed to be solved primarily by force of arms and partially by 
diplomacy in 1870, a fact that further undermined the legitimacy of the 
newl) -founded state of the Piedmontese.
Thus the Risorgimento, in fact, marked another important turning point in 
Italian history regarding the failure of national integration. The task of 
"making Italians" was even harder than "making Italy" since the Italian state 
lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the newly-integrated parts of the new state. 
The nationalist policies to prop up a weak nation were unable to create a 
"civic and democratic integration". The high level of illiteracy and the 
persistence of the local dialects, and allegiances to local entities and the low 
level of communications between different regions of the country could not 
be overcome by policies of the newly-founded Italian state.
The newly-founded Italian state applied a method of trasfonnismo 
(transformation) through which it aimed to co-opt the inhabitants of the 
newly-aimexed territories and gain legitimacy in their eyes. It was also 
regarded as a method for national integration. However, this co-optation 
process remained very elitist since the alliance between the northern
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industrialists and the southern landowners, called blocco storico (historical 
blockade), impeded the penetration of state policies to the grassroots. As a 
result, it was considered as a revolution manquee [incomplete revolution] since 
the pre-First World War liberal class failed to "make Italians". The center and 
periphery gap as explained in various models of Stein and Rokkan could not 
be overcome. The state remained alien and distanced from the masses and, as 
noted, it lacked legitimacy in their eyes.
The ideal of creating the Italian nation, however, did not fade away with the 
failure of the liberal class that ruled Italy after Risorgimento. The lack of 
legitimacy of the liberal ruling class, increasing social unrest together with 
such frustrations in the international arena especially after the First World 
War created an appropriate atmosphere for the fascists who used nationalism 
as a tool of propaganda against the liberal class. Although the shared 
experience of war created a sense of national identity, it nevertheless, was 
not able by itself to "make Italians". The ultimate goal of the fascist regime 
that came to power in the aftermath of the war was that of creating the 
"Italian man" as well as the Homo Fascistus.
The National Fascist Party, Partita Nazionale Fascista (PNF), failed in its project 
to "nationalize" the Italians, because rather than attempting to construct a 
new national identity, it limited itself to mobilizing a variety of sectors 
behind the symbols of fascism. Through public rituals, commemorations.
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public events and through offering everyone a status in society, fascism 
sought to incorporate the alienated sectors of the society into the state 
apparatus, thus closing the gap between the center and periphery. However, 
the exclusion of middle classes and ethnic minorities culminated in the 
decline of popularity of fascism in the eyes of the people. The decreasing 
legitimacy of the fascist regime together with the military defeat and 
destruction of the Second World War left Italy without Italians again. As a 
result, the task of "making Italians" was not accomplished by the fascists 
either.
The aftermath of the Second World War and the Resistance Movement 
against the fascist regime and Nazi presence reflamed the already existing 
ashes of the division of Italy. The North started to blame the South of not in 
engaging in the Resistance Movement, whereas the Southerners still felt 
alienated from the regime and the state.
The cultural, economic and social gap between the North and South of Italy 
became a serious concern in the aftermath of the Second World War when 
reconstruction began. Against the fascist background, the 1948 Constitution 
envisaged the devolution of powers from the center to the periphery; twenty 
regions were created, four of which had special status and powers. This 
decentralization was regarded as a means of trying to increase the legitimacy 
of the state in the eyes of the people as well as promoting the participation of
277
the citizens in political life through the regional institutions. However, the 
regional clause in the 1948 Constitution was put into effect only in the 1970s, 
after the eruption of social unrest in such peripheral ethnic regions as South 
Tyrol. It was assumed that the creation of the regional tiers of government, 
referred also as the meso-level, following the creation of similar institutions 
in some other European countries would to some extent ameliorate the 
unrest. However, setting up of regional governments, let alone increasing the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the people, further increased the tension 
by indirectly increasing the gap between the North and the South.
For in the South, the regional governments did not function effectively. On 
the contrary, they provided an institutional basis for corruption and 
clientelism, that was a common phenomena in the South due to the lack of a 
civic consciousness and commune mentality as it was revealed by Robert 
Putnam. Thus the state-allocated funds were channeled to improper 
destinations and little development took place. Whereas in the North, due to 
the historically inherited commune mentality, the performance of regional 
governments were far more successful. Thus state funds were utilized 
efficiently and the cultural, social and economic gap between the North and 
the South increased in real terms.
Another important factor that further exacerbated the North-South difference 
was the entry of Italy into the European Community. The underdeveloped
278
Mezzogiorno immediately became a major problem for the European 
Community since it was the least developed of all the regions in the 
Community. The Community allocated some funds as part of its regional 
policy framework for the development of the Mezzogiorno. However, these 
funds too were wasted to a great extent. In addition, European integration 
provided ground for the legitimacy of claims from the economically- 
developed Northern regions of Italy. The Northerners perceived themselves 
much closer to Europe than to Southern Italy, which further undermined 
efforts of national integration in Italy. Thus the European Community, while 
acting primarily with economic considerations indirectly led to increase the 
gap between the North and South.
The post-Second World War period also witnessed the institutionalization of 
clientelistic politics especially in the South and subsequent corruption 
scandals. The Christian Democrat party (DC) which came to power in the 
aftermath of the war, governed the country for a long period and was 
especially strong in the Southern parts of the country. However, the party 
basically functioned through patron-client relationships and in time, the 
South became the hotbed of the Mafia and corruption.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Italy went through a major transformation 
as a result of some international and domestic stimuli. Thanks to the judges' 
efforts, many corruption scandals that had been going on during the Cold
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War years were uncovered. As a result of long investigations and arrests, it 
was found out that the political parties, but mostly the DC has been involved 
in the corruption, called TangentopoH, including even the President of the 
Republic, Giulio Andreotti. This was a major shock to the voters, especially 
in the North, who meanwhile distanced themselves from the traditional 
parties, DC and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI lost votes also 
because communism had collapsed in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc 
had been dismantled. The electoral reforms, the pressures inserted towards 
more decentralization were other stimuli behind the political transformation 
in question, particularly in the North culminated in the emergence of the 
Leagues under the leadership of the Lega Nord.
The Leagues, the most important of which has been the Northern League, 
(Lega Nord), brought into the political agenda the old North-South conflict in 
a different manner. The party, led by Umberto Bossi, has argued that the 
Italian state could no longer function effectively because it is governed by a 
Southern mentality. The party questioned the Risorgimento, that is the 
unification and integrity of the country and advocated the view that Italy 
should no longer exist as a unitary country. The country should be divided 
into three macro-regions, according to cultural and economic lines, the North, 
the Center and the South. The party went even further and declared an 
independent Republic of Padania in the North. However, due to some tactical
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mistakes the party lost its ideologue, Gianfranco Miglio and some of its 
support.
This study has also tried to show that the rise of the L·ga Nord has been a 
very important case which runs contrary to national fragmentation theories. 
For instance, the well-known "internal colonialism" model of Michael 
Hechter could not explain the emerging fragmentary movement in the 
northern part of Italy, which is economically more developed than the 
southern part. Likewise, according to Ted Gurr's "relative deprivation 
theory", it should have been the South, the economically more backward part 
of Italy which should demand autonomy and secession. However, the case is 
the opposite. Thus both theories fail to explain the rise of neo-regionalism in 
Italy in the 1990s.
Even though the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy was regarded as a new 
phenomenon stemming from the rise of globalism, or from the crisis of the 
state, in the present study it is argued that the rise of the federalist debate in 
Italy was not a new phenomenon and was not related solely to globalism and 
the crisis of the Italian state. Thus even though the theories on globalism and 
crisis of state which try to explain the fragmentary movements are useful in 
explaining the Italian case, they are not sufficient. Instead, it has been argued 
that the neo-regionalism in Italy had long historical roots and that the 
historical roots of regionalism are vitally important for understanding the
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present rise of neo-regionalism in Italy. It is for this reason that this study has 
focused mainly on the historical heritage of the Italian state before Unification 
was achieved and in this respect tried to shed light upon the peculiar features 
of Italy that had an important impact upon the rise of regionalism in Italy.
The second task of the present study has been that of explaining how the 
Italian state tried to deal with this historical heritage in its efforts to "make 
Italy" as well as "making Italians". To this end, the study looked at state­
building and nation-building processes in Italy since they are regarded as the 
two crucial phases of national integration. To do this, three historically- 
important time periods were chosen in Italian political development, namely 
the Risorgimento, the Fascist interlude and the Republican period. The 
success or the failure of the policies pursued in these periods were vitally 
important in the course of the national integration process. All along, thus the 
major question posed was whether or not the Italian state succeeded in 
creating Italians as well as Italy.
The study concluded that so far the process of national integration was not 
fulfilled in Italy and "Italians are still not made." As Ronan Paddison argues, 
the existence of a regionally-based party demanding secession, has proven 
that political integration has failed. The failure of economic integration is best 
revealed by the ongoing gap between the North and South part of the Italy, 
which brought the country to the brink of fragmentation. This gap might get
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even wider with inefficient implementation of the regional funds of the 
European Union in the South on the one hand and the increasing integration 
of the North with Europe as a result of the rapid process of globalization The 
failure of cultural integration is revealed by the anti-Southern sentiments 
among people in the North and their "orientalist" look towards the Southern 
culture and people and the prevalent secessionist, neo-regionalist and 
federalist schemes that aim to find a solution to this "unsatisfactory 
cohabitation" of the Northerners and Southerners in the same country.
As a result, the study concludes that the rise of neo-regionalism in Italy in the 
1990s can not be explained solely by the old and more recent theories on 
regionalism. Even though these theories contribute to our understanding of 
the Italian case, they, nevertheless, fall short of providing a historical 
background to the present problem of regionalism. With the aim of providing 
this lack in historical analysis through explaining the critical junctures in 
Italian political history, the present study tried to fill this gap in the old and 
more recent theories on regionalism. It is concluded that the rise of neo­
regionalism in Italy was a consequence of the failed attempt of "making 
Italians". In other words, Italy is made, but there is still time to "make 
Italians".
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Appendix A : Lega Nord's Proposal of Federalism in Italy
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Source: Giovanni Agnelli Foundation
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Appendix B : A Two Way division of Italy
Source : David Forgacs and Robert Lumly ed. Italian Cultural Studies 
an introduction (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996, p .ll6.)
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Certain so c ia l characteristics o f  sections o f Ita ly  P o r t ly  a fter n ationa l Unification
North-West North-East Tuscany East Central South
0\
Sicily Sardinia Italy
b e n s ity  o f p o p u la tio n ,
average number of 
persons per square 
mile .1871
280 315 231 191 218 228 68 234
S ize  o f  c o m m u n ity ,
average in square 
miles ,1871
7 8 33 19 18 31 26 14
H eading  a b ility ,
per cent of persons 
aged 6 and over able
-  , . > re a d ,1 f i7 1 ________
55 42 32 25 17 15 14 31
Hoiitical p re fe re n c e ,
per cent of vote for 
Right party , 1871
70 70 77 69 33 14 53 54
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Source : Lloyd Saville, Regional Economic Development in Italy 
Edinburgh University Press , 1968, p.l5.
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Appendix D : Regions of Italy
fntematibnal boundaiy 
Regional boundary 
Special statute regions 
1948 
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l^ ional capital
2001cm
Source : David Forgacs and Robert Lumly ed. Italian Cultural Studies
an introduction (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996, p.115.)
317
Appendix E : Italy, Productivity Levels, By Region
ITALY - PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS * , BY REGION
REGION PRODUCTIVITYLEVELS
Piemote 101
Valle d'Aosta
Lombardia 114
Trentino-Alto Adige 85
Veneto 94
Friull-Venezia Giulia 93
Liguria 114
Emilia Romagna 96
Toscana 95
Umbria 85
Marche 77
Lazio 98
Abruzzi 72
Molise 56
Campania 76
Puglia 72
Basilicata 61
Calabria 66
Sidiia 80
Sardegna 87
TOTAL ITALY 93
* Value added per employee, all sectors 1974 (EEC=100)
Source : SECTORAL PRODUCTIVITY AND REGIONAL POLICY ,CEC Document
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Appendix F : Italy - Distribution of RTD Factors by Region
ITALY - DISTRIBUTION OF RTD FACTORS BY REGION
GERD / B ER D / S + T EM PL RTD
REGION
GDP
(%)
1982
GVA
(%)
1982
GRADUATE
OUTPUT
PER
MILLION
POPULATION
1982
IN HIGH 
TECH. 
IN D U STR Y/ 
EMPL. IN ALL 
INDUSTRY  
1981 
(%)
POTENTIAL
INDEX
( Z )
Pi emote 1.93 1.94 409.67 18.98 1.79
Valle d'Aosta 0.43 0.45 - 6.04 -0.72
Lombardia 1.37 1.28 426.86 21.98 1.34
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.20 0.10 28.56 15.15 -0.57
Veneto 0.52 0.27 444.67 10.64 -0.04
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.60 0.42 213.06 13.71 -0.07
Liguria 1.21 0.96 489.18 18.72 1.04
Emilia Romagna 1.08 0.31 560.08 11.66 0.42
Toscana 0.78 0.45 539.16 8.03 0.18
Umbria 0.56 0.21 678.66 9.58 0.18
Marche 0.26 0.07 212.78 8.30 -0.64
Lazio 1.97 0.78 520.57 16.68 1.25
Abruzzi 0.35 0.20 286.78 16.06 -0.11
Molise 0.02 0.01 - 0.87 -1.36
Campania 0.75 0.31 495.10 10.51 0.14
Puglia 0.36 0.07 220.05 5.16 -0.72
Basilicata 0.61 0.22 - 8.82 -0.63
Calabria 0.21 0.01 180.53 2.69 -0.98
Sicilia 0.53 0.13 469.48 8.06 -0.19
Sardegna 0.48 0.07 292.31 11.08 -0.32
TOTAL ITALY 1.04 0.72 413.52 14.39
Source : U. del Canuto, IRI, Rome
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ITALY - DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT INTENSITY IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIES : MEZZOGIORNO AND REMAINDER OF ITALY
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Appendix H : Industrial Performance in the Italian Regions, 
1978-1985 and The Civic Community in 
the Italian Regions
InsiJtutjonal Perforniance in the Italian Regions, 1978-19S5
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Source : Robert Putnam et.al.. Making Democracy Work, 
Civic Traditions in Modem Italy.
Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton Univ. Press, 1993
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Northern and Southern Satisfaction with National, Regional and 
Local Government (1988)
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Appendix K : The " Three Italies " of Arnaldo Bagnasco
THE NORTHWEST
Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta 
Liguria, Lombardia,
THE CENTER I NORTHEAST
Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Alto Lazio, Marche, Toscana, 
TrentJno-Alto Adige, Umbria, Veneto
The 'three Italics*: a refinement of the 
ISTAT categories introduced by Amaldo Bagnasco 
in his influential Trcltalie (Bologna, 1977)
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Appendix L : The Symbol of the Lega Nord
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Appendix M : The Manifesto of the Lega Nord
Lombardi!
Non importa che etâ avete, che lavoro fate, di che tendenza politica 
siete: quello che importa - che siete - e che siamo tutti lombardi. Questo e il 
fatto realmente importante, ed e giunto il momento di ricordarlo dandogli una 
concretezza politica.
E come lombardi, infatti, che abbiamo tutti un fondamentale interesse 
comune di fronte al quale devono cadere in sottordine i motivi della nostra 
divisíone in partiti di ogni colore: partit! italiani che ci stnÿrnentalizzano e 
distolgono il nostro impegno dalla difesa dei nostri interessi per servire 
interessi altrui (e il loro, prima di tutto!).
Questo nostro fondamentale interesse comune e la liberazione della 
Lombardia dalla vorace e soffocante egemonia del governo centralista di 
Roma, attraverso I'autonomia lombarda nel piu vasto contesto dell' 
autonomía padano-alpina. E una questione di sopravivenza lombarda nemica, 
culturale, economica - che investe il senso di îesponsabilitâ morale, civile, 
politico, di tutti i lombardi, senza distinzioni di sorta.
E un'esigenza che il regime accentratore romano ha sempre cercato di farci 
dimenticare temendone iÿna nostra responsabile presa di coscienza, ma che 
ora - di fronte a una situazione nazionale in irrimediabile deterioramento - si 
propone come problema çoncreto che dobbiamo portare al piü presto alia 
ribalta della vita politica.
II governo accentratore di Roma - con la complicitá di tutti i partiti 
italiani (che sono contemporáneamente sostegno ed emanazione del regime 
centralista unitario) - chiacchiera di autonomie e di Europa, ma di fatto non 
vuole ne autentiche autonomie ne lo State Federate Europeo.
Abbiamo infatti un Parlamento Europeo fantasma perche create 
apposta senza poteri, e strutture regional! che non sono govern! autonomi, ma 
solíante doppioni amministrativi del governo centrale, único depositario di 
ogni potere: Ma non esiste effettiva autonomia senza il relativo potere politico. 
E oggi, la Lombardia non e piü dei lombardi, lá Padania non e piü della gente 
padana. E solíante un'espressione geogr~ca senza alcun valore politico, un 
territorio senza diritti di fronte all'invadenza altrui. D suo popote e una massa 
di gente priva di un'identitá politica, incorpórala anónimamente in uno State 
nazionale in fallimento che ci trascina nella sua crisi senza sbocco e senza 
speranza.
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Appendix N : The Caricature in Corriere Della Sera
I II belpaese e f/n iTo
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The leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi says to the President Scalfaro 
"The 'Beautiful Country' is finished . There is only Padanian Chese"
Corriere Della Sera
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Appendix O : The Caricature in Corriere Della Sera and La Repubblica
Source : La Repubblica, 14.9.1996
CECOSLOW^CCA PAZZA
(The crayz Czechoslovakia) 
Source : Corriere Della Sera, 6.5.1996
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Appendix P : The Fantasy Map
Source : David Forgacs and Robert Lumly ed. 
Italian Cultural Studies : an introduction 
(New York : Oxford University Press, 1996, p.l04)
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Appendix R ; The Fantasy Map
ATTENZIOKlEi!!
a)
u*. 30
( Attention ! You are entering the area where they kill children) 
Source : La Repubblica, 18.9.1990
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Appendix S The Financial Self - Sufficiency of the Regions 
According to Giovanni Agnelli Foundation
Source : Giovanni Agnelli Foundation
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Appendix T "Twelve Region" Proposal of the 
Giovanni Agnelli Foundation
Source : Giovanni Agnelli Foundation
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